

**The four-dimensional theses for one fundamental synthesis:
Lacan's subject as the subject of resistance**

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Abstract

This article aims to explore Jacques Lacan's idea of the subject, which is sporadic in his writings and teachings. It argues that Lacan's subject is and will always be the subject of resistance. To understand the nature of the Lacanian subject, this inquiry focuses on four fundamental theses: (1) mirror-stage, (2) negation, (3) trauma, and (4) woman. The article takes on a philosophical task in this regard. The synthesis of all the theses suggests that Lacan's subject is the subject of resistance. This type of subject is preoccupied with agility, movement, speech, and action, which nurtures a dissonance from the consecutive consonance posited by the Other. Its presence marks the logic of disruptive ego-consciousness. Lacan compels everyone to negate ego-consciousness as a true locus of the subject. This marks a flamboyant declaration of independence of Lacan's disjunctive synthesis about the subject as a revolutionary subject.

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It is unlike the conceptualisation of the subject that is consistently envisioned in a psychoanalytic community under the dominance of scientific behaviouralists such as Erik Erikson's focus on ego identity and Carl Jung's optimism of the unity of consciousness and the unconscious of the subject.

Key words: Lacan, subject, trauma, resistance, negation.

Introduction

This article explores the idea of the subject (*le sujet*) based on the conceptual tectonics and psychoanalytic semantics of Jacques Lacan, a French critical psychoanalyst. The article argues that the nature of the subject exposed by Lacan in four dimensions - mirror-stage, negation, trauma and woman - contributes to one fundamental synthesis: Lacan's subject is nothing else but the subject of resistance. In other words, the primary proposition is that the subject of Lacan is, at its core, a subject of resistance to a socio- politico symbolic homogeneity, despite being examined from four diverged contextual dimensions. This argument is affirmed following a proper methodological account. In terms of the methodological approach as well as a clarification of the praxis, to understand this aspect of thought on the notion of the subject, one needs to closely read Lacan's poetic work called *Écrits*, including some seminars

available in the English language. This article is resolute in its claim that the Lacanian subject is the subject of resistance, which is faithful to Lacan's original insight. To be more precise, it is about encountering and appreciating Lacan's writing and teaching to internalize his philosophical-psychoanalytic proposal. This self-incorporation of Lacan's crux of thinking is different from an academic activity in the present, which often relies on interpreting the unsaid meaning left unaddressed in the text.

In its essence, the subject of resistance is the subject whose act and movement shows a compelling refusal of the constellation of being, in which the latter demands the former the act of sublimation of the subjective experience to coincide integrally with the objectivity of a socio-symbolic homogeneity. But prolonging itself like a shadow that splits from a concordial spot, the act of displacement from a constellation of beings that refuses to morph itself into a congregative wholeness while enigmatically swerving from homogeneity is the essentialisation retained in this article, the meaning of the subject of resistance. To sustain the argument that Lacan's subject is a subject of resistance, this cannot be independent of the history of psychoanalysis debating on the same subject. In terms of subjectivity and a consideration of the being of the psyche, there is an enormous gap between Lacan and other psychoanalysts such as Erik Erikson and Carl Jung. With respect to the positions of Erikson and Jung, unlike Lacan's subjectivity, it seems that

Erikson limits the subject to the ego-identity, pertaining to the particularity of subjective formation in respect to social organizations and production of ego organisms in socio-historical contexts (Erikson 1980, p.160). Similarly, a Jungian position in its panoramic view advances a scientific diagram of the subject's multiple personalities such as introvert, extrovert, the pattern of behaviour, and the collective unconscious desire that none of those traits come out to challenge a modernised normativism conflated with behaviourism. A Jungian belief verges entirely on the propensity in which the unconscious fails to perturb a fort of consciousness, disclosing a hypothesis of the unification of the personality archetype where conscious and unconscious marks imminently a non-duality prospect, a belief that differs from a Lacanian exposition of the subject as the subject of resistance (Jung, 2002, p.56).

Erikson and Jung believe in the correlation between the preexisting objectivity and the development of the human subject at each stage of anatomical and mental evolution. In contrast, Lacan's thinking is seen as counter clockwise to this correlation. This insight corresponds with Soravis Jayanama who points out that a Lacanian discourse is a matter of critically interrogating a socio- politico construction, including the relationship among individuals, and insofar as the relationship is organically fragmentary and contingent; therefore, the reality is just inscribed based on texts, statements, and speech acts (Jayanama, 2022, p.277), alarming

that the subject is rather the Real. As the Real, this subject is geographically and temporally located somewhere else, refusing to encapsulate in the performative act of linguistic reductionism. In Lacan, the Real is an un-signified being that cannot be represented by language and sign. Lacan's subject is characterized as the radical element or the cut in the signifying chain that fails to maintain the consistency of the signifying chain. The Real is implicit in Lacan's suggestion of the existence of the repressive and unconscious topology, which is non-recognition as a form of knowledge in a Lacanian theoretical diagram. This allows Lacan's subject to differ from Erikson's and Jung's. To fulfil the objective, this article is divided into four sections, each examining a different dimension of Lacan's subject as the subject of resistance.

In the first section, it is the dimension of the mirror stage. During the mirror stage, infants can see their own reflection in a mirror, which leads to the realization that the image they see is themselves. They begin to understand that they are separate from others and try to mimic the behaviours of those around them. This can lead to a sense of alienation from their true selves, as they become preoccupied with satisfying the expectations of others. However, this can also lead to the development of a sense of resistance, as individuals learn to act independently and reject the influence of others. In other words, after realising a difference that the subject has with the Other, the subject learns to mimic the image

of the Other. Thus, the subject becomes encapsulated in the desire of the Other. But the desire of the Other is meant for the subject something alienated that which makes the truth of the subject's being going astray, so what is foundational to this compels a possibility to diverge from the presence of the desire of the Other, acting as if the Other does not exist and this is the birth of the subject of resistance.

In the second section, the topic of resistance is discussed in relation to a dimension of philosophy. According to Lacan's theory, a subject of resistance is different from a fallen being of the ego. The true locus of the subject is related to a negation of the ego-consciousness. In this context, negation means that the subject of resistance negates the structural framework of language, which plays an active role in forming the ego. The subject of resistance should be conscious enough to realize that the ego is illusory and never the subject's true locus of thinking. This idea is critically related to G.W.F. Hegel's philosophical speculation of the absolute knowledge of the master. The subject of resistance emerges where negation from the master is an actuality of the subject. A dynamical historicism, consonant with the subject of resistance, can be impelled forwardly eventually.

In the third section, the discussion is extended by introducing trauma as a third categorical dimension. The article argues that trauma based on temporal structure is not solely a remnant of the past but also

related to the logic of alienation predominant in the present. The act of de-traumatization, therefore, requires the subject of resistance to decenter from the current of the present, which overclaims and overlays a historical progressivism.

In the fourth section, it is significant to expand the scope of Lacan's subject as a subject of resistance to include the notion of woman. The logic of Lacanian woman is that she's the absent entity at the heart of the dominant framework of society, which is assumed to be virtually ruled by toxic patriarchy. Lacan's woman is a subject of resistance because of her brilliant ontological difference from the male base representation, based on her action and mysterious desire, which make her the non-all as well as the hysterical.

