

ผลกระทบของปัจจัยระหว่างประเทศและการเมืองภายในที่มีต่อกระบวนการประชาธิปไตยของรัฐ

The Impact of International Factors and Domestic Politics towards the Process of Democratization in the Post-Soviet States: An Approach from Regional Integration and Government System

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บทคัดย่อ

วัตถุประสงค์ของบทความนี้เพื่อรายงานการวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพที่ได้วิเคราะห์ผลกระทบของปัจจัยระหว่างประเทศ และการเมืองภายในที่มีต่อกระบวนการประชาธิปไตยของรัฐที่เกิดขึ้นหลังจากการล่มสลายของสหภาพโซเวียต หลังปี ค.ศ. 1990s จำนวน 15 ประเทศ รวมทั้งศึกษา ยุครุน เป็นกรณีศึกษา ผู้วิจัยใช้ทฤษฎีของ Whitehead และ Schmitter เป็นกรอบแนวคิดในการวิเคราะห์ และศึกษาความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองภายในประเทศ ทั้งปัจจัยภายใน และปัจจัยระหว่างประเทศ ผลการศึกษาพบว่า ประเทศที่รับเอาแนวคิดของสหภาพโซเวียตในการร่างนโยบายต่างประเทศ มีการพัฒนาอย่างมั่นคงในรูปของระบบรัฐสภาและคณะกรรมการตุรี หรือระบบกึ่งประธานาธิบดี กับนายกรัฐมนตรี ในทางกลับกัน พบว่าประเทศที่รับเอาแนวคิดของประเทศรัฐเซียมีการพัฒนาที่ไม่มั่นคงในรูปของระบบประธานาธิบดี หรือระบบกึ่งประธานาธิบดี กับรัฐสภา

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Abstract

Using the connection of the domestic and international politics in fifteen countries of the post-Soviet states, this study intends to adopt case-studies to stress the functions of “international-domestic factors” during the democratic transition process. It is discovered in this study : countries that have adopted the integration with the European Union as their foreign policies have presented stable development in the pattern of “parliamentary cabinet system” or “premier- presidential system.” On the contrary, post-Soviet states that have adopted the integration with Russia have presented unstable development in the pattern of “presidential system” or “presidential-parliamentary system.”

Keywords : democratization, European Union, semi-presidential system

Introduction

The post-Soviet states have undergone a rapid democratic reform after abandoning the communist restraints, not only at the political level but also at the economic one, which represented a dual-transition. That is to say, the democratic transition includes the establishment of the liberal democracy under the political system framework as well as a free-market economy in favor of the development of capitalism (Lewis, 1997, p. 390). In the Post-Cold War era, most of the post-Soviet states followed semi-presidential system or presidential system, except for Latvia and Estonia who had parliament system (Protsky, 2011, pp.98-116). During the process of democratization, part of the former Soviet Union countries had the intention to erase the stain of “sovietization” as to found the western-style democracy and a free market economic system (Riabov, 2014, pp. 34-35). Meanwhile, they have been gradually advancing into the integration of the European Union (EU) States. On the other hand, some other countries have also established presidential or semi-presidential system, yet their intention was to integrate with the Russian economy, such as Kazakhstan and other countries in Belarus and Central Asia (David, 2012, pp. 32-33) This research aims at the study of the interaction between the fifteen post-Soviet states and their linkage at the international level and the domestic level. The international factors that influence the democratization process of this region are mainly European Union and the United States, while the domestic factors are the governmental systems and the politicians (especially the president and the prime ministers). In addition, a further analysis is done for the

case of Ukraine hoping to prove the following two major hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The adoption of the foreign policy preferences of participating in the integration of the European Union at the international level and of following “parliamentary cabinet system” and “premier-presidential system” at the domestic political system would be likely in favor of a stable development of democracy.

Hypothesis 2: The adoption of the foreign policy preferences of participating in the Russian integration at the international level and of following “presidential system” or “president-parliamentary system” at the domestic level would contribute less to a stable development of democracy.

The Democratic Transition in the Post-Soviet States

Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia), the five countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) and the South Caucasus region (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) used to be part of the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—CCCP. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, each of the republics gained their independence through a series of transitions: from a variety of authoritarian systems into democratic institutions at the political level and from state-owned, monopolized and closed economies into market-based economy systems (Piatek, Szarzec & Pile, 2013, pp. 267-288). Both the political and economic transformations have an interdependent relationship.

