ความร่วมมือระหว่างสหภาพยุโรปกับตุรกีในการแก้ไขวิกฤตผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรีย ระหว่างปี2015-2016: การโน้มน้าวด้วยประเด็นที่เชื่อมโยงกัน

Explaining EU-Turkey Cooperation on Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015-2016: An Issue-Linkage Persuasion

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Abstract

  This paper attempts to examine EU-Turkey cooperation in 2015-2016 concerning the recent Syrian refugee crisis by employing a concept of issue-linkage persuasion. As a massive influx of Syrian refugees into European countries in 2015 had triggered many European Union (EU) members to suspend Schengen and Dublin system unilaterally, it has recently caused the EU to rethink substantially about its common strategy to handle the crisis. The EU's paradox was whether it was able to break a dichotomy between providing refugee protection and defending its socio-political security through securitization. One of the effective solutions to the crisis, however, was to contain the refugees in the third countries and Turkey was designed by the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016 to take such a role as an EU's strategic partner. Nonetheless, the cooperation between the two parties has not emerged as a given. It has been subject to a strategic interaction, which can be explained from a game theoretical perspective. In particular, a suasion game demonstrates that an asymmetric power between two actors (North-South relations) plays an important role in determining a payoff structure. As a rule, equilibrium is always in favor of the powerful

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player, that is, while the EU's strategy was preferable to pass the buck, Turkey was pressured to contain a huge number of the refugees in its soil. In this regard, it is argued in the paper that an issue-linkage persuasion has been used in this case, when the situation fell into a negative-sum game, as a significant tool in fostering EU-Turkey cooperation on the Syrian refugee crisis by providing mutual incentives, side-payments, and private interests. Once the EU manages to solve the crisis in its soil, it is likely that the EU-Turkey relations will swing back to its contentious politics.

Keywords: *Syrian refugee crisis, EU-Turkey cooperation, Game theory, Issue-linkage persuasion.*

บทคัดย่อ

บทความชิ้นนี้ศึกษาวิเคราะห์แบบแผนความร่วมมือระหว่างสหภาพยุโรปและประเทศตุรกีในการแก้วิกฤต
ผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรียในปี 2015-2016 โดยใช้แนวคิดเรื่องการโน้มน้าวผ่านประเด็นที่เชื่อมโยงกัน ในปี 2015 ขบวนผู้ลี้ภัย
ชาวซีเรียจำนวนมากได้เดินทางเข้าไปในพื้นที่อาณาเขตของสหภาพยุโรปและทำให้ประเทศสมาชิกจำเป็นต้องระงับ
การใช้ข้อตกลงเชงเกนและระบบดับลินเป็นการชั่วคราว ปรากฏการณ์ดังกล่าวทำให้สหภาพยุโรปต้องทบทวน
ยุทธศาสตร์การรับมือกับวิกฤตการณ์ผู้ลี้ภัยอย่างเร่งด่วน ปัญหาหลักของสหภาพยุโรปในเวลาดังกล่าวคือทางแยก
ระหว่างการเลือกที่จะปกป้องผู้ลี้ภัยกับการรักษาความมั่นคงด้านการเมืองและสังคมด้วยการใช้นโยบายความมั่นคง
ภิวัฒน์ อย่างไรก็ดีแนวทางในการแก้วิกฤตดังกล่าวอย่างได้ผลคือการกักกันผู้ลี้ภัยไว้ในประเทศที่สาม ด้วยเหตุนี้
ตุรกีจึงกลายเป็นประเทศกันชนให้กับสหภาพยุโรปจากการทำข้อตกลงระหว่างสหภาพยุโรปและตุรกีในเดือน
มีนาคม 2016 อย่างไรก็ตามความร่วมมือระหว่างทั้งสองตัวแสดงไม่ได้เกิดขึ้นมาจากภาวะสุญญากาศ หากแต่ก่อกำเนิด
มาจากการปฏิสัมพันธ์กันในเชิงยุทธศาสตร์ซึ่งสามารถอธิบายได้ผ่านกรอบของทฤษฎีเกม กล่าวโดยเฉพาะ แนวคิด
เกมการโน้มน้าว (suasion game) ชี้ให้เห็นว่าฐานอำนาจที่ไม่เท่าเทียมกันระหว่างสองตัวแสดง (ความสัมพันธ์แบบ
กลุ่มขั้วเหนือและใต้) มีความสำคัญในการกำหนดโครงสร้างของผลตอบแทน ตามหลักการแล้ว จุดสมดุลของความ
สัมพันธ์ดังกล่าวมักจะอยู่ในสภาวะที่ผู้เล่นที่เป็นมหาอำนาจจะได้รับประโยชน์มากกว่า นั่นหมายความว่าในขณะ
ที่ยุทธศาสตร์ของสหภาพยุโรปในการจัดการวิกฤตผู้ลี้ภัยคือการผลักภาระให้ประเทศอื่นนั้น ประเทศตุรกีจึงถูก
กดดันให้รับกักกันผู้ลี้ภัยจำนวนมากให้อยู่ในประเทศตัวเอง ดังนั้นข้อถกเถียงในบทความนี้ชี้ให้เห็นว่าการโน้มน้าว
ด้วยกับประเด็นที่เชื่อมโยงกันถูกใช้เป็นเครื่องมือในการต่อรองทางการเมืองในช่วงที่ผู้เล่นทั้งสองอยู่ในสถานการณ์
ที่ย่ำแย่ติดลบ นอกจากนั้นเครื่องมือดังกล่าวยังถูกใช้เพื่อสร้างความร่วมมือกันระหว่างสหภาพยุโรปและตุรกีในการ
จัดการกับผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรียผ่านการแลกเปลี่ยนสิ่งจูงใจร่วม การจ่ายทดแทนและการให้ผลประโยชน์เฉพาะส่วน
อย่างไรก็ตาม ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสหภาพยุโรปและตุรกีมีแนวโน้มที่จะกลับไปสู่การเมืองที่ไม่ลงรอยกันเมื่อ
สหภาพยุโรปสามารถแก้วิกฤตดังกล่าวในภูมิภาคของตัวเองได้