On the Mirror-Stage: the Other and the subject

In this section, the objective is to rethink Lacan's concept of mirror-stage in order to highlight that the subject of resistance is the subject that decenters from the mirror-stage. To begin with, mirror-stage is the inevitable process in terms of the formation of subjectivity. The subject must engage in this destiny of self-psychical development. The mirror-stage is a ground. It is the earliest stage of life prior to any further development. The fact is that the subject, as an infant, sees his and her own shadows in the mirror. Then, the subject realises that the subject is

different from the Other such as father and mother. This is a disconnection. The subject feels that his or her life does not belong to the Other, in which the lack is at stake of the position of the master-signifier that governs the subject's imaginary (Edkins, 2019, pp.3-4). This is a hole-like in the feeling of the subject. To solve this disconnection, to fix this hole between the subject and the Other, the subject seeks to mimic the image of the Other. Based on the fulfilment of this emotional vacuum, the subject demands himself or herself to compromise with the desire of the Other. From the subject's perspective, the Other is a specular identification. Lacan affirms that the mirror stage, starting at the age of six months is the "triumphant assumption of the image with the jubilatory mimicry that accompanies it and the playful indulgence in controlling the specular identification" (Lacan, 2006d, p.151). Precisely, on the ground of the desire of the Other, under this presence, the subject, at the earliest stage of his or her life, wants the Other to satisfy with the subject's mimicry. When the subject attains this relationship, the subject, in consequence, tries to keep the image of the Other as a crucial image to the subject, but this is problematical insofar as the mimicry is a supreme form of impersonation that violates the age of enlightenment whose virtue is in tremendous respect to personification and individuation.

Yet, the problem starts at this point. The point is self-development that happens in the mirror-stage which is related to the

desire of the Other forms a wrong subjectivity. It makes the subject alienated from himself/herself. Lacan does not agree with the subject that compromises with the desire of the Other. This means that the mirror-stage is discussed for the subject to depart from the mirror-stage. Lacan tries to deconstruct the desire of the Other that the subject takes as the specular image. Following this psychical- philosophical act of deconstruction, Lacan's subjectivity is quintessentially a subjectivity that resists the desire of the Other. Based on this attempt to dismantle correlationism, Lacan's subjectivity is synthetically a subject of resistance. This argument is possible because Lacan is interested in the image of the human being that forms knowledge of the subject (Lacan, 2006d, p. 153). To render this argument clearer, there are two points worth noting.

First, the subject must distinguish carefully between the ego, which is formed following the desire of the Other – a false subjectivity – and the subject, which is the singularity and autonomy in the subject. The latter is a true locus of subjectivity that has nothing to do with the ego. Second, the subject must distinguish between the subject as the ego, which is alienated by the desire of the Other and the subject that separates from the alienating effect caused by the desire of the Other. This separation from alienation is a true locus of subjectivity. Separation is a necessity for the identification of the locus where the subject really

thinks, unlike the womb of the symbolic order that the subject finds being-in-itself lacking and deprived (Shepherdson, 2003, p.120).

Those two points are naturally situated in Lacan's thinking on the mirror-stage. The subject, as a subject of resistance, must break from the mirror-stage. This is not about a choice of interpretation. This is because Lacan acknowledges Jean-Jacques Lhermitte, a neurologist, who he claims that Lhermitte "had devoted for many years to the singularity and autonomy in the psyche of the image of one's own body" (Lacan, 2006d, p.151). Reading Lacan's *Écrits* carefully, it is even clear that following the desire of the Other, the ego cannot be highlighted as a true locus of subjectivity. The ego is what Lacan affirms its existence but later denounces as "the hallucination of one's double, including the latter's (ego's) appearance in dreams and the delusional objectifications that go with it" (Lacan, 2006d, p.151). In his attempt to break from this ego enclosure that forms a false subjectivity, he literally admits that "but what is most important is still its autonomy as the imaginary locus of reference for proprioceptive sensations" (Lacan, 2006d, p. 151). This subject's concern with autonomy shows that a Lacanian subject is a subject of resistance. The ego cannot be anticipated as a subject of resistance because Lacan is critical of it, literally, he suggests that what the subject truly performs is:

a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual or, rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subject's becoming, no matter how successful the dialectic syntheses by which he must resolve, as *I*, his discordance with his own reality

(Lacan, 2006a, p.76; italic original)

In Lacan's statement quoted above, mirror-stage shows a dialectic of the self. Mirror-stage operates in tandem with the desire of the Other. This is a crucial psychoanalytic process that shapes the ego. In other words, the mirror stage produces the ego in order to allow the subject to partake in reality smoothly. But the reality following the effect of the desire of the Other is a deceitful objectivity. Ridiculously, this connection between the ego as a false subjectivity and the desire of the Other as a deceitful objectivity is met. This leads to an ontological tension. From this tension, subjectivity resists it. Lacan seeks to uncover and break from this tension. In the quote again, carefully, Lacan affirms by himself that breaking from the tension the subject is the becoming. The actuality of becoming immanent in the subject is the result of the subject having a discordance with his own reality. The subject is irreducible to anything such as the desire of the Other that forms for the subject an ego.

This irreducibility reminds one of a philosophy of flow. In Lacan's perspective, the flow is related to a construction of phantasmatic

imaginaries internal to the autonomous singularity of the subject. He even continues that this image of subjectivity – the *imago* – is the true object of psychoanalysis (Lacan, 2006d, p.153). The subject needs to identify its own subjectivity as an irreducible phenomenon. This subject of a Lacanian fashion brings Lacan the nearest to resurrecting an anti-Christian ghost of Friedrich Nietzsche’s “will-to-power” atheism as the twin of the “will-to-life” (Themi, 2014, p.57). The will to power, identical to the will to life, is the flow. The flow internal to the subject’s experience of life attracts one to grasp the process of the human being who is naturally thrown and caught in the imaginary spatiotemporal complexes throughout his or her lifetime. The subject of resistance is expected to be fond of the flow until anything that wants to confine it becomes a lack. This category of subject is certainly what is known in philosophy as *amor fati*, that is, a constancy of greatness amidst the ontological contingency. This argument is possible because Lacan’s emphasis is on “a metamorphosis in the individual’s relationships with his semblable such as separation and a trauma of weaning” (Lacan, 2006d, pp.153-154). From this passage, two points arise. First, the semblable refers to the desire of the Other such as a mother, whom the ego seeks love and must reconcile with a desire of the mother as the Other. Second, Lacan deconstructs this relationship. The subject of resistance is the subject that refutes to ensconce in a monotonous homogeneity. This kind of subject emerges naturally at this earliest stage

of life, such as the trauma of weaning and separation from the mother's attractive female body (breast, etc.), which for the subject is the most precious object of desire, with an absence of the father as the agency of the Oedipus complex. The subject of resistance is a worldly existence like a rainbow never touches the soil following a separation from the Other (Nobus, 2022, p.44). This viewpoint buttresses Lacan's original insight on metamorphosis in the individual's non-relationship with his semblable, to which this ontological status led by the semblable cannot sustain a longstanding correlationism in the first place.

The mirror-stage shows a dialectic of the self at the earliest stage of life. This means that Lacan's subject as a subject of resistance to a social norm is the flow. This flowing subject unconventional to normalisation is explicitly “lapsing into the unthinkable, that of an absolute subject” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 79). When the subject is the unthinkable, the subject is a locus of truth. When the subject is unthinkable, this is because the subject is the becoming. It is the becoming that makes the subject the absolute in the subject himself/herself. The flow internalised in the subject is the absolute. This is what Lacan calls a *specular I* that is related to the subject's autonomous becoming in contrast to the formulation of ego-consciousness following the desire of the Other that produces *social I* (Lacan, 2006a, p. 79). Thus, the mirror-stage cannot be saluted as the *specular I*. Since its inception, mirror-stage

that gives birth to the ego cannot be heralded as a true jubilance of subjectivity. If the mirror-stage is related to the desire of the Other, Lacan counters that “the Other presents itself to the subject only in an a-sexual form” (Lacan as Cited in Miller, 1998, p.127): a non-relationship between the subject and the Other. Through the mirror-stage where the ego is formed in relation to the desire of the Other, “man cannot aim at being whole, once the play of displacement and condensation to which he is destined in the exercise of his functions marks his relation, as a subject, to the signifier” (Lacan as cited in Tarabochia, 2014, p.225). Following the quote, the Other claims itself, including everything under its eye and functions as the representative of the being-whole. With this presentiment regarding a possibility of all deletions of the lack, the Other that claims itself as a master-signifier primarily causes the subject a condensation; similarly, it does produce displacement to the subject who is caught in this function of the signifier. Once Lacan suggests human beings separate from this being-whole, against this homology and its function that causes displacement and condensation, this is where the subject of resistance emerges in its material form.

