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Contents

Introduction

Jirayudh Sinthuphan

Asia is a problematic concept. What is Asia, other than a way of setting apart a group of non-Western cultures from the West? It is, historically, culturally, and politically, a diverse region that is artificially constructed through a rather generalized perspective. As a result, we often miss some important details in the development of a national state in Asia that has contributed to Asia's diverse forms of sociopolitical existences and challenges. Articles appearing in this issue of the Asian Review bring to light some of these missing details and provide readers with clearer insights to Asia's diversity.

In *Singapore's Speak Mandarin Campaign: A Historiographical Review,* Xing Fang provides a historiographical review of how Singapore's language policy has played an instrumental role in its process of nation building since the country's independence in the 1960s. Singapore's well-known *Speak Mandarin Campaign* has evolved from a form of an identity marker into a form of cultural capital that has also contributed to its success as a leading globalized economy. Since the 1980s, Mandarin has become a dominant language in Singapore together with English. The success of the campaign has led to the decline of Chinese dialects, as well as the decline of Singapore's multi-culturalism and ethnic identity loss in exchange for the Singaporean government's economic pursuits.

Although homosexuality is rarely discussed in Japan, an emerging trend in Japanese media where everyday lives of gay char-acters is depicted in television drama series, has provided a space for LGBTQ+ issues within Japanese society and has raised awareness of the discrimination of LGBTQ+ people among Japanese youth.

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Promoting Sexual and Gender Diversity through the Portrayal of Sexual and Gender Minority Youths in Media: The Views of College Students in Japan by Yuki Amaki guides the readers into the thoughts of a group of Japanese college students on popular media content and the changing Japanese perspective of LGBTQ+ people. Despite a few negative responses, there seems to be a unanimous belief that gay-related romantic dramas could be a catalyst for eliminating prejudice and discrimination against LGBTQ+ community among young Japanese.

Next, Chai Skulchokchai investigates Thailand's turbulent democratization by comparing it to Japan's democratic processes in the 1930's in The *Same Old Story: The Collapse of the Semi-democracy Regime in 1930s Japan and 2006 Thailand.* Despite the events being almost 100 years apart, the article argues that we can still learn from Japan's past failure. Japan in the 1930's was a semi-democratic state in the same way as Thailand is at present. Japan's failed process of democ-ratization lied in its parliamentary structure, that allowed unelected offices a considerable authority over an electoral force, in the belief that there existed a better alternative form of administration than an elected government, as well as in the civilian government's incapability to assert their control over the military.

Lastly, Jakkapong Sukphan and Prapaporn Kitdamrongtam discusses the issue of digital divide in Thailand. *Information Communication Technologies in Thailand: The influence of social structure and the autonomy of use* postulates that digital inequality is a form of social inequality. Although Thailand's digital infrastructure has considerably improved, the issue of unequal access and differentiated use still prevail. People in big cities still have better access to digital infrastructures. It also theorized that social status of individuals also influence their online activities and pursuits. There seems to be considerable digital disparities between social classes, genders, and education levels.

Singapore's Speak Mandarin Campaign: A Historiographical Review

Xing Fang[1]

Abstract—: Language policy functions as a critical instrument in Singapore's nation building since its independence in the 1960s. This paper intends to examine some major literature in the past fifty years concerning Singapore's well-known Speak Mandarin Campaign, in order to reveal the chronological development in scholarship. The content of the literature foregrounds paradigm shifts from viewing Mandarin as an identity marker to valuing it as linguistic capital, and from treating identity as a bounded concept to acknowledging its fluidity in the context of globalisation. The evident historical changes in the writing of the studies also reflect shifts in terms of the scholars' gaze in research, the core subject under investigation, the meaning of critical notions such as national identity and Mandarin, as well as research methods adopted and sources analysed. These findings could reinforce understanding of the scholarly developments concerning Singapore's language policy and inform the direction for investigating recent progress of the Speak Mandarin Campaign and Singapore's national identity formation.

Keywords : Speak Mandarin Campaign, nation building, identity, linguistic capital, language shift, globalisation

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Introduction

Singapore is a nation-state characterized by a tradition of plurality. As a former British colony, the city was originally established as a trading port with its people residing in different ethnic enclaves such as Chinatown, Geylang as a Malay area and Serangoon as an Indian area. Each ethnic quarter developed an education system with their own language as the medium of instruction, which reinforced institutionalised separatism (Ginsberg 1955; Gopinathan 1979). Around Singapore's full independence in 1965, the government launched the policy of integrated schooling in hope of overcoming the ethnic segregation, and bilingual education was advocated and implemented in schools (Gopinathan 1979). All pupils in schools were required to learn English plus another official language of the nation, i.e. Chinese, Malay and Indian. It was believed that English as a non-native language could facilitate inter-ethnic communication and the students' mother tongue could help retain their ethnic identity and cultural heritage (Gopinathan 1979; Kuo, 1985; Silver 2005).

With emphasis on the socio-economic value of using English as a major language of instruction, the number of Singaporean students registering for Chinese-medium schools declined considerably from 1959 to 1977 (Gopinathan 1979). Since the local Chinese is an ethnic majority in Singapore and constituted 76.2% of its population in 1977, the government, led by the People's Action Party (PAP) considered the Chinese-medium schools important for the transmission of Asian and Chinese values. Against this backdrop, the government, chaired by the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, launched the Speak Mandarin Campaign (hereafter referred to as SMC) in 1979 with the intention of countering the influence of the English language and uniting the Chinese ethnic groups divided by their use of various Chinese dialects such as Hokkien, Cantonese and Teochew (Chan 1999; Gopinathan 1979; Teo 2005). This paper aims to review the literature exploring the SMC from the time it was launched to today, with the hope of revealing the trends of development in academic writing with regard to this well-known language policy.

The selection of the literature is based on the researcher's professional expertise, the publisher, the impact factor of the literature, the field of research of the literature, as well as the subject matter of the studies.

Table 1
Criteria for the Selection of Literature (Part 1)

Criteria	Category	Number of Author (n)	Percentage (%)
Author's field of expertise mentioned in the literature	Anthropology	1	4.3
	Art and design	1	4.3
	Education	6	26.1
	Language, linguistics and literature	8	34.8
	Political science	3	13.0
	Psychology	1	4.3
	Sociology	1	4.3
	Others	2	8.7
Author's affiliation mentioned in the literature	National University of Singapore	6	26.1
	Nanyang Technological University	7	30.4
	Ministry of Education of Singapore	1	4.3
	University College, Cardiff	1	4.3
	University of Newcastle upon Tyne	1	4.3
	University of New South Wales	1	4.3
	University of Niigata Prefecture	1	4.3
	University of California, San Diego	1	4.3
	University of California, Los Angeles	1	4.3
	Massey University	1	4.3
	Hungarian Academy of Sciences	1	4.3
	Others	1	4.3

Note. N = 23.