คำสำคัญ: *วิกฤตผู้ลี้ภัยชาวซีเรีย, ความร่วมมือระหว่างสหภาพยุโรปและตุรกี, ทฤษฎีเกม, การโน้มน้าว
ด้วยประเด็นที่เชื่อมโยงกัน*

Introduction

After the World War II, the East and the West have not come to witness the most profound refugee crisis of the contemporary era until Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. Since the breakup of the Arab spring in 2011, the world had been in a high hope that democracy was to deliver its promises in the Middle East. However, the demonstration effect did not turn out to be positive and non-violent in some countries. In Syria where the Assad regime refused to step down after the peaceful demonstration, the civil war had erupted and since then it has produced a significant number of the internally displaced persons (IDPs). More than 6 million people were forced to flee their homes as of 2016, while Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have hosted the highest number of the refugees respectively in the same year. In effect, it is undoubted that the European Union (EU) has also faced a crisis when more than 1 million refugees had risked their lives moving towards European countries. Among 6,000 death toll in the Mediterranean Sea, the picture of Alan Kurdi's dead body on the Bodrum beach in Turkey had sparked an international outcry in 2015 and questions policymakers around the world about the crisis of humanitarian management and failure of global refugee policy (Amnesty, 2016; Barnard & Shoumali, 2015; Cankligil, 2016; Keneally, 2016; UNHCR, 2016c). This man-made catastrophe has been testing a capacity of global refugee regime on the one hand and the political will, which is hinged on policymakers, on the other. The success of refugee regime and the end of current refugee crisis can hardly be realized if the two mentioned features cannot be juxtaposed. This paper, therefore, attempts to shed some light on how the EU which is best known as the most developed supranational institution, normative power, and the winner of the Nobel Prize in 2012, has been dealing its recent Syrian refugee crisis (2015-2016) with its external partners, particularly Turkey. In doing so, the author will use a game theoretical perspective to explain patterns of EU-Turkey cooperation by focusing on an issue-linkage persuasion.