The democratic development of the post-Soviet states is considered as part of the third democratization wave. Some of the democracies have already been intensified, whereas Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia located at Baltic Sea region have already reached into the stage of “democratic consolidation” and officially joined the European Union in 2004 (Tomini, 2014, pp.

859-861). However, other states at Central Asia and the outer Caucasus region, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, have suffered from delays of democratic processes. Still, the future development of the process of democratization is worth for a further exploration and research.

Among the original 15 countries of the European Union (EU), 14 countries of them have implemented “parliamentary cabinet system,” whereas France has followed the typical *"semi-presidential system."* During 1990s, the EU played a significant role at the promotion of political transition in Eastern Europe as countries of the latter had the willingness to join the EU. In June 1993, the EU established the four basic European Union Membership criteria at the European Council met in Copenhagen. Among them, the first one is the political criteria: the candidate state shall preserve a stable and pluralistic democracy, with at least independent political parties, regular elections, the rule of laws, respect to human rights and the protection of the minorities’ rights (Schneider, 2009, p. 16). As noted at the Copenhagen meeting, this political criteria is mainly set up for the Eastern European countries +

hoping to provide a guidance for the politicians and citizens in those countries during the period of political and economic transitions as well as to gradually gain their recognition of the values of freedom and democracy in Europe.

In the process of accession negotiations, the value of democracy has been passively proliferated. By approving the institutional constraints and following the EU's legal framework, the convergence of the

governmental institutions between the Eastern European states and the EU member states has intensified resulting in the process of “Europeanization” where all political figures would gradually accept the value of democracy (Sedelmeire, 2012, pp. 825-837). By determining the political standards, it was hoped that the political systems of the newly joined Eastern European countries would be in line with and in favor of the Western European countries. Both Estonia and Latvia implemented *"parliamentary cabinet system"* and agreed with the political systems of most of the Western European nations.

The so called “Europeanization” refers to the conscious convergence into the Western systems under the pressure of reaching the goals established by the EU after the candidate state chooses to join the EU (Sedelmeire, 2012, pp. 836-837). Owing to the geographical proximity as well as the cultural and historical similarities, Estonia and Latvia had greater willingness to be closer with Western Europe, which also meant a greater sense of affinity and familiarity with their political systems resulting in the adoption of their constitutional systems as well. In addition, after a long period of authoritarian ruling, the Baltic States were even more inclined into the *“parliamentary cabinet system”* rather than the *“presidential system”* since the latter would easily result into one-party dominance and personal dictatorship, for which these small countries were reluctant to expect. Apparently, the Western-style parliamentary cabinet system would be more in line with the demands of these countries (as shown on Table 1)

Table 1

Government Systems in Post-Soviet States

parliamentary cabinet system	semi-presidential system		presidential system
	premier-presidential system	president-parliamentary system	
Latvia 2.07 Estonia 1.96	Lithuania 2.36 Ukraine 4.93 Moldova 4.86 Armenia 5.36	Georgia 4.68 Azerbaijan 6.68 Belarus 6.71 Kyrgyzstan 5.89 Kazakhstan 6.61 Russia 6.29	Uzbekistan 6.93 Turkmenistan 6.93 Tajikistan 6.32

* The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The arrow next to the Democracy Score indicates an improvement or decline compared with the score from *Nations in Transit 2014*.

Sources: Robert Elgie, *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.28-29 ; Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2014 : Eurasia’s Rupture with Democracy,” *Freedom House’s Annual Survey Nations in Transit 2014 (NIT)*, (2014), pp. 22-24.

On the contrary, “semi-presidentialism” and “presidentialism” (please refer to Table 1) were opted by the countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus countries (Protsky, 2011, pp. 101-111). Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen, all post-Soviet states, have adopted the presidential system as they used to be “consolidated authoritarian regimes,” yet the [evaluation of their democracy](#) did not get a good appraisal from Freedom House. In these cases, the president has the absolute authority, while the political parties are relatively weaker in terms of their functions, which would not cause a strong competition with the central power.

Most of the post-Soviet states have elected “semi-presidential system.” According to Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, “semi-presidential system” can be classified as “premier presidentialism” and “president-parliamentarism.” (Shugart, & Carey, 1992). They differ in the power of the president and the objects for which the cabinet is in charge of. In terms of the former, the president in premier-presidentialism has relatively less power within the semi-presidential

system, while in the president-parliamentarism, the president has relatively greater power. In terms of the latter, the cabinet in premier-presidentialism shall be responsible only for the parliament rather than the president, while in president-parliamentarism, the cabinet shall be responsible for both the parliament and the president within the semi-presidential system.