As Table 1 shows, the majority of the authors were affiliated with well-regarded academic institutions or government department, with 56.5% of them from the two most distinguished universities in Singapore. Also, 34.8% of them held expertise in language, linguistics and literature, with the rest specialising in other relevant fields of liberal arts and social sciences.

Table 2
Criteria for the Selection of Literature (Part 2)

Criteria	Category	Number of Studies (n)	Percentage (%)
Publisher	Academic Press (Elsevier)	1	5.3
	Brill	1	5.3
	Elsevier	1	5.3
	Oxford University Press	1	5.3
	Routledge (Taylor & Francis)	10	52.5
	Springer	2	10.5
	The Philippine Sociology Society	1	5.3
	Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore	2	10.5
Impact factor of the literature as of December 2021	7.27	1	5.3
	2.814 (2020)	5	26.3
	2.582 (2020)	1	5.3
	2.491 (2020)	1	5.3
	2.3 (2020) CiteScore	1	5.3
	1.765	1	5.3
	1.523 (2020)	3	15.8
	N/A	6	31.4
Field of research of the literature	Applied linguistics	7	36.7
	Art and design	1	5.3
	Communication studies	2	10.5
	Psychology	1	5.3
	Regional (Southeast Asia) studies	3	15.8
	Sociolinguistics	4	21.1
	Sociology	1	5.3

Subject matter of the studies	Graphic or slogan design	2	10.5
	Identity	5	26.3
	Language shift	2	10.5
	Language attitude	1	5.3
	Linguistic capital	2	10.5
	Mass media	2	10.5
	Nation building	1	5.3
	Policy (language or education)	4	21.1

Table 2 further strengthens the reliability of the literature in that 84.2% of the studies were published by leading international academic publishers such as Routledge, Springer and Elsevier, and 68.6% of the studies were published in journals with an impact factor of at least 1.5. Moreover, the literature is considered useful because the studies discussed a range of subject matter with direct relation to the SMC, and the literature is in highly relevant fields such as applied linguistics (36.7%), sociolinguistics (21.1%) and regional studies (15.8%). Next, the literature is discussed in a chronological order and categorised under themes such as language planning as nation building, identity loss occasioned by the SMC, linguistic capital and language shift, the decline of multiculturalism, as well as the global turn for the SMC.

1970-1979: Language Planning as Nation Building

The principal task facing the PAP government after Singapore's independence was nation-building. Scholars in the 1970s seemed to be interested in exploring how the PAP government was addressing institutionalised ethnic segregation and nurturing a unified national identity. Poh-Seng (1976), Quah (1977) and Gopinathan (1979), for example, provided analysis of Singapore's domestic and regional social environment to reveal the political, economic and cultural factors that propelled its government to build an integrated nation, and they also rendered a discussion of the official policies enacted for achieving this purpose. They pointed out that Singapore's multilingual population,

separate educational streams resulted in unequal socio-economic development among the ethnic groups, and its prominent feature of Chineseness were obstacles to the country's domestic and regional integration. Informed by government publications such as reports, laws and policies, these scholars reviewed Singapore's strategies for tackling the challenges, especially the implementation of the education policy of bilingualism. They considered that this policy would not only allow Singaporeans to learn necessary skills through English, the "neutral" language of technology and commerce, for facilitating inter-ethnic communication and constructing an industrialised nation, but also enable them to retain ethnic values and norms through their mother tongues to maintain Singapore's identity as an Asian nation.

Poh-Seng (1976, 76) deemed the policy of bilingual education supportive for the maxim of "unity in diversity" in Singapore, but Gopinathan (1979) noted that the ascending popularity of English and English-medium schools, owing to the measure of bilingualism, had occasioned a drastic talent drain of Chinese-medium schools, and the situation prompted the Singaporean government to launch the Speak Mandarin Campaign to prevent ethnic value shift, unite the Chinese dialect communities, and maintain increasing trade communications with China. Unlike Poh-Seng (1976) and Quah (1977), who did not evaluate the effectiveness of the language policies, Gopinathan (1979) also criticised the government's oversimplified treatment of Western society as decadent and English as a language lacking common moral values, and he seemed not to agree with the elimination of Chinese dialects and the promotion of ethnocentrism through the SMC. He suggested that such measures would be counterproductive for developing Singapore into an international city, major communications centre and popular tourist destination, and would also thwart Singapore's efforts on cultural integration and nation-building. With these issues raised, it can be found that studies in the 1970s situate the SMC in the framework of Singapore's nation-building where language policies play a vital role from the very outset and cast a strong influence on Singapore's national identity formation.

1980-1989: The Promotion of the SMC and Identity Loss

Scholars examining the SMC in this decade concentrated on the Singaporean government's mobilisation of mass media for the promotion of the campaign. Harrison (1980) again reminded that the trend of students drifting away from Chinese-medium schools to English-medium schools in Singapore was unabated. He expounded how the Ministry of Culture in Singapore was directed by the PAP government to promote the SMC through television and radio programmes, printing presses, etc. Adopting a quantitative approach, Harrison compared not only the transmission time of the television and radio programmes that feature the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew promoting bilingual education and the SMC in 1978 and 1979 but also the amount of coverage of the programmes in the local English-medium press, The Straits Times. The comparison revealed the Singaporean government's determination over the campaign and the increasing role of mass media in presenting the language policies.

Similarly, Kuo (1984) conducted a case study to examine how the Singaporean government employed mass media for boosting the SMC. He first used Lee Kuan Yew's public statements in 1979, which advocate the campaign and encourage extensive use of Mandarin among the youths, to explicate that the status planning of Mandarin was achieved through government authorities. Statistical data, survey reports and legal acts released by the government such as the Department of Statistics and the Ministry of Culture, together with leading local press (e.g. The Straits Times and Nanyang Siang Pao), were then employed to discuss the development of mass media as powerful agents of communication in the country, illustrate the structural regulation of these media by the government, and provide a more detailed description of the government's mobilisation of the media to promote, evaluate and teach in the SMC as compared with Harrison (1980). Also, Kuo (1984) explained more lucidly why the mass media "did not question the legitimacy and objectives of the 'Speak Mandarin' campaign" (30) within Singapore's political context, and reported some critical comments regarding some measures

of the campaign rendered by the English-medium press, such as using "the Romanised phonetic system (Hanyu Pinyin) to spell and document the names of school students" (31), which seemed to have incurred a change of individual identity.