To this end, the paper is divided into three parts. Part one demonstrates the evolution of EU laws and mechanisms with regard to the refugee and asylum management by concentrating on how the EU system has been operating to deal with the refugee crisis. Part two provides an overview of the refugee crisis in 2015-2016 by focusing on the massive influx of Syrian refugee into the EU. It shows that Syrian refugee mobility is an unusual situation in term of its form and content and has significantly shaped European political agenda since 2015. Part three gives an analysis of the recent EU-Turkey cooperation with regard to the European refugee crisis from a game theoretical perspective.

## Dynamics of EU Laws on Asylum and Refugees

The EU as an institution is known as one of the most sophisticated and interconnected bodies in dealing with collective action problems such as human rights. Its roles and functions have been spilled over from security and economic concerns to political and social imperatives. From the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 to the Treaty of Lisbon and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in 2007, EU has made significant efforts and a milestone in protecting and maintaining the value of human rights and dignity. In this connection, it has covered the issue of asylum

and refugee protection in a number of its primary and secondary sources. Thus, it is important to note here that the issue of asylum and refugee is part and parcel of human rights domain and it significantly links to the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1950 and the 1951 UN Refugee Conventions. Failure to protect asylum seekers and refugees may, however, result from negligence and indifference of the international obligation, which may consequently be condemned by international societies. As such, by looking back to the evolution of the EU laws concerning asylums and refugees, it is seen that there are a number of waves that the EU has developed its laws and instruments in order to encounter the challenges of refugee protection in different periods.

Since refugee protection by nature has been connected to an issue of human rights protection in 1950, several developments of EU laws has been updated from time to time. In 1985, Chapter 7 of the Schengen Agreement has been used as the main reference in dealing with migration issue including refugee protection. However, a clear provision had significantly developed in the 1909 Dublin convention. Consequently, it had caused the EU to update its mechanisms in 2003 and 2013 in order to manage the migration and asylum problem, which is known today as the Dublin regulations or Dublin System. However, while implementing Dublin regulation, the EU had also attempted to bring fragmented asylum national policies into one comprehensive umbrella, which formed the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in between 1999-2005. Another important step in making the law even more solid was the formation of the EU charter on fundamental rights in 2000 but it later was in effect in 2009. However, before the Syrian refugee crisis was escalated, the EU has once again organized itself to improve its legal implication by adopting the TFEU in 2007, in which the article 78 and 79 were mainly related to the migration and asylum issues. As it can be expected, in 2015 the European Commission has proposed another important policy innovation in facing with European refugee crisis, which was spell out in the EU agenda on migration. The agenda mainly sets the priority of the EU immediate and long-term strategies in restoring the order and stability within EU member countries. Its effort, however, has not stopped at that stage but move further to deal with external actors for the expectation that the number of Syrian refugees may effectively be reduced. Thus, a bilateral mechanism has provided the EU and Turkey to sign the EU-Turkey agreement in March 2016. This development has been the most significant undertaking between the two parties. Figure 1 shows that the EU laws on the refugee protection have been evolving for 67 years from 1950.

Within 67 years of the development of EU laws in dealing with the refugees and asylum, it shows that there are a number of primary and secondary sources, which has been located in a different significance when managing the issue at hand. Many cases of human rights violation have been brought to the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice by invoking a number of EU laws. Thus, in the case of Syrian refugee crisis, we can see that the primary sources of the EU laws are located in the EU Charter on fundamental rights, EU convention on human rights, and the article of 78, 79, and 80 of the TFEU (The European Union, 2007). Meanwhile, the main secondary sources of the EU standard operation procedure are laid in the asylum procedure directive, EUDAC regulation, qualification directive, and Dublin regulations. Based on the two sources of the EU laws, it forms the main instrument of migration

Figure 1. Evolution of the main EU Laws in Dealing with Refugee Protection and Crisis

European convention on human rights (1950)
Chp. 7 of Schengen Agreement (1985)
Dublin system (1990, 2003, 2013)
Common European Asylum System (CEAS 1999-2005)
EU charter on fundamental rights (2000, 2009 in effect)
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007)
EU agenda on migration (May 2015)
EU-Turkey deal (March 2016)

management, which can be characterized by CEAS, Dublin system, and, the most recent one, EU agenda on the migration. These have formed the main framework of the EU standard operation procedure in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis in the recent time. Figure 2 illustrates a summary of the main sources and instruments of the EU in dealing with its Syrian refugee crisis in 2016.