On Negation: the ego and the subject

Besides the mirror-stage, to grasp a subject of resistance under the Lacanian imaginary, it is significant to turn towards the realm of

philosophy where the aspects of truth, reality, and subject are often presupposed as the indestructible relationship. It is this intriguing correlation portrayed in the terrain of immanence that compels Lacan to produce utterances about the notion of the subject. A necessity here is to escort an epistemological linkage between philosophy and psychoanalysis. Although Lacan is often criticised for his anti-philosophy stance, this criticism is likely to be a misleading anecdote. In his words, literally, “I am attacking philosophy? That’s greatly exaggerated.” (Lacan, 2007, p.146). But even if Lacan were to be grouped as the anti-philosophy person as observed by the critics, his antagonistic stance towards philosophy is positive, insofar as his dialogue *avec les philosophes* is another way to save philosophy from crisis.

On the ground, under this terrain of thought, there is a presumption that philosophy is a narcissistic science of self-love of wisdom. In philosophy, it is narcissism which is a trait of philosophy because the ideal and material wisdom is discussed and contingently retained in the esoteric community. The science of self-love is attractive insofar as it aims to essentialise a particular relationship that is anticipated to have a salutary celebration. In this vein, the relationship between truth, reality, and subject is tantamount to contiguity to which its vitalistic livelihood can be thematically noted as infinity without a scratch. It is this ground that seems to posit itself as a metaphysics against finitude. Positing

itself as infinity, the effect of this thinking of metaphysics is astounding. This ascendancy is anxiously possible, nonetheless, insofar as the ground since its inception is not transcendental but illusory. In effect, the relationship qua relationship is just a smooth one that looks *as if*. This means that the pretext of truth that is often presupposed as reality turns out not as the truth but as the virtual in itself. When reality qua reality produces the virtual in itself, the terrain of reality is extremely twisted. This is an anxiety. It is an anxiety because as long as the space of the subject, in which his or her conscious presence exists inside this epistemological web, the subject incubated in this web will be too illusory. This subject internalised to this web is not the Real, as noted in the introductory section. For the Real, negating this twisted-untenable web is a supreme act, and the act called negation is named, and at the same time, demanded in order to preserve the subject and truth: *negation is the first philosophy of the subject*.

Therefore, a negation from reality is a sign that internal to the ontological wholeness is that reality is traced as the virtual. This negation is the first philosophy of the subject, and it is a signifier of the position where the truth is spoken (*parle*). Negation is prioritised insofar as it is essential for an understanding of the Lacanian subject as a subject of resistance. One assumption is called into mind. The unbiblical-heretical assumption yields towards this; the subject will be the subject of truth

only insofar as reality is often destined to encounter the crack that makes reality itself a self-productive discourse of lack. The reality is the ideal constitution of a socio-symbolic field that overdetermines and symbolises the entire meaning of beings in the world. It is by means of language and all signifiers compatible with it that try to shape the subject that the subject that is partially circulated in the bubble of reality is notoriously yet significantly incomplete. As reality is symptomatic in its nature, this means that there is a constitutive lack embedded in the centre of reality. In terms of objectivity, the assumption is assertive and affirmative, symptom is a main characteristic of reality. In terms of subjectivity, on the contrary, the locus of truth is the subject, and this is a material condition of the asymptomatic existence.

Above, the assumption goes on and what the assumption is discovered to say is that it is the reality that fabricates the subject. In effect, it is impossible to find and discover the existence of the subject as the subject of truth in the operative constitution of reality, for reality is endogenously a fallen science. This is because the rigid production of knowledge under the fabrication of scientific discourse such as algebra and geometry, etc., refutes the consideration of the repressed emotion of the subject as the element native to the signifier of scientific knowledge (Leupin, 1991, pp. 1-17). Because of this erroneous fabrication since its inception, in terms of subjectivity, the subject is distorted. Distortion of the

subject emerges because the subject is demanded to well converge with reality. Distortion is destined to encounter a disruption that is likely to challenge its structural fabrication. This is where the subject of resistance emerges. The voice of this subject that resists the bubble of reality is babble. Its emergence does not deny the logic of existence insofar as what it denies is the reality that the reality in itself is a fallen being or a fallen science. Instead of focusing on reality as a decaying science so as to continue with this illness, it is the logic about the subject and truth that must be addressed. The logical assumption is this: the subject of resistance emblematic of a locus of truth denies a smooth relationship between the subject and reality. Such an act of denial of the smooth function of the pretext of the terrain of immanence that shapes philosophical postulation is an act in which the subject is seen as highly performative and metamorphically transformative. This leads to a negation of reality led by the subject. It is this negation of a symbolic contagion of reality that the true nature of the material subject is rather said and seen as the existential being of the negation of reality. Negation is meant to respond to reality that reality is symptomatic, while the formation of the will of the subject absent from reality allows the subject to retain its identitarian self that is attributable to truth. While reality is faltering, it is the act of negation of the symbolic overdetermination in which the subject has ontologically diverged from reality as the virtual, and this subjectivity with respect to

the shattering of reality as a human constitution of things is jubilantly asymptomatic.

The subject that is seen to produce itself in the fabrication of reality has its name. It has an archaic name in the history of psychoanalysis. The name is an ego, indeed. Lacan interrogates the ego by associating it with anxiety, which primarily overwhelms and objectifies the ego. In the midst and mist of the undefinable anxiety – the fear without the presence of an object – the ego feels in every inch of the body that his or her being is severely intruded upon. With this emotional-affective perturbation, the ego is assigned not to walk off the cliff. The Japanese know this vulnerable ego in the midst and mist of fear without objects than any race in the world, for the Japanese language has this name: *Hikikomori*. Because of the fear that has no cause, and in the circumstance that the ego is mentally overtaken by this, a broken ego is deemed anew by no longer subscribing to be the member of a *socius animal*. Insofar as sentient beings such as the human race are reasonable enough not to kill themselves, the ego is nonetheless immune from suicide and death. Relative to this, Lacan submits the thesis on the ego to the hypothesis of “instinct of self-preservation” he continues that “this ego demands self-preservation because the ego is intruded by the feeling of the fear of death” (Lacan, 2006b, p.100).

Upon the ego as the incessant body of the subject of self-preservation amidst being shrouded in the fear of death, the problem emerges here. The ego can preserve its longevity free from pathological disturbance only insofar as it inadvertently needs the introduction of the absolute master. The absolute master posits itself as a means to an end. The knowledge and worldview that the absolute master disseminates to co-exist with the ego reflects that the master valorises itself in terms of a sacrosanct entity *fait accompli*. This co-existential intertwinement of the ego in the face of fear and trembling reflects a Hegelian conceptual praxis of Master-Slave dialectics. This synthetic form of co-existential entanglement of knowledge between the two halves seems to be something that Lacan is reluctant to reconcile with. Although a synthetic knowledge which is famously propounded in the present is a Hegelian-Lacanian modality of thought, this does not mean that anyone can gloss over the eminent criticism that Lacan has upon a Hegelian praxis. Lacan worries about this presence of the knowledge of the absolute Master that dominates the fear and trembling of the ego, denouncing such ruminated scripture as “the temptation to dominate space” (Lacan, 2006b, p.100) of the absolute master of what he calls “a Hegelian murder” (Lacan, 2006a, p.80). In effect, this ego, which is formulated by the absolute master, seems to be the dialectical erosion of the subject’s energetic historical dynamism, while the rumour in the psychoanalytic community seems to

oppose such Hegelian verification of the absolute endpoint. It seems in Lacan's opinion that the ego that is organically constitutive of the absolute master is symptomatic, and this leads to tension or self-contradiction in the subject.