Given the massive promotion of Mandarin, and changes in Singapore's linguistic landscape, Kuo (1985) further directed attention to the relationship between language and group identification. He drew on his own observation of language use in Singapore and statistics from the Ministry of Education of Singapore and the press (e.g. The Straits Times) to demonstrate that the policy of bilingualism was cultivating a trend of increasing use of English and Mandarin because of institutional support from education and mass media, and this trend further induced language and identity shift in the Chinese dialect groups in Singapore. When the group identity was disappearing, Kuo (1985) argued that a large portion of Chinese cultural traditions and values associated with the dialects would be at stake, and the awareness of ethnic distinctiveness among Chinese Singaporeans reinforced by the SMC would as well hinder the formation of a national identity that was associated with the increasing use of the inter-ethnic language, English. Kuo (1985) did not offer sufficient concrete evidence for supporting such conjectures, but he seemed to resonate with Harrison (1980), suggesting that Mandarin and English are in strong competitive positions within the framework of Singapore's nation-building.

Like Harrison (1980) and Kuo (1984), Newman (1988) also described miscellaneous promotion measures for the SMC based on reports of the press (e.g. The Straits Times and New Nation) and his observations, such as dropping dialect programs on government-operated radio and television, adopting Hanyu Pinyin for the names of children and localities, and using various promotional instruments (e.g. posters, stickers). Newman, unlike Singapore's regulated mass media (Kuo 1984), also attempted to challenge the legitimacy of the SMC by refuting the main arguments in support of the campaign as reflected in one of Lee Kuan Yew's speeches in 1978. Through analysis of the speech and

reports of the government (e.g. Goh Report), he first pointed out that the SMC was influenced by the education reforms in China in the 1950s and the decline of Chinese-medium schools in Singapore, and he then criticised the educational, cultural and practical arguments underlying the SMC, claiming that dialects could positively support the learning of Mandarin that they are cognate with, people do not need to "speak" Mandarin to understand and practise traditional values such as filial piety, habits of thrift and respect for authority, and Chinese Singaporeans do not necessarily need a lingua franca for effective communication between each other because they often possess a repertoire of multiple languages or dialects. Newman (1988) also believed that the success of the SMC was not necessarily grounded on people being persuaded by the arguments but more on the emotional impact of the arguments on them.

As the literature above reveals, the rapid and smooth development of the SMC was explored by scholars with reference to Singaporean government's regulation over mass media. Moreover, the implementation of the campaign was tied by the scholars to identity loss, which prompted further research towards the language and identity shift of the dialect communities in Singapore.

1990-1999: Mandarin as Linguistic Capital and Language Shift

Studies of this decade have demonstrated a growing interest in the expansion of trade opportunities with the rising mainland China after its Open Door Policy in 1978 and its impact on local identity and language shift in Southeast Asia. Drawing on a wide range of press releases such as the Bangkok Post, Nanyang Weekly and The Straits Times from Southeast Asia, China Daily and Renmin Ribao from China and The Economist the West, Nyíri (1997) presented a thorough discussion of the re-orientation of policies of Southeast Asian countries towards mainland China, which he believed was occasioned by China's re-emergence as an economic and military power and the pan-Chinese nationalism that China seemed to employ to engage overseas Chinese. Nyíri sought to reveal how economic interest associated with

the re-opening of the broad Chinese market had contributed to the consolidation of political cooperation and cultural identity between overseas Chinese communities and mainland China. This mounting cross-boarder nationalism, which echoed the initiatives of mainland China in Southeast Asia, was deemed by Nyíri a disservice to Singapore's nation-building endeavors and a phenomenon that may increase tension in Singapore's foreign relations in the Malay sea.

Besides, Chan (1999) adopted the method of iconography to analyse the poster designs of the SMC from 1979 to 1996 and discuss how texts and images were utilised to create a graphic identity under the campaign. Through examining the themes and the presentation of people and objects (symbols) in the posters, Chan discovered that Mandarin was effectively constructed as an identity marker closely connected with culture, heritage and tradition of the Chinese community as well as an instrument for understanding mainland China and gaining access to the potential economic opportunities lying ahead. Thus, this study also sheds light on how China's economic expansion in Asia has occasioned Singapore to realign its national ideology through visual communication with its people.

In line with the studies exploring identity shift in Singapore, Li, Saravanan and Ng (1997) also reported that young Singaporeans of Teochew descent had abandoned their Teochew identity and considered themselves Singaporean Chinese. Unlike common research on language shift that investigates minority community, Li, Saravanan and Ng examined, through observations and interviews, language change in families of Singapore's second largest Chinese subgroup, the Teochew Chinese community. They found that the shifting of the Teochew language to Mandarin and English was mostly attributed to the Singaporean government's promotion of the socio-economic value of the national languages and the language attitudes of the Teochew community shaped by the language policies. Likewise, Gupta and Siew (1995) adopted an ethnographic approach to study language change within a multi-generation family in Singapore. Through observation and

interviews, the researchers discovered that Cantonese as the home language was shifting to English and Mandarin, which resulted in communication barriers between grandparents and grandchildren. Informed by the grandchildren's language attitude that the "dialects" are linked to their old and undereducated grandparents and are of little use or value to them, Gupta and Siew (1995) predicted that Cantonese would continue to suffer language loss.

These studies reveal that the formation of Singapore's national identity was gradually discussed with transnational consideration of a wider Asian context, in particular, the ascent of China's economy. The scholars also diverted closer attention to the issue of rapid language shift in Singaporean families through ethnographic case studies.

2000-2009: Linguistic Capital and the Waning of Singapore's Multicultural Identity

A striking feature of studies regarding Singapore's language policy in this decade is the focus on linguistic capital and instrumentalism. The studies further reveal the intricate relationship between language and identity. For example, analysing the content of speeches and comments made by Singapore's government leaders concerning the country's language policies, mainly from The Straits Times, Wee (2003) pointed out that the rising instrumental value of Mandarin in Singapore's participation in international trade with China could not only weaken local Chinese identity due to its dependence on exonormative standards for Mandarin learning and use but also instigate the competition amongst the mother tongues locally, and further impair Singapore's multiracial national identity.