Figure 2. Main Sources and Instruments of the EU in dealing with its current refugee crisis

Selected primary source	Main instruments	Selected secondary sources
EU charter of fundamental rights & ECHR	Common European Asylum System (CEAS)	Asylum procedure directive
Lisbon treaty & TFEU	Dublin system	Eurodac regulation
Art. 78 & 79 of TFEU	EU agenda on migration	Qualification directive

Having stated that, it shows that the EU has been up and running in managing the transnational migration issues for decades. Within the total approved budget of 155 billion for commitment in 2016, the EU allocated more than four million euro "in commitments for helping member states and third countries to address the migration and refugee crisis" (European Council, 2015). At the core of the current system, the EU has been implementing the Dublin System to handle the current refugee crisis. Its main

purpose is, therefore, to "establish the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person" (The European Union, 2013). It is also important to mention here that the Dublin III was aimed at preventing asylum shopping and asylum seekers in orbit. While the asylum shopping is concerned with limiting asylum seekers' choice of application, the asylum seeker in orbit is related to avoiding irresponsibility of the EU authorities in the process of an asylum application. Be it as it may, the current system has been criticized from many sides because of its ineffectiveness in coping with the European refugee crisis. It is, hence, important for us now to turn to see the condition and the context of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis with a special attention on the Syrian refugee mobility.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in the Global Trend (2015-2016)

A refugee crisis is not a new phenomenon of human history but the 21st-century refugee problem had posed the most complex and interdependent challenges to the nation-states. After the Cold war and the fall of the Berlin Wall, international societies had witnessed a number of civil and inter-state wars such as Gulf War (1990-1991) and the Kosovo War (1998-1999), while the number of refugees in the EU countries had fluctuated from 697,000 in 1993 to 643,000 in 2003 (Connor, 2016). This fluctuation of the number has corresponded with the evolving contexts and the EU mechanisms in dealing with the problem. However, migration and refugee situation in the 21st century has been widely marked as an interdependent phenomenon across continents. In Africa, it is reported that the conflict in several countries in Africa such as Central African Republic, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Burundi have caused more than 16 million to be displaced from their homes (UNHCR, 2016a). In Southeast Asia, Rohingya people living in Myanmar have been the most oppressed stateless people and been forced to flee their homes to seek refuge in other countries by sea route, which is known as 'boat people'. In the Middle East, the civil war in Yemen and Syria has risen the number of the IDPs to be at top of the refugee agenda. Without delving into the civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, it is undoubted that migration and refugee protection are not only confined to a security of people in one particular region, but it has become a global agenda in providing refugee protection or what Suhrke (1998) calls it as "global public goods".

Though the refugee crisis had been a global phenomenon for some periods of times, however, Syrian refugee crisis has been categorized recently as the most severe catastrophe in the contemporary times in term of the casualties and failure of providing refugee protection (Amnesty, 2015). Figure 3 demonstrates that the civil war in Syria has caused 1.3 million to risk their lives moving from Syria and Turkey toward the EU countries (Connor, 2016). This number has been most outstanding among the previous events that the EU had dealt with after the end of the Cold War. This data also coincide with the UNHCR report on the global refugee trends (UNHCR, 2016b), which shows that the nation-states system has been challenged by the crisis of humanitarian management and global responsibility. Over the total number of UNHCR's people of concern worldwide, Syrian refugees make up 4.9 million, which secured the top of the chart since 2015. Unfortunately, only 10 percent of the total (489,000) had managed to stay in the camp, leaving the rest of its 90 percentage to seek refuge in urban destitution or to make a dangerous

journey towards European countries (Betts, 2016b; UNHCR, 2016d). Furthermore, the death toll of refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe in 2016 was 5,022, which marks as an all-time high record at the moment according to the UNHCR (2016e). Having stated that, it is legitimate to pay a special consideration to the 2015-2016 migration crisis on the Syrian refugee case.