According to Lacan, mapping tension in the subject is crucial for psychoanalysis. This tension cannot be illogically deduced to the problem of anxiety. It is fallacious if one tends to equate tension in the subject with anxiety because it is rather a tension that gives a chance for the dominance of the master. With the presence of illogicality relevant to such a reductionistic psychical landscape, where the ego produces anxiety and the master signifier plays a hospitable role in overcoming this illness, the master signifier is in charge of a responsible agency for the ego's convalescence. Master-signifier awards itself in the middle of the ego's anxiety, and what will be anticipated to be productive is null insofar as tension accelerates itself to be a negative tension for the subject of resistance. In contrast, it is the incoherence of such illogicality which is much more delightful for the subject of resistance. The true tension is productive through the assumption based on a devoid of what used to be virtually assumed as the highest form of logicality if this idea can be quintessentially highlighted instead as a new procedure of logicality. The positive tension requests the subject as a subject of resistance to negate the absolute master. Because of the entry of the Hegelian absolute master

which ends up as a “Hegelian murder” that “intersects with the tension of anxiety” (Lacan, 2006b, p.100), this tension internal to the self is rather theorised and more being “approached so humanely by Freud, and which develops in the temporal dimension” (Lacan, 2006b, p.100). According to Lacan’s passage, a Hegelian absolute master reified as the master-signifier tries to rescue the ego from the subjective undefinable and unobjectifiable fear, trembling, and anxiety constituted and induced primarily in the ego, while the knowledge prescribed by the master is nominating itself as an objectivity. The objectivity in the Hegelian vein is nonetheless a genesis of trauma and time, the temporal dimension as Lacan noted above. It is by means of convening a discussion on the subject under a humane approach of Freud that will rescue the subject while permitting one to grasp the subject of resistance apart from the Hegelian genesis of trauma: the subject which is appointed in this task is the subject of resistance.

On Trauma: time, dialectics, and the subject

It is the notion of temporal dimension mentioned in the above section that compels one to focus on the dual aspects of trauma and time. The archaic fashion has its prophecy fulfilled, time and trauma declare an ambiguous relationship. This means that while trauma is emblematic of a renunciation of political mobilisation as a lack of progress, a seizure of time thanks to the subject of resistance to arouse a retaking

and rearrangement of the linearity of time governed structurally under the specific- unalloyed power relationship is crucial for completion of a transformative historiography. It is the subject and their ability to steal a colonisation of time from the dangerous individuals (capitalist/populist/techno-feudalist) that the notion of a politicisation of time is exuberant, leaving behind trauma, which is being stigmatised as a lack of progress, while this plaque discursive practice has its proclamation fulfilled as the natural hypothesis. Under this monotonous topological image of trauma operated in tandem with a politicisation of time, it is this discursive practice itself that nurtures trauma unfairly. This is because such a linguistic scenario displays trauma under a pathologically ontological prejudice as a residue of the past that is isolated from politics. In this natural hypothesis, to condemn trauma as a remaining particle that haunts the subject and emasculates the subject at the same time until a historical progression has fallen represents a traditional hypothesis on trauma.

On the contrary, an ontological differentiation omitted from that traditional pretext is noted and what will be imposed instead is that trauma can reclaim its power. In this vein, a politicisation of trauma is possible. In other words, trauma will no longer surrender as apolitical. Return power to trauma represents a postulation that stops yielding towards a reminiscence of the painful past. It is once and for all that trauma regains its energetic power in which trauma is an excess of a

personification of the past experience. Trauma: if this mysterious affectivity of the subject is personified, what will that trauma be made representable and illuminable? Violating a grammar of “the unclaimed experience” – a repetitive pattern of trauma based on the unconscious freedom that is independent of the subject’s control and a will of knowledge (Caruth, 1996, pp. 1-9) – which is a main feature of trauma, it is the apparatus of language that encumbers itself as a machine for the *re-writing* and reproduction of trauma. It is this linguistic confinement that is deliberative to narrow down trauma only to a past entity that makes politics inactive and tragically inert. This means, ironically, that trauma must be put under the linguistic representation *par excellence* since trauma becomes a knowledge of the subject because of the role of the language. Therefore, writing and re-writing trauma is achievable following that the trauma takes effect via the body, mind, and experience of the subject (Haines 2019, p. 44). But it is the language that endeavours to organise a decent image of trauma that makes the disorganised nature of trauma to be something superficially unreal. The nature of trauma insofar as it is reducible to the personal experience is a consummation of its own unattainable yet vulnerable thesis – a fallen marriage – and this tragedy is because trauma by its nature does betray a discursive practice that aims to offer a form for it. In other words, this is because trauma as the impossible linguistic signifier is the Real that a personal experience finds its ungraspable and

wholly accessible (Zupančič, 2020, p.143). In its nature, it seems that the event of trauma as an ungraspable wholeness needs the disparate parasitic elements constitutive to it. Meanwhile, a personification of trauma violates this law because the language that makes trauma communicable to others is nothing but to represent trauma as the ghost of the past that produces a haunting effect that influences the subject living in the present, leading to new experimental thinking about trauma.

In a new thinking about trauma in relation to politicisation and the subject of resistance, trauma in its principle can be powerfully rejuvenated only insofar as it denies a personification and temporal structure of the past which induces a representation of it through the function of signifiers such as words, visuals, and narratives. For the understanding of trauma as a power that has potentiality beyond linguistic representations and visualising images, the priority is to renounce trauma from its relationship with the experience of the individuals, those who are traumatised by the incident agonising their life, to remap it anew by way of contextualising a relationship under the temporal structure of the present. This new hypothesis predicated on the relationship between trauma and the present is heuristic based on the following two logical images of time, drawing on the philosophical plenitude of Hegel and Bergson, respectively. In other words, following the two logical images of time below, it is not a prerequisite at all to understand trauma by resorting

only to the incident that previously occurred while assuming that the incident has continued painfully in the body and mind of the subject. Thus, from this point on, a ghost of the past is not a proper reflection of trauma. Trauma is deemed contrapuntally as a spectre dominating the present. This is a challenging hypothesis that one is promised to explore trauma as a factor of the present circumstance that is universally dominating human beings.

The first dimension regarding the logical image of time is a Hegelian absolute knowledge of the Master and Slave dialectics, which is hypothetically preponderate. In this interpretation, it will be argued below that it is the notion which is often promoted and aroused in global south theory and border theory called intersubjectivity. Problematically, this notion of intersubjectivity is not only a less radical term in thinking about politics but also a genesis of trauma. At this point, a subject of resistance is rather interjective in the sense that its separation from objectivity will be pronounced. This means that the axiom of the intersubjectivity must be isolated in this praxis because the intersubjective subject will be alienated under its relationship with the Master caught in the spectral universe of language propounded in the Master ideological- semantical spectrum. In this dialectical apparatus of the Hegelian murder, a certainty is that inferiority and a lack of knowledge are indispensable to the identity of the Slave. Meanwhile, it is the entry of the Master into the universal

bewilderment of the world of the Slave that allows the Slave to have hope in leaping towards progress via the acquisition of absolute knowledge prescribed by the Master. Paradoxically, the Master has their own name, be it God, Churches, State, European- colonial cultures, Finance, Investment, Feudal, Technology, Capital and so on. Then the Master borne with those names came to conjure up what is known in the language of philosophy as objectivity, which is the pre-given reality independent of the subjective experience and awaits the subject's interaction and mutual experience associated with it. In large part, from the objectivity which is assumed as nihil to the Master which forges itself thunderbolt as objectivity, means that objectivity is a residue of the vast substance which is structurally fabricated out of the meaningless black hole of nothingness. It nonetheless continues itself by means of insertion and implantation; in so doing, it is implied as the Other that rushes to promulgate its identity of absoluteness to the mind of the Slave such as the proletariats, working-class, labour, prayers, non-Western people and so on. The objectivity of the contextualised present is static because of the Master while the knowledge of the Slave is summoned to be the doubles of the Master, and in this peril, the objectivity that everyone lives in has never been and will never be politically neutralised.