Teo (2005) adhered to the approach of critical linguistics and used Halliday's systematic-functional grammar to conduct critical discourse analysis of all the SMC slogans from 1979 to 2004 in terms of themes, mood structure, lexicogrammatical features and interpersonal metafunction. Through examining a variety of sources of data concerning the SMC such as government officials' speeches, excerpts published on the official SMC website,

local press releases (e.g. The Straits Times) and other official print materials on the SMC, Teo revealed how the discourse of these slogans had reproduced and reinforced the government's political and economic ideologies. In line with Wee (2003), Teo also believed that the emphasis of the economic value of Mandarin in relation to China's large market potential would irritate the non-Chinese ethnic minorities and make them feel disadvantaged and marginalised, which might further split the nation's multicultural fabric. Based on census reports from the Department of Statistics of Singapore, Teo also indicated the fall of dialects in the country and stressed that a lot of Singaporean culture is dialect-based, and with the loss of the language connecting the generations and transmitting traditional culture and values, young Chinese Singaporeans would become more enchanted with Western values and ideals carried by English, so a trend of more significant culture and identity loss would be underway.

Adopting Bourdieu's concepts of capital and field, Silver (2005) examined the connection of Singapore's education system with its language and economic polices. Through analyzing government policy documents, government officials' public speeches, press releases, Silver showed that the education system and polices of Singapore reinforced the role of English and Mandarin as economic capital for increasing the country's opportunities in international trade. More importantly, Silver discovered that English started to expand its traditional roles as economic and social capital (facilitator of interethnic communication) and assume new roles as cultural and symbolic capitals (i.e. identity marker) when an increasing number of Singaporean families made English their home language in order to provide their children a head start in school; the government also encouraged highly proficient bilinguals to become bicultural. As English fulfilled the new roles originally intended for the mother tongues, Silver (2005) argued that "it has begun to dominate the linguistic field and reduce the need for bilingualism in contrast to stated policies" (61) and could further influence Singapore's extant multilingualism. This seems to echo Teo's (2005) concern that English may occasion further cultural shift in the local linguistic landscape of Singapore.

Following the trend of probing the relationship between language and identity, Bokhorst-Heng and Wee (2007) explored the achievements of the SMC and the failure of the Pinyinisation of Singaporeans' names. Grounded on the notions of pragmatism and communitarianism (e.g. the spirit of community) that the government adopted in rationalising its language policies, Bokhorst-Heng and Wee analysed the naming practice of Chinese Singaporeans with reference to the government officials' public speeches, press releases (mainly The Straits Times) and census reports from the Department of Statistics of Singapore. They found that the implementation of the SMC was successful because the Singaporeans were convinced of the pragmatic value of Mandarin, which would give them an edge when they compete with others to take advantage of China's growing economy, yet the government's urge to change dialect names to Pinyinised names had been sternly rejected by Chinese Singaporeans because they found no pragmatic grounds for such change and it breaks a person's connection with his or her ancestry and group identity and contravenes the spirit of Confucianism.

To sum up, the literature above employed different approaches and concepts to discuss the economic value of Mandarin and English in Singapore within the context of China's booming economy. Through analysis of government discourse and news releases, the literature alerted the government to the gradual loss of Singapore's multiculturalism due to its economic pursuits via language policies but also demonstrated a rising scholarly trend that focuses on local Singaporeans' defense against ethnic identity loss.

2010-2021: The Global Turn and an Uncertain Future

As technological advances have facilitated greater global movement of people across territories, greater diversity and new challenges have appeared in societies like Singapore. Drawing on sources such as government policy documents on education, speeches delivered by government officials, news reports (e.g. The Straits Times), census and statistical data released by government, Chua (2010) revealed Singapore's changing population landscape

on account of its new immigrant intakes and discussed how this movement of skilled talents together with China's rising economic status had pushed the SMC and the bilingual policy to take on a diversified approach and move towards multilingualism and multiculturalism as the norm of language education in order to prepare Singaporeans for an increasingly multilingual world. However, Chua doubted the effectiveness of this new approach because she believed that it is impossible for language learners to master multiple languages at the same level.

Unlike Chua (2010), who believed the Singaporean government had adopted a prestige planning approach to promote the learning of Mandarin and English for their economic prestige, Curdt-Christiansen (2014) conducted critical discourse analysis of the textual features of media sources, TV advertisements, campaign slogans and government officials' speeches regarding the SMC and found conflicting ideologies behind the image planning policy (the SMC) and the prestige planning policy (the Chinese curriculum reforms from 2004 to 2010). In particular, Curdt-Christiansen (2014) revealed that the government continued to increase the image of Mandarin and even portray it as a global language. On the other hand, the Chinese language curriculum reforms reduced the number of productive skill (writing) learning. This, to some extent, lightened the weight of Mandarin learning and did not bring about positive change in Singaporeans' attitudes towards Mandarin. Taking the perspective of students, Curdt-Christiansen (2014) argued that the incongruence between the educational reform and the promotion of the SMC was sending confusing messages that could, in fact, discourage the learning of Mandarin. He also contrasted the situation of Mandarin with English, which, under the prestige planning policy, had gained a steadfast status in Singapore's educational system and become the medium of instruction for all school subjects except mother tongues in all schools. When all benefits are granted to those who master English, Curdt-Christiansen cast doubts on the fate of Mandarin in Singapore.

Interested in exploring language change under the impact

of the SMC, Ng (2017) adopted a mixed method approach to investigate Singaporean dialect-speakers' self-reported language use in public and private spaces, and their attitudes to Mandarin, English, other dialects of Chinese, as well as the SMC. The results of the self-administered survey of the study show that although dialects were still a major language within the family, Mandarin as well as English were overtaking them to become the dominant language in both public (e.g. shopping centres) and private domains (e.g. close friends and colleagues). Ng (2017) attempted to elucidate the language shift by revealing the respondents' general positive attitude towards the practical functions of Mandarin, its economic value in international trade with mainland China and Taiwan, and the official arguments of the SMC that Mandarin can unify Chinese dialect groups and maintain Chinese culture and traditions. Ng also indicated that the government's pro-English educational policy seemed to have caused the majority of the respondents to believe that Mandarin is less important than English. Through the follow-up semi-structured interviews with some of the respondents, Ng (2017) noted that their support for the continuation of the SMC was related to their concern of the decline of Chinese language and culture because English is becoming children's language at home and Singapore is transforming into an English-speaking country. Despite the dominance of Mandarin and English over dialects, Ng (2017) revealed a persistent desire among the survey respondents and the interviewees for preserving dialects because they are identity markers of subgroups within the Chinese community, which may also facilitate transmission of local Chinese culture and traditions and help prevent the marginalisation of the dialect-speaking elderly population in society.