The “premier-presidential system” allows the sharing of power, for which the system implementer can distribute the power in a balanced way; that is, the power is given to the representative of the majority party in the parliament – the premier. In contrast, the constitutional operation of “premier-presidential system” is generally smoother (See Elgie, 2007, 53-71). Specific data and empirical research are proposed by Robert Elgie indicating the conflicts in the constitutional operations that had occurred in the current “premier-presidential system;” this, in general, is more evident and severe than countries with “presidential-parliamentary system.” In addition, the democratic performance of countries following “presidential-parliamentary system” is not as good as

countries with “premier-presidential system.” When consensus cannot be reached between the president and the parliament in the states with “presidential-parliamentary system,” serious constitutional conflict and political deadlock may usually be triggered; it may even lead into a democratic collapse.

As pointed out by Samuels and Shugart, the president in a “presidential-parliamentary system” can handle more constitutional power than the one in “premier-presidential system;” thus, the political party under “presidential-parliamentary system” shall be highly inclined into presidentialisation. The key reason relied on the mechanism for direct presidential elections as they lead to the bi-polarization of the party system. For instance, the degree of party presidentialisation in France is relatively high (See Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 41). In other words, political parties have become the election machine of the president, so the prevalence of the latter over the party is shown in the majority of seats of the party which the president belongs to in the parliament; thus, “presidentialized party” occurs.

This phenomenon usually takes place in Central Asia and outer Caucasus region. Meanwhile, examples of consensus for which the government and the parliament can reach a consensus are Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, where the president and the party with the majority of seats in the parliament belong to the same political party. Also, where the advantage of the prevalence of the president over the party can be displayed on the majority of seats of the largest party in the parliament, the effective political values in the parliament are lower; this shows that the states are lack of strong opposition parties that can counterbalance the ruling party.

EU's Influence on Countries of the Former Soviet Region

The international factors of the democratization of the former Soviet states mainly come from the European Union. The eastward expansion of the European Union indicated the official formation of multilateral and bilateral cooperation

mechanisms between the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe with the former Soviet states. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is actually a diplomatic strategy of the European Union seeking to integrate countries at the east and at the south of the European Union with the EU². They were mainly developing countries, including those nations who were seeking to join the EU or to be economically closer with the EU.² As long as the conditions of the political, economic or other reformations in the neighboring countries comply with the EU rigorous criteria, the EU would then provide financial assistances. The whole process was supported by the “action plans” approved by both Brussels (the European Commission) and the target countries. The EU was committed to use the agreements in exchange for the promises of political, economic, trade and human right reforms in the neighboring countries. In this way, the latter would enjoy tariff treatment as well as financial and technical support within the EU market (industrial products, agricultural products, etc.)

As pointed out by the official website of European Neighborhood Policy, the main purpose of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU expansion in 2004 with neighboring countries as well as to prevent the formation of new boundaries between the enlarging EU and the neighboring countries. The vision of the ENP is to take further step in the integration with neighboring countries which might not necessarily be a member state of the EU. The contour of this policy has been outlined by the European Commission in March, 2003. The involving countries include Africa, the Mediterranean countries in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries of the region (excluding Russia and Kazakhstan.) Russia's reaction to the EU's ENP was the advocate of Common Economic Space instead of participating in the ENP.

In addition to ENP, Poland and Sweden have proposed the idea of “East Partnership” (EP) in the first half of 2008. It was approved by the EU summit in June of the same year, while the recommendations were formally introduced by the European Commission in December 2008. The heads of state or government from

the 27 nations of the EU and other six nations of the European and Asian countries signed the “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership” on May 8th, 2009, proclaiming the official beginning of the partnership.³ The plan of the “Eastern Partnership” (EaP) was initiated by the EU with the purpose to handle the relationship between the EU member states and the former Soviet states, which were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Such plan aimed to establish a negotiation of the commercial and economic strategies between the EU member states and the former Soviet states as well as the “Europeanization” at the political, economic and social levels in these countries as to increase the degree of integration into the EU. The promotion of the democratization process in the six countries followed as to ensure the stability, security and prosperity at the eastern boundary of the EU.