Figure 3. Number of Asylum Seekers in Europe in 2015.

Source: Connor, P. (2016, August 2). Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015. Retrieved December 31, 2016, from http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/

Syrian Refugee Crisis and the EU

As the statistics from UNHCR and other related sources have shown, Syrian refugee crisis represents the failure of humanitarian management and shared responsibility. Apparently, the civil war in Syria, which serves as a root cause of the Syrian refugees, can hardly be solved if the Assad's old regime remain intact. It is because the Syrian civil war is not simply an internal war between Assad regime and its internal oppositions, it had split into a proxy war between pro-Assad regime and anti-Assad regime, which involves regional powers such as Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Gulf countries as well as non-state actors such Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) and Hezbollah. Hence, the mobility of the Syrian refugees is highly corresponded, but not solely, to the degree to which internal conflict is escalated. Based on such situation, Betts points out that refugees have at least three main choices to make for their survival: encampment, urban destitution, and dangerous journey (Betts, 2016a, 2016c).

The choice of making the dangerous journey had already claimed more than 5,000 lives of the death toll in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016. It was shown that European countries were their preferable destination after Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon but such destination is not without a high cost. However, in 2015 and 2016 it had shown that more than 1.3 million had managed to make their way to Europe through land and sea routes. Around the second half of 2015, some of the EU countries had been under anxiety because of the mass influx of Syrian refugees coming mainly from Turkey and crossing toward

Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Germany. One of the immediate measures that the affected EU members had adopted was to suspend the Schengen principle and implement securitization policy by building fences and barrier as well as introducing a border control (Amnesty International, 2015; Karamanidou, 2015; Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2016; Sommers, 2015). In 2015, refugee crisis had occupied the political debate widely within the EU institution as well as their national politics. Some critics assert that the EU system under the operation of the Dublin regulations was not ready to handle such massive amount of the influx while others point out that it was not only the EU's crisis of humanitarianism but also a fragmentation of political will and policy trajectories.

It is clear that the mobility of the Syrian refugees into the European countries had turned the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkish problem, and the Jordanian burden into the "EU refugee crisis". This interconnectedness of the problem, however, does not emerge as a natural event but had rather been made by the victim of the war, who had been neglected by nation-states and that the international societies are yet to deliver their burden-sharing. Looking from the game theoretical perspective, Syrian refugee crisis before 2015 was not the crisis of the EU and hence its preferred strategy would reasonably be noncooperative. However, after the Syrian refugee crisis turned out to be the EU crisis, it was seen that the EU reaction has been different. The EU and its members have been tackling the crisis in two main ways: internal and external mechanisms. Internally, the EU and its members had attempted through unilateral and multilateral actions. As had already mentioned above, some EU members had acted unilaterally to suspend some of the EU principles such as closing border, building fences, and introducing border control.[1] Besides, the EU itself had also tried to propose burden-sharing schemes to its members, which consequently unable to reach an agreement. Externally, the EU has done a good job in pressuring other third states to contain the refugees by offering some incentives in return. Turkey has been targeted as one of the third countries that had signed a joint agreement in March 2016. Thus, it can be seen that although the internal mechanisms of the EU have not delivered an expected outcome yet, while the external instrument of persuasion had paid its effort in coping with the recent EU refugee crisis more effectively.

The UNHCR's statistics in figure 4 shows that after the March 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey the number of Mediterranean Sea arrival had decreased constantly. In October 2015 the number of sea arrivals was on a rise, but at the end of 2015, it started to go down steadily. In a bigger picture, it can be read that the number of the sea arrivals had declined from 1 million in 2015 to less than 500,000 in 2016. This development has given a credit to the bilateral cooperation between the EU and Turkey. However, it is important to note that the fluctuation of Syrians' mobility can be perceived that the Syrian refugees themselves were aware of the legal implication on the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey and because of that they decided to act sooner rather than later (Yazgan, Utku, & Sirkeci, 2015). This ideational explanation can also, in my opinion, explain the reason why now the Syrian refugee had made a move in that direction started from July to October 2015. Be that as it may, the 2016 agreement has been seen by the two players as a successful commitment in coping with the European

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[1]See more details at Bačić Selanec (2016) and Leerasiri (2016, pp. 60–68).

refugee crisis. Figure 4 illustrates the fluctuated mobility of Mediterranean Sea arrivals in 2015-2016 (UNHCR, 2016c).