In line with the research interest in shifting language and culture, Lim, Chen and Hiramoto (2021) studied the increasing contact between Chinese Singaporeans and non-local Chinese in Singapore through analysing their discourse (disputes) in two viral videos. The study focused on the changing identity and language ideologies of Chinese Singaporeans in relation to the shift of their dominant home language from Mandarin to English, pan-Chinese Confucian values and the recent influx of mainland Chinese

migrant workers. The findings revealed a distinctive Chinese Singaporean identity marked by fluent English and Confucian values, which seemed to cause division between Chinese Singaporeans and mainland Chinese (im)migrants despite their shared linguistic heritage, and increase social tensions within the nation.

The issues raised in these studies demonstrate that the development of the SMC was explored and discussed in light of the trend of globalisation. The studies seem to question the practicality of the new multilingual approach employed by the Singaporean government for reforming the SMC because English and Mandarin, with their economic benefits, continue to marginalise weaker languages in the country, and the changing Chinese Singaporean identity or Singaporean Chineseness, resulting from ongoing language shift, also seems to cause new fissures in Singapore's population landscape in the context of globalisation, and further complicates its nation-building process.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to provide a review of the scholarly development concerning Singapore's Speak Mandarin Campaign since its inception in the 1970s, and it has revealed that the shifting language policies of Singapore and the progress of the campaign have been profoundly influenced by regional and international sociopolitical climate. In general, studies in the 1970s provided the fundamental political framework regarding the SMC as scholars linked the campaign to Singapore's strategy of nation-building during this decade. In the 1980s, scholars focused on the government's utilization of mass media for promoting the SMC and started to direct attention to language and identity shift among the Chinese dialect communities in Singapore. Works in the 1990s documented cases of rapid language shift in Singaporean families occasioned by the SMC, the development of which was gradually associated with China's rising economic status and pan-Chinese nationalism. After the 21st century, the studies showed that Mandarin and English were emphasised as linguistic capital in Singapore's language policies, and scholars' attention turned to the decline of Singapore's multiculturalism and local Singaporeans'

defense against ethnic identity loss within the framework of the governments' economic pursuits. From 2010 onwards, the studies further explored the development of the SMC in relation to the trend of globalisation and turned to examine the feasibility of the new multilingual approach for the SMC as well as identity conflicts arising from continuing language shift towards English, which foregrounds new challenges to Singapore's nation-building endeavors.

Taken together, the above studies in the past fifty years suggest that scholars shifted from a pro-government's view that attempted to provide political justification for the SMC to a people's perspective that questioned the dominant political discourse by focusing on the negative impacts of the campaign such as language shift within the family and identity conflicts in public spheres. The focus of the subjects being examined also changed from official language policies to personal language attitudes and use (e.g. naming) in response to these policies. The national Singaporean identity that cuts across almost all the studies also shifted from a relatively bounded and static notion to a more flexible and fluid one in light of the pan-Chinese nationalism and the trend of globalisation. The notion of Mandarin as identity marker was likewise expanded to subsume the concept of linguistic capital. As for the sources analysed in the studies, the change from primary official documents (e.g. government policies, laws, statistic reports) to a more dominant use of secondary source such as leading local newspapers was also noted, and the scholars' research methods also changed from conventional content and discourse analysis to the use of ethnographic observation and a mixed use of quantitative survey and qualitative interview. These trends and changes have enhanced understanding of the scholarly developments concerning the SMC and have guided researchers to concentrate on Singaporean people's reaction to the campaign, treat language and identity as dynamic constructs, and employ mixed research methods and diverse sources for further investigation on the progress of the campaign.

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Promoting Sexual and Gender Diversity through the Portrayal of Sexual and Gender Minority Youths in Media: The Views of College Students in Japan

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Abstract—: As one social phenomenon, television drama series depicting gay male couples' everyday lives have become popular in Japan as well as East Asia. The purpose of this research is to assess how much these TV drama series influence young people to improve their awareness and knowledge of the prejudice and discrimination faced by LGBTQ+ people in society. My target population for this study was current college students in Japan. 167 students were asked to write comments about whether or not Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities because of the wave of popular dramas. From the views of college students, the results of this study have revealed the positive and negative aspects of broadcasting romance TV drama series depicting gay male youths. Through this survey, many participants indicated a belief that gay-related romantic dramas could be a catalyst for eliminating prejudice and discrimination against LGBTQ+ among young people, while others responded negatively about this idea. The students who gave negative responses stated that the rise in the popularity of dramas about gay male couples among Japanese

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people is a temporary phenomenon, and that the tendency can easily change. Romantic drama series about gay male youths may be effective as a supplementary teaching material to encourage youths to respect LGBTQ+ people and appreciate difference.

Keywords : *Media, College Student, Gender Diversity, Sexual Minority, Gender Minority*

Introduction

With many sexual and gender minorities – lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ+) persons – having experienced discrimination and harassment, many companies in Japan have offered LGBTQ+ friendly workplaces and set up LGBT initiatives to support and promote LGBTQ+ rights. In Japan, people often believe that being gay is a misfortune. Without solving this problem, society cannot expect, much less promote diversity and inclusion for LGBTQ+ people (Fujimoto 2019, 150). Japanese people's attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people have gradually been changing. As one social phenomenon, television drama series depicting sexual minority youths, particularly gay male couples' everyday lives, have become popular in Japan as well as East Asia. The content of these drama series often includes experiences of gay male youths' loneliness and social isolation and depicts how sexual and gender minorities encounter difficulties in coming out about their sexual identities and gender orientations. Most of these drama series have been based on Japanese manga comics depicting gay male couples, manga intended mainly for female consumers (Baudinette 2017, 60; McLelland and Welker 2015, 4). Since 2016, Japan's major private TV networks have broadcasted several romantic drama series about gay male youths. The examples are as follows: Ossan's Love (2016), What Did You Eat Yesterday? (2019), Cherry Magic! Thirty Years of Virginity Can Make You a Wizard?! (2020), Vanishing My First Love (2021), Old-fashioned Cupcake (2022), Minato Shoji Coin Laundry (2022), and so on. Some TV drama series were turned into movies because they were surprise hits in Japan and East Asia, including in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. The movie Ossan's

Love: LOVE or DEAD (2019) was released in East Asia, and the movie, What Did You Eat Yesterday? (2021) was released in 2021. Cherry Magic! Thirty Years of Virginity Can Make You a Wizard?! was turned into a movie in April 2022 because of the popularity of the TV drama series in Japan as well as East Asia. These movies have gathered attention and have enjoyed box office success.