The EU hoped that through this plan, free trade area could be gradually be established in the six independent states - Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Belarus – as well as to increase its financial assistance, simplify the visa procedures into the EU, strengthen the cooperation in energy and security fields, etc. The plan of “Eastern Partnership” clearly included democratization into the EU’s policy agenda for the former Soviet states. Based on this foundation, the EU has progressively formed the political, economic, cultural trinity of democracy promotion policies. Parallel to the maintenance of the EU traditional market and the economic development, the democratization at the former Soviet states was assisted as to achieve the goal of security, development and prosperity. The main purpose of initiating the EaP plan was to carry out the “Europeanization” at the political, economic and social levels in these countries increasing the degree of integration into the EU. In this way, it would ensure the stability, security and prosperity of the eastern boundary of the EU.

The European Union had took a further step in terms of the political, safety, economic and cultural cooperation as to increase the possibility for eastern neighboring countries to participate in EU actions,

which would eventually guarantee and maintain the prosperity and safety of the EU. On June 27th, 2004, the EU signed the Association Agreement with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. This agreement has reduced trade barriers and promoted democratic reforms. According to Jose Manuel Barroso, the signing of the agreement signified the solemn promises that the EU made for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The EU would be alongside with these countries throughout the road towards stable and prosperous democratic nations.

Russia's Influence on Countries of the Former Soviet Region

Russia intended to maintain or re-establish tradition within the former Soviet region although it shares a common interest over the stability of the place with the EU. Nevertheless, it is discovered that zero-sum competitions have been arising during the last few years. As nations in the outer Caucasus and Central Asia had been republics allied with the Soviet Union during the cold war, they suffered from an industrial structure with poor economies. Even if they possessed the advantageous industries of raw materials, they were actually limited by the geographic transportation conditions. Not even nowadays can they occupy a significant share in the international market but just seeking regional economic cooperation. The best option to revive the economies in Central Asia and the outer Caucasus is to re-establish the economic ties with the former planned economic systems, which means to restore the economic and trade relationships with the current Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries as well as regional economic cooperation with Russia.

In September 2003, the heads of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which are nations with the largest size of economy among the Commonwealth of Independent States officially signed and established the Common Economic Space (CES).⁴ It basically transformed the system integration into the idea of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, capitals, services and persons). Other related regional

economic cooperation organizations in Central Asia and the outer Caucasus include the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC) and the Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan Customs Union.⁵ In October 2000, Russia signed another Treaty with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan forming the Eurasian Economic Community. Uzbekistan also joined the treaty in October 2005. It initially originated as a custom union and developed into the Eurasian Economic Community which aimed to establish a “unified economic space” within the framework of the custom union. This took the process of integration into a new level.

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed another Agreement on the Customs Union Commission in October 2007 and the establishment of a custom code in 2009. This was the formal establishment of the customs union between the three countries. The formal implementation of the unified tariff, the mechanism of quota, incentives and preferential systems and a unified list of prohibited or limited commodities for importation and exportation to a third country began in January 2010. The custom code signed by the three countries entered into force in July 2010 representing the formal operation of this custom union. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, three countries that were under the right conditions, took the initiative to establish a custom union within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community.

Countries in Central Asia and the outer Caucasus were inclined to regional economic integrations with Russia. After their independence, the old Soviet-era economic ties were restored within a few years. However, there are countries that withdrew from the Russia-led regional integration such as Georgia. The military conflict with Russia resulted in within Georgia a distrust of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for having effective mechanisms. Georgia made an effort to establish an economic system of free market and accepted the assistances from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank

in order to promote the economic reform with vigor. Currently, only two countries--Georgia and Kyrgyzstan--from the Central Asian and south Caucasus region have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Overall, countries from Central Asian and south Caucasus region have actively participated in regional integrations. The gradual increase in trade openness would actually help the democratization of these countries. However, the democratization processes within the countries that had joined the Eurasian Economic Community and expected a further step in the economic integration with Russia were not distinguishable enough as the evaluations from Freedom House were poor. Countries that joined the EU or the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development did not want to be part of the Russian eco-political integration;⁶ meanwhile, they have a stronger connection with the Western countries, so their progress of democratization was more evident, while the democracy evaluation was also better. Countries worth of particular mentioning were Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.