It is better to keep in mind that objectivity is not naïve while the subject of resistance is hindered from emerging under this narrow

confinement of parochial correlationism, insofar as objectivity has its own motive in the beginning, that is, to communicate, homogenise, and fabricate the mind of the subjective experience. This mutual relationship, rather than a separation of objectivity and subjectivity, is the genesis of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity seems to reproduce the dialectics of Master and Slave, and it is less sensible to celebrate intersubjectivity by delegating it as a useful decolonial toolkit or lens against the colonial colossal effects such as in the literature of postcolonial theory, border theory, and global south that unaware of the Hegelian philosophical and historical dimensions of the term. Although intersubjectivity envisages a probable multiplicity of sites and spaces of mutual interaction and negotiation between the colonisers and the colonised in several distinct dimensions such as cultures, language, art etc. the term is suspicious of its ability to push forward the abolition of existing global power relation dominated by the Master named severally as Capital, Technology, Finance etc. as noted above. Therefore, a global south theory with a dismissal of proper knowledge of the history of philosophy fails to note that intersubjectivity is affirmative of a Hegelian murder. To choose this notion to be a conceptual apparatus aimed to disrupt and change the entire present history of the financialised geo-political competitive world is faltering. As this problematical notion is attributable to a repetition of the Master named Capital that bears with it the objectivity of repugnant neo-

liberal imperialism, it never serves itself as a notion that puts an end to colonialism as expected by the global south theory and the border theory. Intersubjectivity is far from changing a temporal presence under the dominance of the Master that has multiple genealogical guises. Affirmatively, the tension between the Master as the objective progress and the Slave as the fallen subjectivity is rather considerably a genesis of trauma. Against the relationship between a dialectic of Master and Slave responsible for the birth of intersubjectivity, Lacan in his criticism of Hegel is pronounced, and in his words “[Hegel] deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of our history” (Lacan, 2002, p.98) And what is advocated in the synthesis of Hegel appears to be “a self-punishing neurosis with hysterical/ hypochondriacal symptoms of its functional inhibitions, psychasthenic forms of its derealization of other people and of the world, and its social consequences failure and crime” (Lacan, 2002, p.101).

Above, the passage is explicit enough to portray the symbol of a Hegelian Master and its own possible inclination towards mental illness such as the hypochondria symptom developed in the ego to a likeliness of nihilism in the objectivist reality. Intersubjectivity, as noted above, is the conceptual apparatus that represents an irreversible entanglement between the subject and the progress of history led by the Master. The event of alienation arises because of the Slave and the intertwinement of

their worldview with the Master. This alienation and its effect suggest a presence of trauma in the contemporary world, not the trauma as the haunting effect of the past atrocious event. It points out to the subject that fails to emancipate from this intersubjective dimension under the aegis of Hegel's dictatorial progress of history while this subject cannot be part and parcel of the subject of resistance. Under this intersubjectivity based on Hegel's protégé of prescriptive knowledge, and in front of the absolute Master, the event of the death of man is ubiquitously a traumatic scenario. Relative to a discussion, Lacan is clear in this following statement, "here the natural individual is regarded as nil, since the human subject is nothing, in effect, before the absolute Master that death is for him" (Lacan, 2006b, p.98) Lacan is also explicit that it is "dangerous to the subject for whom they can constitute the "fertile moment" of a delusion if he has even the slightest hint of a psychotic structure" (Lacan, 2002, p.118). This is because the nature of the subject is alienated insofar as it is systematically drowned into the huge flood of the world under a mastery image thematised by Hegel as the Man of Europe whose synonymous name is Capital and Technology.

Under this temporal presence of Capital and Technology that tries to convince everyone of its constitution of the fertile moment, the subject of resistance is suggested to omit from a parasitic-delusional compulsion, enabling one to grasp Lacanian psychoanalysis's discourse in terms of

resistance of the subject in a mutual societal and psychoanalytical context. Therefore, instead of compromising with a sign of psychotic structure that one of its names is Capital, the subject of resistance that global south theory and border theory need at their uppermost for the emancipatory political dimension is essentially the interjective, not the intersubjective one. And to grasp the interjective subjectivity, this force on behalf of vitalism will be visible only insofar as the subject begins to resist its own nihilistic objectivism impregnated in Hegel's "self-punishing neurosis" condemned literally by Lacan. This logic of neurosis refers to the function and playfulness of a fantasy and its effect based on a homology of objectivity and subjectivity. It means that objectivity assumes itself as an absolute totality as also the pleasure principle while the subjective experience in touch with it is vital for the continuity of Hegelian objectivity. But the more this situation continues like this, the more it causes a neurotic fantasy reducible as a sustaining reality to the subject. This is because it will continue itself as the productivity of the virtual – a derealisation – which is a symptom of inhibition imposed on the subject as noted in Lacan's passage above, and this leads to the dangerous idea of the so-called intersubjectivity that the emphasis of global south theory and border theory fail to note upon such danger. In another fashion, it can be said that intersubjectivity in a conjunctive synthesis with Hegels' postulation is a reminiscence of the physics and the cosmic black hole

which is a presentiment of a semiotic repetitive pattern. But in the avoidance of such semiotic redundancy that comes close to a mimicry of human behaviour of the artificial intelligence, and under Lacan's logic that compels the alternative identity of the black hole, Lacan's subject as a subject of resistance is a sign of a machinic superpower, in which the human thought and action is reified as the emission of multiple particles resonant with the logic of the Real (Watson, 2011, p.73).

Beyond this conscious space of intersubjective nihilism anchored in a Hegelian principle which is generative of a neurotic fantasy, it is the philosophy of Henri Bergson, endorsed by Lacan, that the second dimension regarding the image of time will be displayed. This gives a subject of resistance the deepest high hope, at least, in part to anticipate a separation from alienation in a traumatic sphere caused by Hegelian's practice of dialecticism. The goal is to achieve de- traumatisation. Significantly, it is Lacan's reference to Bergson that heals the subject from an obsessive neurotic of Hegelian objectivity and in accordance with this realm of thought, a new practice of dialectics is introduced and a high hope to see the subject of resistance is flickering amidst a sky of Hegelian dialectic's night of the world. It is of the term "dialectical negativity" of which a man named Lacan has an owl of Minerva on his turf. Dialectical negativity is the method of thinking about the subject dissymmetrical to the genesis of the ego rooted in Hegel's phenomenological axiom because

the phenomenology of the self, the *Gestalt*, reflects an indoctrination of “Hegel’s gnoseology which formulates the law that generates reality through the unfolding of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis” (Lacan, 2006c, p. 115). To assure, it is certain that Lacan takes into account the idea of dialectics, albeit his rearticulation of such praxis makes him opposable to Hegel’s schematic knowledge, to which the latter stresses in *The Logic of Science* that:

If earlier abstract thought was interested in the principle only as content, but in the course of philosophical development has been impelled to pay attention to the other side, to the behaviour of the cognitive process, this implies that the *subjective* act has also been grasped as an *essential* moment of objective truth, and this brings with it the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle

(Hegel, 2014, p.67).

In this Hegelian version of thinking, his certain focus is on the materialism of the subject. His negation of the abstract idealised notion of the content is obvious, enabling Hegel to be viewed as a materialist philosopher because he sees the conscious act of the subject that forms itself as an objective truth. The objective is to nurture life, give life, and sustain living beings: a Hegelian conatus. This is how an integration of objectivity and subjectivity is cumulative in forging a homology. In a

cognitive process, which can be considered as a methodology for the philosophy of life, the subject's act implies a lack of further progress insofar as it is interlocked under a kindle of the absolute certainty of knowledge. As objectivity demands at its outset an affirmative ground of knowledge for consolidation as for the later immanent sublimation of the subjective experience, the subject in itself is a representation of such ground of knowledge. Eventually, once this correlationism of subjectivity and objectivity reaches its shore, with the process reaches its full circle, this Hegelian thinking culminates in an aggrandisement of the traumatic temporal presence in a sense that the subject itself pertains to the imprisonment of thinking as well as the indication of the historical determinism.