Many romantic TV drama series depicting gay male couples' everyday lives have also been produced in Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. In Thailand, romantic TV drama series depicting gay male couples' everyday lives, with professional young actors, have been released on virtually a monthly basis, including titles such as SOTUS (2016), Until We Meet Again (2019), He's Coming To Me (2019), 2gether (2020), Not Me (2021), and Lovely Writer The Series (2021). They depict not only gay male couple's romance but also discrimination and prejudice toward gay male youths in their everyday lives. Gerbner (1998) states, "Broadcasting is the most concentrated, homogenized, and globalized medium" (176). These TV drama series have become a global phenomenon. Baudinette (2019) states that Japanese manga comics depicting male-male relationships have been adapted to the local Thai context, and that a new queer genre has been created in Thai popular culture (116). They have been "glocalized" in Thailand to produce popular romantic TV drama series. Many people in East Asia have become addicted to these drama series. One of the more popular TV drama series in Thailand, 2gether, was made into a movie titled 2gether THE MOVIE, and it was released in East Asia. In Japan, the movie was released in major movie theater chains in 2021.

Consciousness and awareness of prejudice and discrimination against sexual and gender minority people may gradually be changing among young people thanks to the increased portrayal of gay male youths in romantic TV drama series. With these drama series gathering attention, how have college students come to see LGBTQ+ people? How does watching these TV dramas affect their attitudes? Has society become more accepting of LGBTQ+ people with the social phenomenon of LGBTQ+-related media?

Does the fact that TV broadcasting companies are producing romantic TV drama series depicting gay male youths' personal lives and LGBTQ+ issues mean that LGBTQ+ people need to worry less about suffering rejection by their family members or friends? Has this changed their level of concern about becoming subjects of jokes or slurs? The purpose of this research is to assess how much these TV drama series influence college students to improve their awareness and knowledge of the prejudice and discrimination faced by LGBTQ+ people in society.

Research Questions

The primary purpose of this research is to explore how college students see the popularity of gay male youths' romantic drama series on Japanese TV and how much these social phenomena affect their recognition of prejudice and discrimination toward LGBTQ+ people. It is to be expected that the wave of popularity of gay male youths' drama series should have significant impact on college students' attitudes and consciousness toward sexual and gender minorities. It is also to be expected that the global phenomenon of popular LGBTQ+ drama series in East Asia should play an important role in advancing understanding of sexual and gender minorities among young people.

Theoretical Perspective

There are many internal and external factors that influence people's attitudes and consciousness toward sexual and gender minorities. Cultivation theory can be used to determine the extent to which repeated exposure of young people to TV programs can influence their attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs about social reality over time. Gerbner (1969) first proposed the idea of cultivation indicators in the 1960s. Gerber (1998) suggests, "Television is the source of the most broadly-shared images and messages in history" (177). Zerebecki et al. (2021) state about the theory, "When a viewer watches multiple programs, mental representations of the televised message accumulate in the mind. These representations become easier to retrieve from memory" (5). The theory yields important benefits in researching how repeated

exposure to messages from media can influence the way people view society. Repeated exposure to media over time shapes people's perceptions, their values, beliefs, and attitudes. Zerebecki et al. (2021) note that "shows that present ethnic or sexual minority members in a positive light have the power to convince viewers that such individuals could be valuable members of society" (5). Based on this theory, Meer and Pollmann (2022) hypothesized that people who watch a lot of Dutch TV programs including portrayals of LGB people will have more positive attitudes toward LGB people than those who do not (644). Repeated viewing of similar messages about homosexuality on TV programs can result in more positive attitudes toward LGB people, and increased positive portrayals and representations of gay people on American TV programs have made viewers more accepting of LGB people (Zerebecki et al. 2021, 6). It is possible that the same could be said of Japan, where people who repeatedly watch romantic dramas featuring gay characters may have more positive attitudes toward gay people than those who do not watch such dramas.

Literature Review

Many researchers have conducted surveys about sexual and gender minorities, but not much research has focused on how romantic TV drama series depicting gay male couples' everyday lives influence young peoples' consciousness and awareness about sexual and gender minorities in Japan. Human Rights Watch (2016) reported that many sexual and gender minority students in Japanese junior high schools and high schools have experienced bullying because many Japanese people still retain negative stereotypes and attitudes toward sexual and gender minorities (16). Broadcasting TV drama series might be a solution to help young people understand loneliness and social isolation among LGBTQ+ people.

Media Representations of Gay Male Youths on Japanese TV Drama Series

One popular LGBTQ+ drama series, Ossan's Love, was a surprise hit in Japan and East Asia, and the drama was turned into

a movie, Ossan's Love: Love or Dead, in 2019. The movie was also a hit in Japan and East Asia. Ossan's Love was accepted by many people of all ages and genders, not only gay people or female fans who typically watch dramas depicting gay male couples' everyday lives. Kawano (2021) notes that Japanese drama series depicting gay male couples as main characters have become popularized amongst many people in Japan regardless of age or gender (197). TV companies now more commonly depict gay male characters in ways comparable to straight characters in drama series (Kawano 2021, 195). Fujimoto (2019) and Kasuga (2022) state that depicting gay male couples' everyday lives filled with happiness, without any kissing or hand-holding on screen in Ossan's Love and What did You Eat Yesterday? helps all viewers understand that being gay is a valid lifestyle. Many people still harbor stereotypes and misconceptions about LGBTQ+ people, and depicting gay male couples' everyday lives in TV dramas should help reduce these stereotypes and misconceptions.