Figure 4. Number of Mediterranean Sea Arrivals in 2015-2016

Source: UNHCR. (2016). Refugees/Migrants Response - Mediterranean. Retrieved January 16, 2017, from http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php

However, there are a number of criticisms that had been made to argue against the 2016 deal. The main arguments focus on the negligence of human security and an unfair share of the burden. The first argument of the critics demonstrates that the deal has laid a good ground for violating human rights systematically (Human Rights Watch, 2015, 2016a). The EU-Turkey readmission agreement was the case in point because it opened the way for Greece and other EU members to send Syrian refugees, who had crossed the border after 20 March 2016, back to Turkey. Human rights groups criticize that Turkey was not the third safe country that can guarantee refugee protections and it is possible that the send-back refugee can be pushed back to the war-torn areas. They had also warned that an implementation of the deal will consequently violate the principle of *non-refoulment*, which was guaranteed by the 1951 UN convention on refugee (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016b). However, the EU has turned down that position. Besides, the second argument shows that the deal has sparked a hot debate on the fairness of burden-sharing (Amnesty International, 2014). Some argue that those who were sent back to Turkey were low-skill or unclassified labors for the EU, meanwhile, those who were to receive by the EU were more qualified refugees. In addition, as Turkey was now hosting more than 3 million refugees and while the EU, which consists of 27 countries, has received only 1.3 million, it is not fair to make such a deal in the first place. The critics assert that the EU should not pay money to get rid of its burden, but it should offer a burden-sharing framework through a fair resettlement scheme. However, what we have seen from the criticisms is that human rights activists advocate for the nation-states to pay more attention to human security rather than focusing on state security and its myopic interests alone. The EU as a promoter of the democracy, human rights, and liberal values should not hide and contradict with its own values and principles. It was a prime time that the collective action should be made to produce refugee protection on the one hand and to overcome policy fragmentation on the other.

Game Theory and EU-Turkey Cooperation

As it has been argued that the EU's external instruments have been proved to be more effective

in handling the EU refugee crisis if compared to its internal responses. This external tool can be seen as a strategic interaction between the two players in calculating their expected outcomes. However, cooperation under anarchy is not likely to occur naturally and thus it should not be viewed as a given. Rather, the asymmetric power between the EU and Turkey shapes the expected utility and drives the players to pursue a certain set of strategy. In order to understand such kind of interaction, game theoretically perspective can help to elaborate the pattern of their strategy and payoff structure. This section, thus, attempts to explain a pattern of the EU-Turkey cooperation on the refugee crisis by using the suasion game in particular. Game theory can be used to understand a strategic move between players in order to attain the expected outcome. It is also widely employed to unpack the pattern and condition of international cooperation under the anarchic system of world politics (Oye, 1985). However, in the standard utilization of the game theory, Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) has been used to explain the problem of cooperation and the suboptimum outcome that the players are likely to face when making its unilateral action (Suhrke, 1998). As a rule, the PD depicts that the payoff structure in a non-iterated game would be DC>CC>DD>CD that is because any player is likely to cheat unilaterally while other is cooperating if it is availed of that opportunity. Thus, if each player acts unilaterally, then it is likely that they will reach the point of the suboptimum outcome, but if they cooperate they will get a shared expected utility at the point of equilibrium (CC). Hence, cooperation is likely to happen if the players can communicate and realize such payoff structure in an iterated game. However, Betts (2008, 2009) argues that PD does not provide an accurate scenario of the interaction between the North and South, which is based on an asymmetric power. For him, the more accurate version of the game theory in examining North-South relations with regard to the refugee protection is a suasion game. In particular, it demonstrates a situation "in which a stronger actor has little direct interest in cooperating, while the weaker actor has so little bargaining power that it can either accept what is offered or disengage entirely" (Betts, 2009, p. 174). Thus, the expected outcome and the equilibrium in such a game is different from PD in the way that in the PD the equilibrium would be a mutual cooperation (CC), while in the suasion game it would be an unrequired cooperation (CD) in a repeated game.