On the contrary, Lacan's dialectical negativity represents that the presence of existing things can be either conceived alive or animated only insofar as it is intensely mutated and modifiable. Dialectical negativity allows one to grasp the truth not in a way that truth is a reductionistic objectivism postulated by the Master, while the Slave is urged to be faithful to the anti-thesis that beats its thesis prior to achieving a synthesis. It is allowed anew the scenario in this absolute immanence of dialectical negativity that all living beings are always- already processual while a Hegelian principle based on certain absoluteness relies on the sublimation of the inferiority such as the Slave to adopt the superior higher position

such as the Master, compelling one to explore and further the relationship between trauma, unconscious, and the subject.

What can be observed is indeed a split in terms of the practice of dialectics between the two faithful believers of dialectics, namely Hegel and Lacan. To interrogate Hegel, again, in terms of the unconscious and the subject, it is easy to see how the Master and its discourse in Hegel's kaleidoscope produce the effect on the unconscious of the Slave. But Lacan's statement is that "truth is not a pre-given that one can grasp in its inertia, but rather a dialectic in motion" (Lacan, 2006c, p.118). From the passage, it means, on the contrary, to Hegel's postulation that to the certain extent that the unconscious is produced by the prism of the Master and discourse, the unconscious is in itself the inertia. It is the inertia of the unconscious, which is endogenously repressive, while it is Freud who tries to save the unconscious from this monographic image; his emphasis is that the motion of the unconscious arouses one to indeed think about the unconscious in the form of formless dynamics. By refusing a painful nostalgia due to the ghost of the past, dynamic unconscious in its aetiological sense is rather a flow of life in its intensity until the subject is unaware that he or she can wither away anxiety-provoking thoughts that at its base does compel a formation of ego-consciousness. At this point, comprised of a logical-dialectical negativity as noted above, Lacan under the influence of Freud emphasises the dynamics of the unconscious which

means that the unconscious has a motion in resisting the Master and its repressive effect always already constituted in its singularity, and this thinking upon unconscious is important to the subject of Lacan as a subject of resistance, a subject that denies homogeneity in every case.

Also, this is the reason why Lacan finds a partnership in a critique of naturalistic adequacy regarding time and subject in the thesis of Bergson (Lacan, 2006b, p.100). In Bergson, a subject and object are caught in the matrix of constant mutation for an achievement of radical subjective metamorphoses as seen in his famous motto explicating that to exist is not just to be given as the beings in the world, but to impel a change to what is supposed to be a transcendental existence, thus, according to Bergson *to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly*. In effect, by this heedful advice in refuting homeostasis with the Hegelian Master, and only by way of making itself in the infinite motion until it is certain to become the site of the imperceptible elusive to and evasive from the Master, can the unconscious be no longer repressive but increasingly voluminous, and this will achieve de-traumatisation of which the subject of resistance is paramount to this task of anti- Hegelian's objectivism and subjectivism homology. An example of this dynamics of the unconscious is Marxist, according to Lacan, literally, "It is certainly piquant to see Marxists wrestling to discover the imperceptible traces of this unfolding in the progression of the

essentially idealist notions that constitute mathematics and overlooking it precisely where it is most likely to appear" (Lacan, 2006c, p.115). While it can be said that the Marxist existence is to adopt and internalise change to the Hegelian idealist notion of historical determinism, it is also possible to say that such tremendous existence of the communist theorist is prolonging the self in the automatic self- transformation inducing an objectivity historical reversibility. In other words, this particularity of Marxist existence raised by Lacan is a universality of the imperceptible trace that is ontologically invisible in the centre of the synthesis and syntax of determinism based on a correlationism of the subjective and objective knowledge promoted by Hegel. While the former is the formidable invisibility – a crack – the latter aims to mathematise and mesmerise society in its objectivised image *writ large*.

From the explication of Marxist existence that marks itself as an absent body capable of threatening a historical progression, it is based on Lacan's dialectical negativity that aims to set every matter, including human subject, in motion that compels Lacan to consider a discreet fraternity of the emancipated man. Lacan's subject is the subject of resistance, again, he literally said that the emancipatory subject is embodied as "the fracturing that reveals that his formidable crack goes right to the very depths of his being" (Lacan, 2006b, p.101). The example of this subject of resistance is *fait accompli* the Marxist, it is not far from

seeing that the identity of this unique subject is that it is a formidable crack in its true essence. This phenomenon of the crack is considerably crucial for subjectivism's destitution from a realm of trauma based on alienation, as noted above. As a remedy for alienation, this kind of subjective segregationist is not limited so little to the enjoyment of political community, but rather conducive to anti-Hegelian objectivism that arouses the subject to be tasked with a proclivity to discover the truth of being. This is the reason why Lacan heedfully advises that seeing the subject in its true realm is possible. It is the subject that cracks a primal cause of its own pathological subjectification – objectivity – so that the subject, as the subject of resistance, can access the very depth of his or her problematical being. Uncovering the depth of being, here, this category of subjectivity can only be identifiable only insofar as it is demanded first and foremost to plant itself as a small seed in the world probably named capitalism, techno-feudal capitalism, and so on, to later discover that it is such this world that is responsible in making the subject goes astray in the beginning. It is the world in the beginning that grounds itself as a huge plantation, in which the self-consciousness of the human being is cultivated as a seed in its estate, that the ironic assumption called “what is real is rational” based on Hegelian dialectic of self-consciousness is precipitated, thus according to Lacan:

These principles are nothing but the dialectic of self-consciousness, as it is realized from Socrates to Hegel, beginning with the ironic assumption that all that is rational is real, only to precipitate into the scientific judgement that all that is real is rational. But Freud's discovery was to demonstrate that this verifying process authentically reaches the subject only by decentering him from self-consciousness, to which he was confined by Hegel's reconstruction of the phenomenology of mind

(Lacan, 2006e, p.241)

The passage suggests that from Socrates to Hegel, the world is real and rational is the iconographic image of the sentient beings in need to sacrifice their nascent-immature ground of living to the ground of reason because the latter is essentialised as the absolute ground of the real and rational. But this thinking cannot retain its monumental status. The subject, in its logical reason, must be enchanted by the logical thinking that all that the subject needs is to begin from the beginning. A true political moment arrives when the subjects being fabricated in such cunning ground of reason begin to see themselves de-traumatised from the alienated traumatisation of the world they are compelled to belong to, in order to secure the logical status that the rationality of the world promoted by Hegel is precipitated not as the Real but as the virtual. The subject is the

subject of resistance. It has its name, indeed, probably in the light of Marxist reason as the *name of the proletariat*. Alongside this, it can be said that a psychoanalytic logic offered by Lacan about the subject is encouraging the subject to refuse to thrive as the organ of this cunning reason of the world. So, it is by operating a dialectical negativity upon the body itself that the logical apparatus cultivated in a psychoanalytic community is exposed against Hegels' dialectics, and the outcome of this is a glowing subject of resistance which really depends on Freud's discovery. It is Freud's discovery which rescues the subject from falsification of the identification of being since Freudian psychoanalysis is committed to taking into account a veridiction of the subject that can collect itself based on an act of decentering from self-consciousness fundamental to the being, which is the being-thrown-into-the-world. This process is vital for de-traumatisation and crucially important to the subject of resistance; the exemplification is not only a Marxist existence but also a woman to which the articulation of the notion will be made in the following section.

On Woman

Besides trauma, the theoretical landscape of psychoanalysis is extensive when Lacan decides to proceed with psychoanalytic knowledge in an innovative fashion. Merging now with a gender matter, through his

discussion of women, a woman is exposed not in a biological account but rather in a conceptual apparatus that helps delineate a subject of resistance. In this sense, for the emergence of the subject of resistance aimed to forcefully challenge the ontological wholeness, Lacan, in this praxis, encompasses his articulation of woman – a Lacanian woman – with the theological principle, in which God is the underlying supreme entity. Worthy of note in advance to avoid a huge misunderstanding is that, when God is seen as equivalent to a woman, this equation aims less to show that Lacan regards God's sexuality as predominantly female over male. His emphasis is rather that woman has the ontological status of the Real. While symbolic order is assuming itself as a reality, the Lacanian Real is a category of phenomenological substance that manifests a cleavage internal to the symbolic order. Following this, the reality fabricated by the symbolic order is virtual while the Real is, therefore, an *ex-sistence*, notably, an outgrowth entity from the shaky surface of the ontic-being.