Morikawa (2022) also investigated why many people in Japan were attracted to gay-themed drama series. She found that viewers understood the TV producers' intention of depicting a pure romantic drama without regard to gender and without discrimination against gay characters (17). She states that it is difficult to interest heterosexual men in gay-related dramas, and that many heterosexual men would not watch gay dramas with serious content. It was the fact that the drama in question was portrayed as a normal romantic and comedic drama that attracted so many people. She concluded that, "although the paratexts of Ossan's Love brought heterosexuals and homosexuals together by sharing an ideal society, it is unclear whether this drama promoted society's understanding of LGBTQ communities" (18). There are not many drama series related to LGBTQ+ people in Japan, making it difficult to change people's perceptions of LGTBQ+ people through television programming. Japanese society has not recognized LGBTQ+ people, and Japanese media, such as TV programs, need to send out more powerful messages to change societal perceptions (Morikawa 2022, 18). In addition to Ossan's Love, other gay-related dramas need to be produced with content

that will be of interest to heterosexual men and women. It is also necessary to create an environment where watching gay-related romantic dramas is not something embarrassing or hidden, and where such dramas can be a normal topic of conversation among friends. If such an environment can be created, understanding and acceptance of LGBTQ+ people may be further enhanced.

Media Representations of LGBTQ+ People on Dutch Television

With LGBTQ+ related television programs airing in Europe and the U.S., Meer and Pollmann (2022) investigated how the media in the Netherlands, where LGBTQ+ understanding is more advanced, affects the attitudes that Dutch people hold toward sexual minority people. They examined how stereotypical representations are related to Dutch people's views of sexual minority people. Based on cultivation theory, they formulated two hypotheses. The first is that people who watch more TV programs with stereotypical portrayals of sexual minority people on TV would have more stereotypical views of sexual minority people in the real word. The second is that people who watch more TV programs with portrayals of sexual minority people on TV would have more positive attitudes toward sexual minority people. In the study, 272 participants (93.8% heterosexuals, 1.50% lesbians, 3.70% bisexuals, and 0.7% gays) responded to an online survey measuring to what extent Dutch TV programs related to sexual minority issues influence Dutch people's perceptions and attitudes toward sexual minority people. They found it was clear that watching TV programs with stereotypical representations and depictions was not positively associated with Dutch people's attitudes toward sexual minority people. Those who watched stereotypical depictions of gay men on TV programs were shown to have even more negative attitudes toward sexual minority people. The two hypotheses they mentioned were not confirmed. No association was found between watching sexual minority-related TV programs and attitudes toward sexual minority people. They revealed that people who watch high levels of stereotypical portrayals of sexual minority people do not have more perspectives of sexual minority people. They also found that younger age groups and non-white

people were shown to have a more stereotypical view of gay men than other age and racial groups. Gender, religion, race, and sexuality are important influential factors in attitudes toward sexual minority people, especially among heterosexual men, religious, and non-white people, indicating that they have negative attitudes toward sexual minority people. In the study, they revealed that people who frequently watch stereotypically portrayed TV programs do not have different attitudes toward sexual minorities compared to those who do not watch stereotypically portrayed programs, and the degree of stereotypes about gay men is associated with television viewing. The results of the survey of people in the Netherlands should be used as a reference, and a similar survey should be conducted and compared in Japan. By comparing the survey results from the Netherlands, where understanding and acceptance of sexual minority people are advanced, with survey results from Japan, where many people still have prejudice and discriminatory attitudes toward sexual minority people, I may be able to obtain hints for reducing prejudice and discrimination against sexual minority people.

Taking into consideration my respondents' inputs, I should be able to offer important suggestions about how external factors, such as broadcasting romance TV dramas depicting gay male youths, influences young people's consciousness of negative stereotypes and attitudes toward sexual and gender minorities with the aim of helping to reduce the gap between fiction and gay male people's real lives. The results of this survey will provide direction for further research by revealing the positive and negative aspects of broadcasting romance TV dramas depicting people belonging to sexual and gender minorities in Japanese society.

Research Method

My target population for this study was current college students in two private universities in Tokyo, Japan. The survey on paper was distributed in intercultural studies courses after they discussed the wave of the popularity of romantic drama series depicting gay male couples in class. The survey I administered took approximately 20 minutes to complete, which the college

students did in class. The survey was given to approximately 180 college students. The results of this study reveal similarities and differences of opinion and attitudes toward sexual and gender minorities among college students.

In the background of the questionnaire I distributed, I have included each student's gender and year in university. In the next section of the survey, participants were asked about whether or not sexual and gender minorities continue to face prejudice and discrimination in Japanese society. The survey measured whether or not Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities due to the wave of the popularity of romance TV drama series depicting the portrayal of gay male youths' everyday lives.

In the last section of the survey, I asked them to write open-ended comments and conducted qualitative analysis through the survey. My question for them was as follows:

What do you think: Do you think that Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities because of the wave of the popularity of romance TV drama series depicting gay male youths' everyday lives?

All collected quantitative data was analyzed using cross-tabulations in the SPSS system. Also, the open-ended comments on the questionnaire were processed using KH Coder text mining software (Higuchi 2016; Higuchi 2017). Co-occurrence networks are connected by the KH Coder software based on the pattern and frequency of the extracted words in the respondents' comments. As shown in the figures below in the data analysis section, strongly related words are connected by lines. Also, the participants' information was kept confidential within this study. An identification number was given to each participant, and their names do not appear on any data.

Quantitative Data Analysis

In the study, 167 college students responded to the survey. Of the 167 students, 99 were female students, and 68 were male

students. No one chose "other" or "prefer not to answer" for gender identification. The survey was relatively balanced with regard to gender. The respondents were classified as female students or male students. Also, in the group of female students, 55.6% were freshman, 29.3% were sophomores, 13.1% juniors, and 2.0% seniors. In the group of male students, 58.8% were freshmen, 20.6% were sophomores, 19.1% juniors, and 1.5% seniors. The majority of both groups is freshmen.

The students were asked two questions regarding LGBTQ+ people in Japan. They responded on a 4-point scale (1=totally disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=somewhat agree, 4=totally agree), with 4 representing "totally agree." When I analyzed college students' responses on an agree-disagree scale, significant differences did not emerge between female and male students as indicated in Table 1.