Steve Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, two western scholars who are specialized in authoritarian regime, pointed out that the keys for the authoritarian regimes to finally achieve the democratic transition in an international environment of the Post-Cold War era were the Western interference and the connection with the West (Levitsky, 2005, p. 21). From the democratization process of the fifteen former Soviet states, it can be confirmed that the democratic transition in the three Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have already been completed reaching to the stage of “democratic consolidation.”⁷ The remaining twelve are still in the stage of democratic transition. Those who had intimate connection with the West had better evaluation of democracy, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; on the contrary, those who were closer to Russia rather the West had poor evaluation of democracy, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (as shown in Table 2)

Table 2

Former Soviet States that Have Joined Russian or EU and American Eco-political Integrations

International Organization	Democratic Score (Freedom House 2014)	Average
Join EU or West's Eco-political Integrations		
European Union (EU)	Latvia (2.36) ↗ Estonia (1.96) ↗ Lithuania (2.07)	2.13
GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development	Ukraine (4.93) ↗ Moldova (4.86) ↗ Georgia (4.68) ↗ Azerbaijan (6.68)	5.29
join Russian eco-political integrations		
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC)	Russia (6.29) ↗ Belarus (6.71) ↗ Kazakhstan (6.61) ↗ Tajikistan (6.32) ↗ Moldova (4.86) ↗ Uzbekistan (6.93) ↗ Ukraine (4.93)	6.09
Common Economic Space (CES)	Russia (6.29) ↗ Ukraine (4.93) ↗ Kazakhstan (6.61) ↗ Belarus (6.71)	6.14
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan	Russia (6.29) ↗ Belarus (6.71) ↗ Kazakhstan (6.61)	6.54
Russia and Belarus Union State	Russia (6.29) ↗ Belarus (6.71)	6.50
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)	Russia (6.29) ↗ Belarus (6.71) ↗ Kazakhstan (6.61) ↗ Kyrgyzstan (5.89) ↗ Tajikistan (6.32) ↗ Armenia (5.36)	6.20
<u>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</u>	Russia (6.29) ↗ Belarus (6.71) ↗ Kazakhstan (6.61) ↗ Kyrgyzstan (5.89) ↗ Tajikistan (6.32) ↗ Armenia (5.36) ↗ Moldova (4.86) ↗ Ukraine (4.93) ↗ Turkmenistan (6.93) ↗ Azerbaijan (6.68)	6.06

* The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The arrow next to the Democracy Score indicates an improvement or decline compared with the score from *Nations in Transit 2014*.

Source : Freedom House, "Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia's Rupture with Democracy," *Freedom House's Annual Survey Nations in Transit 2014 (NIT)*, (2014), pp. 22-24.

The International-Domestic Factors of the Democratization in the post-Soviet states

The European Union (EU) has a powerful attraction for the post-Soviet countries at the economic level. Through the external incentives of financial assistances, these countries ought to meet the additional conditions attached with the economic aids which were usually the improvement of democratic

conditions within the country. At the same time, through the signing of "Association Agreement" (AA) and the institutional constraints, the pace towards democratization was accelerated in these countries. In face of the eastern expansion of the EU, Russia did its best to enhance its influence over post-Soviet countries; this fact can actually be proved by the treaty signing between Russia, Belarus and

Kazakhstan to the proposal of Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

The author has established a correlation with the international environmental factors and the domestic political changes. From the actors' perspective, international factors can alter the behaviors of the domestic politicians. Taking the example of Ukrainian political crisis, ex-Ukrainian-president Viktor Yanukovych intended to sign the official AA in November, 2013, yet due to the Russia pressure,⁸ the Ukrainian government suddenly announced its suspension; meanwhile, in a dramatic change, the president announced the strengthening of the economic and trade relations with Russia. This led to the avalanche of protests by the pro-Western Ukrainian citizens. Owing to the support from EU and western countries, the pro-Western politicians and political party eventually regained the power and ousted the pro-Russian president Yanukovych. This also confirms that the key to democratization are the interaction between international support and domestic democratic power and the influence of such interaction towards the growth of domestic democratic power.

“Semi-presidential system” has been adopted as the Ukrainian governmental system. Unlike parliamentary system in which the head of state can be changed through no-confidence vote, the presidency has been a zero-sum competition; thus, disputes can only be resolved only through mass demonstrations. Squeezed in the middle of EU and Russian pressure, neither a pro-Russian president nor a pro-Western president could satisfy the pro-Russian population who had the expectation to join in Russia's EEU and the pro-Western voters who wanted to join the EU. Therefore, Ukraine must take the country-specific environmental background and practical needs into consideration for the adjustment of the governmental system as to adopt the most suitable one in favor of the stable development of democracy.