Consistent with the logic that woman is the Real, Lacan admits that he believes in God in a way that God that he substantializes is different from God being posited in a biblical patriarchy. Following its belief, the biblical text claimed that God is masculine and only a rendition of men to the supremacy is the context that is permissible for them to acquire dominant positions in the Christian evangelical. Lacan in his recalcitrance to such biblical theorem forges on the contrary that it is the

God, which is the entity that can be metaphorically reified as the *jouissance* of woman (Lacan, 1999, p.77), and *jouissance* in this sense refers to “extra” (*en plus*) to which the extra element of woman and her desire is something that the screen fails its mission to screen all things in need of the screen (Lacan, 1999, p.77). In this interpretation, God can be a representational image of a subject of resistance only insofar as God, in a Lacanian sense, is the God that is disjointed from a constitution in a biblical patriarchy. God can retain the status of a feminine *jouissance* – a surplus enjoyment – only insofar as a woman pertains as the subject irrespective of the patriarchal order. Here, what emerges is the subject of resistance to a certain extent that it is *jouissance* that one experiences and yet knows nothing about that puts us on the path of ex-existence. (Lacan, 1999, p.77)

A Lacanian woman is a radical subject of resistance, its motive is not just to stand counter to anything that forcefully oppresses it. It is the female *jouissance* “that does not exist and does not signify anything” (Lacan, 1999, p.76) in the symbolic order. This allows one to grasp female *jouissance* as the Real as a renunciation of existence from symbolic overdetermination. In this context, it gives rise to *jouissance* as a surplus-enjoyment. To enjoy means to repeat breaking the existing rule and this is a condition of surplus-enjoyment to emerge. To enjoy means to situate one’s action and to perform a psychical procedure that is additional to

the regulation of pleasure. Precisely, *jouissance* refers to the surplus pleasure unknown and in addition to a customary *praxis*. It is a surplus enjoyment that opposes its limit, and this is the reality principle of *jouissance*.

This means that the truth is held and secured consistently in advance. Yet, the truth is saved in consistency, in an opaque way. Truth has its paradoxical nature; it is a science of consistency that is not independent of opacity constituted in it, and this induces science to be a mystic character pertaining to the aspect of obscurantism. This is also the truth of enjoyment. Thus, a female *jouissance* is the enjoyment only insofar as it is the excess of a regulation of enjoyment. So, a condition of existence, according to a concern in line with phenomenology, is this: the subject exists in a way that it never ceases to exist. It is this that forms enjoyment to the subject of resistance, a kind of subject that steps in yet refutes to partake wholly in the socio-linguistic determination known as the superficial texture, including the tentacles' binding effect created by the symbolic order. According to Lacan, "there is a *jouissance* that is hers about which she herself perhaps knows nothing if not that she experiences it – that much she knows. She knows it, of course, when it comes" (Lacan, 1999, p.76).

In terms of the so-called *imago*, it is glimpsed at first sight that woman is doubled in the sense that she imitates others who, for her, are

the intimate semblants. She is placed in this relationship with others, and, according to this pitfall, a misrecognition is attributable to her subjectivity. Insofar as she is incommensurable to this wholeness, in the form of others, and only insofar as she is tabooed as fundamentally the subject destitute from the intimate semblant, being hysterical means that the organism of woman is not all since its inception (Lacan, 1999, p.81). In this respect, she is a subject of resistance prompt with the possibility of activating a socio-economic transformation. A relationship with a man is an ambivalent partnership, and insofar as a woman is observed to have fabricated a false reality about herself in this relationship, the order of men that claims a universality of knowledge is untenable and eventually corruptible. A tension in terms of ontology is detected and precisely receptive. The rift is observed, indeed. The rift is the ontological disharmony that displays an antinomy between the knowledge of a woman that a woman knows about herself and knowledge about a woman that a man thinks a man knows about a woman.

To be more precise, although he repeats that “woman does not exist”, this does not mean that Lacan is anti-woman. Reversibly, one must be sensitive to the nature of truth as the nature of paradox as noted above, so precisely, woman does not exist means that woman does exist. Woman does not exist is rather a reference to the inexistence of women only in relation to the problematical causality about women called the

ontological construction of knowledge about women led by men. As the subject of resistance, *the woman does exist anywhere* while she is agile in performing her dialectical existence that resists the knowledge of men. In line with this interpretation, the Lacanian woman *Cogito* is precisely this, *I as a woman does not exist in the consciousness of man. As I am somewhere else, so if man thinks about me in the whereabouts that man knows, I am, therefore, not to exist as in the language of man.* This is why Lacan asserts that “we therefore see the hysterics fabricate a man as best she can – a man who would be animated by the desire to know (Lacan, 2007, p.34). No doubt, Lacan takes knowledge about woman as the riddle speech that performs a hysterical discourse. The vacuous entity, which is known as a woman, is a particular form of ex-sistence that evades a totalitarian regime of a toxic patriarchal order. In this vein, a man has a desire to get to know the hysterics, but a man will suffer from a severe trauma of neurotic symptoms if he resumes that same route of mapping the hysterics and their indefinable desires.

Against a transcendental image of a woman under the epistemic constitution of a male schematisation of knowledge, it can be argued that according to Lacan, it is not a woman that does not exist, but *woman does exist*. For the locus of male presentiment and its repercussion, her condition of existence is reversible to a condition such as the male gaze because she has grounded her own context in a spatial-temporal structure

that, to the order of men, is the alienation. In this domain, she has her own discourse, which for man her discourse is enigmatically a black hole. She is a subject of resistance only in the context of the discourse of which her corpus *par excellence* indicates the status of the in-itself only in her, while this is inducing a desire of man to know her. Lacan, literally, in his words “what matters to her is that other called a man knows what a precious object she becomes in this context of discourse (Lacan, 2007, p.34). Precious object suggests a locus of *object petite a*. The *object petite a* is significant in Lacanian psychoanalytic concept and the *object petite a* does urge everyone to focus on a duality of senses.

In the first sense, the *object petite a* is customarily known as the “object cause of desire”. It must be noted that the object cause of desire is a reference to something which is absent in the domain of the symbolic order such as language and the desire of the Other. It is the peculiar object out-of-joint from the packing wholeness that offers objects of desire to the subject. This means that it is the object cause of desire, which is apparently distinctive, yet in a paradoxical way that it surreptitiously has no place in the language. To understand this, it is worth making a distinction between the object that is always already there to desire and the object cause of desire. To begin with, something that is always already there for everyone to desire refers to the objects that are always already available in socio-symbolic order, such as a teddy bear, a high social status,

the Hobbesian global war, a capitalist maximisation of profit, and so on. Those are easy to find and obtain from the symbolic order. On the contrary, something that is considered as a “cause” of desire means that it is an object impossible to find in the socio-symbolic order. It is absent from the centre of the socio-symbolic order. Precisely, it is the object neither capable of the world making it possible nor available to everyone, such as the Chinese dragon, a classless society, the Kantian perpetual peace, and, of course, an egalitarian justice for all. Those objects cause of desire abstain from the symbolic order, those objects are the Lacanian *object petite* because they are not available in and absent from the turf of the human construction called a symbolic order, and in this tension, the symbolic order’s claim on wholeness, is disrupted in order to encounter the lack in itself.