Figure 5. Payoff structure in Prisoners' Dilemma and Suasion Game

Prisoners' dilemma	B		Suasion game	B	
A	(CC) 3,3*	(CD) 1,4	A	(CC) 3,4	(DC) 4,3*
	(DC) 4,1	(DD) 1,1		(CD) 2,2	(DD) 1,1

*represents equilibrium.

Source: Betts, A. (2009). *Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 29 & 34.

The suasion game demonstrates that in an initial situation of the North-South relations there is only a single equilibrium outcome, which is preferable to the North and allows them to exploit the South (CD). However, the strategy for the South to move to its preferred outcome (CC) is to move to the non-cooperation or a negative-sum game (DD), in which both will suffer from such course of action or inaction. In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey has done inaction in order to allow Syrian refugees to get

crossed to the European countries, which in turn changes an initial payoff structure from a non-burden sharing situation (CD) to European refugee crisis (DD) and, in effect, it makes everyone worse off. In such a situation of a negative-sum game, it triggers both Turkey and the EU's policy-makers to revise their strategies in dealing with the crisis, though each perceives the intensity of the crisis differently. As the crisis unfolded from 2015, the EU had then taken an initial move to discuss with Turkey several times and consequently formed an assurance game, which avails itself of a new equilibrium of a collective action (CC). The 18 March EU-Turkey agreement was the evidence of the new equilibrium between both parties within which the EU as an international institution had managed to persuade Turkey to accept the deal by using issue-linkage incentives.[2]

According to the EU official statement, the EU-Turkey agreement were based on nine significant points, which can be characterised by 1) readmission of Syrian refugees to Turkey, 2) resettlement of Syrian refugee to the EU, 3) Turkey's implementation of coast guard measures, 4) introduction of voluntary humanitarian admission scheme in the EU, 5) visa liberation for Turkey, 6) provision of 3 billion euro financial aid plus the future addition of 3 billion euro to Turkey, 7) upgrading the customs union, 8) re-energising Turkish accession to the EU, and 9) initiative of joint humanitarian action in Syria (Council of the European Union, 2016). This agreement shows that each side has several actions to move and, hence, expect to receive the immediate and future incentives. For the EU sides, it was obliged to provide financial aid, accelerate Turkey's accession process, give concession on the visa-free provision and prepare for the resettlement. Meanwhile, Turkey agreed to accept readmission of refugees and implement coast guard mechanisms with the EU in order to prevent illegal migration. As it can be seen, the EU priority can be categorised by 1) to stem illegal migration from Turkey and 2) to break smuggling business of migration, while Turkey's priority can be divided into short-term and long-term goals, which are 1) to gain a visa liberalisation, 2) to receive financial aid, and 3) to complete the EU accession process. Thus, the payoff structure for the EU was shaped by its success in reducing the Syrian illegal migration, restoring EU internal systems in dealing its refugee crisis, cutting smuggling networks, and getting no worse-off respectively. On the other hands, the payoff for Turkey was structured by the outcome of getting a visa-free passport, the financial supports, acceptance as the EU members, and no worse-off respectively. Interestingly, it showed that at the end point of the strategic path, this strategic interaction was to end up with a positive sum game (CC), at least for some period of time.

It is important to note here that the role of issue-linkage persuasion has been at the core of political bargaining between the EU and Turkey. It has also been used as a tool to overcome the asymmetric power between the North and the South. Betts (2009, p. 41) asserts that "cross-issue persuasion describes the conditions under which actor A can persuade actor B that issue area X and issue area Y are linked as a mean of inducing actor B to act in issue area X on the basis of its interest in issue area Y". As it can be seen in this case, the EU does not only represent the countries of the North but also act as an international organization that attempts to aggregate mutual interests between the core and periphery countries. The

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[2]The formal communications between Turkey and the EU are discussed in Koma (2017, pp. 37–38).