Via Ukraine's “case studies”, an analytical framework was constructed: externally, choices are

between regional political and economic integrations promoted by Russia or the EU, while internally, the “variables” of the governmental system can be analyzed. Four regions (region I, II, III and IV) has been divided. From Figure 1, it is visible that most of the post-Soviet states where presidentialism or presidential parliamentary system has been implemented are in region (or quadrant) II. These countries have also participated in the regional integration promoted by Russia. On the other hand, a few post-Soviet states where parliamentary cabinet system and premier-presidential system have been implemented are in region (or quadrant) IV. These countries have then joined the regional integration promoted by the EU. The evaluation for democracy in countries located at region IV is better, while the evaluation for countries located at region II is worse.

Countries located at region I and III are a few countries of the post-Soviet states. The evaluation for democracy is worse than states at region IV but better than region II. In the future, countries located at region II might advance into the direction of states at region I, III or IV during the democratization process. The key to observe the future development of the process of democratization in the post-Soviet states is the increase influence of the EU towards these countries and the decreasing influence of Russia. If the influence of EU continues to increase while the influence of Russia decreases, the post-Soviet states might advance into region I and IV.

In the past, many scholars consider that the function of international factors during the process of democratic reform have secondary roles; however, from the case of Ukraine, international factors played the major role, while domestic factors were of minor importance. If the EU and Russia had allowed Ukraine to advance into both directions (to the East and to the West), this possibility would have not led to the inappropriate foreign policies and eventually the domestic political crisis. The West urged Ukraine to choose a side, either the EU or Russia. This lack of understanding of the internal structure finally led to a continuous deterioration of the Ukrainian political

crisis. The West could not force Ukraine to make the final decision as it would just produce further damage resulting into the dilemma of secession and collapse of democracy. Also, it would intensify the confrontation between Russia and the West. If EU could allow both options as a possibility (to the East and to the West), then confrontations would not occur between Ukraine and Russia, while the development of the democratic reform would proceed with stable continuity.

Conclusion

Democratization within post-Soviet countries has begun after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the trend of globalization. The strategy of joining regional integrations at the external level has been influenced by the EU and Russia. Currently, these countries have been striking a balance between the two giants, the EU and Russia. Countries that have joined the political and economic integration promoted by Russia are those countries with authoritarian regime. Their domestic governmental systems are either “president-parliamentary system” or “presidential system”, such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and other countries. Those countries that have joined the EU are the one that have consolidated the democratic institutions. Their governmental systems are either “premier-presidential system” or “parliamentary system”, such as Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.

After more than twenty of academic explorations, a consensus has been reached: if international factors are taken out from the consideration, it is impossible to understand the whole process of “democratization”. In the past, most scholars considered international factors as minor roles during the process of democratization when studying the functions of international factors in the process of democratic transition. However, from the cases of post-Soviet countries (Ukraine), the role of international factors is equally important with the domestic factors. The Ukrainian case can clearly

confirm that the international factors of democratization cannot be observed separately from the domestic factors; actually, the interaction of international factors and domestic political changes shall be further analyzed.

In the post-Soviet region, Russia intended to maintain or re-establish the tradition. Although Russia and the EU share a common interest in the stability within the post-Soviet region, it is discovered in recent years that the phenomenon of zero-sum competition has emerged among both parties. At the international level, if both the EU and Russia can tolerate the possibility of the post-Soviet countries (such as Ukraine) advancing into two different directions (to the EU and to Russia), the inappropriate foreign policies in these countries would have not be precipitated causing the conflicts between Ukraine and Russia and triggering the domestic constitutional crisis.

This study has concretely found that participating in the integration of the European Union at the international level and of following the “parliamentary cabinet system” and the “premier-presidential system” (premier-presidentialism) at the domestic political system would be in favor of a stable development of democracy. On the contrary, participating in the Russian integration at the international level and of following the “presidential system” or the “semi-presidential system” (president-parliamentarism) at the domestic level would have less contribution to a stable development of democracy. The development of the post-Soviet countries can be mirrored on the situation of Taiwan. The domestic structure of public opinion in Taiwan is similar to that of the Ukraine. Meanwhile, Taiwan is also swinging between the struggling of the US and Mainland China. For Taiwan, TPP and ECFA are definitely the regional organizations at the external level. Thus, the author hopes that experience of the democratic development in the post-Soviet countries can be a reference for Taiwan.