To illustrate more examples, a true nature of communism deemed originally in Marx’s axiom is the *object petite a*. It has no place in the contemporary political languages such as welfarism as a pseudosocialism, wokeism, nationalism, and populism (such as a Trumpian MAGA etc.) that overwhelm a landscape of contemporary political thought. The left in their proper subjectivities, in effect, must defend this lost object cause of desire discovered in Marx’s postulation against this desire of the Other, or else subjectivity which is caught in the sensational whirlpool of the desire of the Other will displace a proper subjectivity entirely. In

consequence, as the object cause of desire, subjectivity highlights itself as a negativity exonerated from the desire of the Other, the universe of language that denies subjectivity in its true formation. It is where the language cannot find it, and at this negativity is where subjectivity makes an announcement of its birth. In its core, in relation to woman as the subject of resistance, the *object petite a* is an ex-sistence – the Real – and for woman this means a negativity of the male representation of woman. When a woman has no place in the language that man speaks, this makes her the object cause of desire, in which man has gone mad because of her. And this madness of man craving to know her allows her to be a proper subjectivity as Lacan puts this argument this way:

It cannot be the case, either, that the hysterick's division, symptomatic tearing apart, is motivated as the production of knowledge [savoir]. Her truth is that she has to be the *object a* in order to be desired. The object a is a bit thin, men go crazy about it. They are unable even to suspect that they could get by with anything else – another sign of the importance that covers the most subtle of all impossibilities

(Lacan, 2007, pp.175-176)

In the second sense, *object petite a* must be unconventionally (re)interpreted, exuberantly revised, and deemed anew as a denial of offers by the others towards the subjects in order for the subject to

continue repeating the same obsessional-neurotic act. However, it is the symptom nonetheless that is constituted in the act of repetition. Despite the subject knowing that its act of repetition is a symptom, the subject refuses to change. Rejecting the offer from others, the subject continues the same symptomatic act to ensure that nothing will be changed. Lacan describes that “at the level of the hysteric’s discourse it is clear that we see this dominant appear in the form of a symptom. It is around the symptom that the hysteric’s discourse is situated and ordered” (Lacan, 2007). From Lacan’s passage, if the subject takes the offer of the others, it means the subject compromises with the desire of the Other, and if this is the case, the subject is deprived of its true identity. The desire of the Other means, precisely, not to make the others not want me. But a hysterical subject is existentially possible only insofar as its ontological cleavage explosively reveals that its ground of thinking does not belong to anything that wants to supply, govern, and form its desire since its inception.

In this respect, in this second sense of course, the most important aspect is that it is the enjoyment which is related to a denial of offers intent by the subject. In other words, enjoyment can save its true nature following the subject intends to reject all offers of others while the subject is legitimate in resuming the course of the same (symptomatic) action. For this hysterical subject, it is a fulfilment that kills enjoyment while it is the

lack and a denial of objects that saves enjoyment via the obsessional-neurotic act. Accordingly, in front of others, the subject cherishes and maintains a lack in itself. And in so doing, in this impossible relationship to others, this subject is the sublime subject, intending to make itself a fallen being and also the unfulfilled being. The subject who understands this kind of enjoyment intends to be the fall, trying to maintain himself or herself as the fallen being. The meaning of *object petite a*, in this second sense, is this: the subjects are their own discourses, namely, the discourse of the hysteric as the fallen beings and this, for them, is an extreme vitality. Lacan suggests that hysteric is the *object petite a*, but “for *qua object [petite] a*, she is the fall, the fallen object, fallen as an effect of discourse, which in turn is always broken at some point (Lacan, 2007, p.34).

For instance, in love, following a quarrel, a woman as the hysteric rejects all comforts and reconciliations from her lover, and this rejection is maintained as an obsessive- neurotic act. Yet, for her, this is an enjoyment as a result of her denial of the offers made by her partner. Another example is in politics; the left is obsessive- neurotic enough to enjoy criticising and denouncing an ongoing political affair. They all deny being part of any political parties that offer them significant political positions. If they take the offers, they cannot continue their obsessive- neurotic act, and for them, it will be the end of enjoyment. So, in order

to keep their enjoyment in being critical of all political parties going, all offers from others (e.g. political parties) must be turned down.

In this argument, it can be said that *objects petite a* is the subject whose identity is diagnosed as the hysterical who assumes herself as the *subject cause of desire*. This is an extreme form of narcissism. It is the ideal image of narcissism in the absence of the Other that is different from the narcissism of the Other because such a figure of narcissism will emerge only insofar as the subject chooses to cooperate with it. But a narcissism in this focus is a hysterical narcissism. It is the subject of resistance with the will-formation of self-love that is omitted from the desire of the Other. In other words, the hysterical subject is a woman. As a subject of resistance that denies the offers of others, this image of woman as the hysterical maintains herself as the subject cause of desire and masochistically, what the subject may whisper to herself is this: *I, amid all denials, do love my symptomatic narcissistic self*. Therefore, the subject of resistance has a paradoxical meaning. That is to say, while rejecting all offers of others, a woman figurative of a hysterical subject finds herself desirable despite she knows that her act and thinking are symptomatic. This is why the hysterical subject finds herself problematically and weirdly desirable. She is the *object petite a* in herself; she is the absolute in herself despite such absoluteness has a gap or a hole in the signifier of the absoluteness. Yet, this absoluteness in herself is an insignia of the subject of resistance. It

produces itself as the discourse while producing what Lacan (2007, p.44) calls a “a reject-producing effect [effet de rejet]” and this allows the woman to be reified as the subject of resistance to be the *object petite a*.

Conclusion

In summary, this article bears with its task the inquiry of the subject sporadic in Lacan’s works that appear in the form of writing and a seminar. Based on the dimensionality of the four diverse episodes ranging from mirror-stage to woman, the subject of the Lacanian psychoanalytic formulas and conceptual semantics has one synthetical knowledge; it is the subject of resistance that which its action, mind, and thinking are really against a homology that attempts a mapping of the subject. In this essence, insofar as the subject wreaked havoc on the reality that the objective correlationism forms for the subject nothing but a false consciousness, and by retaining a locus of the truth of thinking and action, this means the subject cannot be confused with ego-consciousness. The subject that resists homology means that the subject primally sees himself or herself as a spilt subject, which in Frued, the German terminology called *Spaltung*, is hoisted in a psychoanalytic discourse as the Real.

The Real is by which the subject is performatively a negative dialecticism that is seen to refuse a rational claim such as of the Master’s determinism and subordination of the Slave speculated in Hegelian dialectics. From such philosophical consideration, asking for the

phenomenology of the self, especially the locus of the true *ex-sistence* of the subject, is inevitable. In response to a complexity of subjectivity and existence that concerns philosophy, Lacan's subject of resistance emerges since the subject's early stage of life, namely, the mirror-stage, which is a ground for mimicry to take effect. But for in-depth thinking, this process is turned upside down insofar as it is just a ground not for the attachment but for the detachment, and the latter is where the subject of resistance emerges. An act of detaching from something is depictable in the new terrain of thinking about trauma. The writing in this article attempts unconventionally that trauma does not live with the hypothesis of the haunting memory of the past, but trauma is linked to the contemporary circumstance of alienation. It is induced yet at the same time intriguing to say that trauma is related to the alienating effect that the present time produces. What appears after this is the subject with the act of speaking on behalf of reason (*sapere audē*) is the act of de-traumatisation. It is the act that salvages us from possible nihilism, and this movement of socio-politico thought belongs epistemically to the subject of resistance.

Lastly, by gendering a subject of resistance, a woman is a signifier of the hysterical refers to the phenomenology of the self that disengages and disentangles from God's image of a woman that often subdues her. Therefore, *woman is God in herself*, and this *sapere audē* makes sense insofar as she is a *jouissance*, while this subject of resistance that depends

on female embodiment is violating a totality claim on knowledge of the patriarchal symbolism; a piece of mysterious jewellery in which her sense of humour, body colour, and joke depend on her act of just simulating herself as the unreal image for men counterpart: a clamour of the camouflage permissible for her to retain *jouissance* while persevering a synthesis idea of *woman is a God in woman*, a subversion of Spinoza's *man is a God in man*, indeed.

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