EU's top priority was, however, to solve the European refugee crisis by stemming Syrian refugees' influx from Turkey, whereas Turkey's top interest towards the EU was to receive visa-exemption and become its full member (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). Thus, issue-linkage of the case at hand can be seen in two ways. First, the illegal influx of refugees into the European countries since 2015 can be seen as an unprecedented weapon from the South and has been linked to other important issues such as threats to state security, economy, terrorism, identity, and demographic change. Second, the EU had persuaded Turkey to sign the deal in 2016 by linking its refugee crisis to other important issues such as visa exemption, EU accession, economic integration, aid, and human rights protection. In particular, the fundamental ground of the deal did not simply concern the security of refugees per se but as Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Prime Minister at the time, clarified, "readmission agreement applies only with visa exemption" (Anadolu Agency, 2016). These exchanges of private interests in different issues had determined a new pattern of expected outcomes within which both players were likely to receive. Because of the interdependent character that Turkey and the EU had tied to each other, it had made the bargaining process becomes a venue for preferring the cooperative strategy (CC) in 2015-2016.

Thus, the strategic interaction between Turkey and the EU in 2015-2016 has shown a pattern of DC-DD-CC, which moved from a zero-sum game to a negative sum game and finally to a positive sum game. As it can be perceived, it was not plausible for the situation to move from DC to CC directly because Turkey had no sufficient capacity to influence the EU and the EU had less interest to get an active engagement from the very beginning. Instead, the situation moved from Turkey being the destination of refugees (DC) to the EU as their new destination (DD). When both sides were in the negative sum game (DD), Turkey was perceived to have a relatively more bargaining power than it had before, while the EU had also the interest of getting involved more actively in managing the crisis. This is a crucial point in which the issue-linkage persuasion took place, which led to a new equilibrium (CC). In such equilibrium, Turkey was likely to get a payoff higher than its original position if the EU did not cheat. However, it can never be guaranteed that the new equilibrium of their new payoff will remain with the CC strategy for a long period of time because, when considering about the relative gain and a rational actor, the EU is likely to get fewer benefits in the long run and there is no regime to enforce the rules and regulations too. Hence, as the situation of their negative relations in 2017 is unfolding, once the EU can ameliorate its own internal refugee crisis, it is more likely that the EU will readjust its strategies and move towards its preferred equilibrium (DC). Though Turkish policymakers know very well that Syrian refugees can be used as their weapon to retaliate the EU, Turkey, however, has no sufficient capacity to determine the equilibrium in the long run.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that EU-Turkey cooperation concerning the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015-2016 should not be taken for granted as a given phenomenon. Instead, it has been shaped by a strategic interaction between two rational actors in order to maximize its expected outcomes. At the first

instance, Syrian refugee crisis had been confined to a regional problem of a few countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. The logic of the game theory, however, depicts that in such situation the EU has no special interests in taking part seriously and it was reasonable for the EU to stay passive for the crisis management. Besides, a logic of a suasion game demonstrates that the EU would be better off for being non-cooperative, but the way in which the weaker players can change a payoff structure was to retaliate or bring a situation of the stronger and the weaker down towards a negative-sum game. This situation has been seen only after Syrian refugees risked their lives and marched into the European countries in 2015. Since then the EU countries started to react in different and fragmented ways after Syrian refugee problem becomes a European refugee crisis. The paper showed that the EU relatively failed to manage the crisis from within but succeeded in using external mechanisms to stem Syrian massive influx, especially when the EU had persuaded Turkey to sign an assurance game in a series of bargaining, which concluded in March 2016. In essence, it is argued in the paper that the pattern of the move had been tied with the issue-linkage persuasion such as nexus of refugee-visa liberalization, refugee-EU membership, and refugee-development. This tool is proved to be effective for the weaker in order to overcome an asymmetric power between North-South relations and avoid a collective action problem. Under the new pay-off structure (CC), however, Turkey was likely to get a higher return utility if its EU counterpart did not cheat. In short, this case has shown a pattern of international cooperation between the core and periphery countries pertaining to the refugee crisis. It also demonstrates a lesson that issue-linkage persuasion can be used as a powerful tool between the powerful and the weak actors in international bargaining in order to form a new equilibrium and ensure their expected outcomes, at least in a short-run refugee crisis management.

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