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Footnotes

¹ The semi-presidential system is a system of government in which a popularly elected fixed term president exists alongside a prime minister and Cabinet who are responsible to the legislature of a state. It differs from a parliamentary republic in that it has a popularly elected head of state who is more than a purely ceremonial figurehead, and from the presidential system in that the cabinet, although named by the president, is responsible to the legislature, which may force the cabinet to resign through a motion of no confidence. See Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 1980), pp.165-187.

² The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a foreign relations instrument of the European Union (EU) which seeks to tie those countries to the east and south of the European territory of the EU to the Union. These countries, primarily developing countries, include some who seek to one day become either a member state of the European Union, or more closely integrated with the European Union. The ENP does not apply to neighbors of the EU's outermost regions, specifically France's territories in South America, but only to those countries close to EU member states' territories in mainland Europe. See Stefan Ganzle, “EU Governance and the European Neighborhood Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” in Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, eds., *The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 31-46.

³ The Partnership is based on a commitment to the principles of international law and fundamental values, including democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to a market economy, sustainable development and good governance. The Partnership is founded on mutual interests and commitments as well as shared ownership and mutual accountability.

⁴ Common Economic Space (CES) or Single Economic Space (SES), a project of economical integration of three post-Soviet states: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, who are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Common Economic Space would involve a supranational commission on trade and tariffs that would be based in Kiev, would initially be headed by a representative of Kazakhstan, and would not be subordinate to the governments of the four nations. The ultimate goal would be a regional organization that would be open for other countries to join as well, and could eventually lead even to a single currency. See Ksenia Borishpolets and Stanislav Chernyavsky, “The Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan: Present and Future,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2012), pp. 120-129.

⁵ The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC) originated from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia on 29 March 1996. The Treaty on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community was signed on 10 October 2000, in Kazakhstan's capital Astana by Presidents Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan. On 7 October 2005 it was decided between the member states that Uzbekistan would join. Freedom of movement without visa requirements has been implemented among the members. See Ksenia Borishpolets and Stanislav Chernyavsky, "The Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan: Present and Future," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2012), pp. 120-129.

⁶ The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development is a regional organization of four post-Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). GUAM's charter was signed during a summit in Yalta on 6 to 7 June 2001 by the four current members and Uzbekistan, which later withdrew. According to the former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko the charter set objectives for cooperation, such as promoting democratic values, ensuring stable development, enhancing international and regional security and stepping up European integration. GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) Group was formally founded as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these former Soviet Union republics.

7 Democracy is consolidated when it becomes the "only game in town". They take this to mean three things. Behaviorally, no group is seriously engaged in secession or regime change. Attitudinally, most people accept that democracy is the best form of government (so not only does nobody try to change the regime, nobody particularly wants to). Constitutionally, democracy is consolidated when all the major organs of the state act according to the democratic institutions. This means more than elections. There need to be five institutions (assuming, first of all, that there is a state): freedoms necessary for development of civil society (not just group memberships), an "autonomous and valued political society" (parties, elections, legislatures, etc.), rule of law (i.e. laws apply to leaders too), usable bureaucracy (i.e. state capacity), and "institutionalized economic society" to mediate between the state and the market. See the chart on page 14 for a nice summary of all these "arenas.". See Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post- Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp.5-15.

⁸

In the face of the Russian pressure, the Ukrainian Parliament vetoed some acts that were aimed to meet the EU requirements in November 2013. The Ukrainian government also announced the suspension of the signing of the EU "Association Agreement" although the Ukrainian president Yanukovych still participated in the Vilnius Summit; however, he finally decided not to turn down the offer. This action triggered the discontent of the western Ukrainian people who was in favor of being close to the West. On February 22nd, 2013, the Ukrainian Parliament staged a coup by proclaiming the dismissal of the pro-Russian president Yanukovych. After several days, the Speaker of the Parliament Turchynov was approved to be the interim president, while the leader of the "All-Ukraine Union 'Fatherland'" Arseniy Yatseniuk became the new prime minister. By the end of March, the new prime minister and other 28 leaders of the EU member states have signed the "Association Agreement" for the political framework at Brussels, Belgium. The economic framework was being delayed to June 2014, for which Georgia and Moldova would sign it with the EU. A new pro-Western president Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko was also elected. See Serhiy Kudelia, "The House That Yanukovych Built," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 43 (July 2014), p.19.