Table 1. Recognitions and Attitudes toward Sexual and Gender Minorities

	Female Student				**Male Student**			
	N	**Mean**	**SD**	**CV**	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**CV**
1. Do you think that LGBTQ+ people continue to face discrimination in Japanese society?	99	3.02	0.73	24.17	68	2.99	0.82	27.42

	Female Student				Male Student			
	N	**Mean**	**SD**	**CV**	**N**	**Mean**	**SD**	**CV**
2. Due to the wave of the popularity of romance TV dramas depicting sexual and gender minorities' everyday lives, do you think that Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities?	99	2.82	0.56	19.86	68	2.84	0.70	24.65

(*CV=Coefficient of Variation)

When I analyzed college students' responses on an agree-disagree scale, no significant differences emerged between these two groups on question 1, as indicated in Table 1. In question 1, the students were asked about whether or not sexual and gender minorities continue to face discrimination in Japanese society. The data show that the majority of respondents think that sexual and gender discrimination still exists in Japanese society. The female students are more likely to think that sexual and gender minorities are indirectly and directly discriminated against, compared with the male students' responses. Also, looking at the coefficient of variation (abbreviated to CV) in Table 1, the CV of the male students is higher than the CV of the female students in question 1. The female students were more likely to be concerned about sexual and gender minority issues and accept sexual and gender minorities than the male students, but not significantly so.

In question 2, the students were asked about whether or not the wave of the popularity of romantic TV drama series

depicting gay male youths has encouraged Japanese people to be more understanding of sexual and gender minority issues in Japan. The data indicates that the majority of students in the two groups gave negative responses about the relevance between social acceptance of LGBTQ+ people and media portrayal of gay male people. Another finding is that, looking at the CVs in question 2, the CV of the male students was higher than the CV of the female students. It seems that male students are more reluctant to understand and accept LGBTQ+ people, compared with the female students' responses, and that most male students are not interested in watching gay male youths' romance drama series. This might be related to the low level of acceptance and understanding of LGBTQ+ people among the male students.

Qualitative Analysis of the Data

Influence of Broadcasting Romance TV Drama Series

1. The View of Female Students

In the survey, 167 students responded to the open-ended questions. All the students were asked to write comments about whether or not Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities because of the wave of popular dramas. Figure 1 is a co-occurrence network graph based on the collected comments. Characteristic words in the same subgraph are connected by a solid line. When characteristic words co-occur in other subgraphs, words are connected by a broken line. The quantitative data indicates that 77.8% of female students "somewhat" to "totally" agree that Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities. They believe that broadcasting romance TV dramas has led to positive perceptions of LGBTQ+ people. From the female group of characteristic words extracted using KH Coder software, I extracted the three positive concepts.

The first concept is that the portrayal of gay male couples as leading characters leads viewers to be more open-minded toward LGBTQ+ people. As Figure 5 shows, "drama" is related to

"open-minded," "broadcast," and "popular." The female students wrote comments:

> "There are not so many taboos in Japanese culture. Broadcasting LGBT drama series leads people to understand and accept LGBT people. In recent years, globalization in Japanese society has had positive impacts on human rights. Japanese people need to discuss the human rights of LGBT people and improve legal systems for them."

> "In recent years, the portrayals of gay male couples in TV drama series have increased in Japan. This is a recent phenomenon for Japanese mass media, so Japanese people are becoming tolerant toward LGBT people."

The second concept is that the depiction of young gay male couples in romance TV drama series has been widely introduced among Japanese youths, and they are likely to understand and accept LGBTQ+ people. As Figure 5 shows, "LGBTQ" is related to "many," "people," "understand," "recognize," "know," "feature," "manga (Japanese comics)," and "society." Female students wrote these comments:

> "The romance TV drama series, movies, and manga depicting young gay couples have become increasingly popular among young people, so our public understanding of LGBT has grown."

> "I work in a bookstore part-time, and I found out that there are many manga books and novels about young gay couples' romance and their everyday lives. Many Japanese people know that gay couple's romance is a literary genre."

The third concept is that Japan has a big market for manga comics and novels depicting gay male couples' romances, though many Japanese people still have prejudice toward LGBTQ+ people. As Figure 1 showed, "girl" is related to "rotten," "recently," "LGBT," and "issues." "Rotten girl" (fujoshi) is a Japanese term for female fans of manga comics, TV drama, and novels depicting the romance between two gay male characters. Female students

wrote these comments:

> "Movie production companies have produced many LGBT films and TV drama series. I think that is a good turning point, that people have recognized the social problems and the issues faced by LGBT people, such as bullying at school and discrimination against LGBT. I am called a rotten girl. Rotten girls had a negative image several years ago, but in recent years, I have become very proud of myself for being a rotten girl."
>
> "LGBT TV drama series have become increasingly popular, and we have large rotten girl communities. I think LGBT drama series play a significant role in deepening the understanding and acceptance of LGBT people."



Figure 1: Co-occurrence Network of Female Students' Positive

Responses

But 22.2% of female students "somewhat" to "totally" disagree that Japanese society seems to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities on the popular wave of romance TV drama series. From the female group of extracted characteristic words, two negative concepts were extracted.

The first concept is that gay male couples' romance stories in TV drama series are fully fictional, not real. The female students note that popular romance stories are glorified and are unrealistic. As Figure 2 showed, "people" is related to "watch," "fiction," "many," and "same sex love" in a group. Another group is that "homosexuality" is related to "drama," "glorify," "close to," and "part." Female students wrote these comments:

> "TV drama series depicting romance between two gay characters are fully fictional, and many scenes are glorified. If my friends were gay male couples in real life, it would be difficult for me to accept them."

> "LGBT films and TV dramas are fictional. While many Japanese people have embraced gender and sexual diversity in recent years, in real-life situations, it is still difficult for many people to understand and accept gay male couples at schools and in workplaces."



Figure 2: Co-occurrence Network of Female Students' Negative Responses

The second concept is that manga comic books depicting the romance between two gay couples are very popular among Japanese women, so the TV production companies have produced romantic drama series depicting gay male youths. But the popularity of TV dramas has not led Japan's government to recognize same sex marriage, and the drama series have not played a significant role in changing the course of prejudice and discrimination toward LGBTQ+ people. As Figure 6 showed, "television" is related to "content," "simple," "fantasy," "topic," and "love" in a group. Another group is that "manga (comics)" is related to "movie," "Japan," "feature," "open minded," and "popular." Female students wrote these comments:

> "True love between two gay men is just fictional in the dramas. If you met a gay couple in real life, you wouldn't be able to accept them. Japan's mass media was very con-

servative. In recent years, the media has tended to produce LGBT drama series because many people are concerned about the social problems faced by LGBT people."

"The television broadcasting companies choose to offer romance drama series depicting young gay male couples and their everyday lives based on Japanese LGBT comic books. I understand that the drama series have become popular in Japan, but this social trend hasn't led Japanese politicians to recognize same sex marriage. Also, I don't think that broadcasting these romance drama series helps stop prejudice and discrimination against LGBT people in Japan because many politicians are still very conservative."

2. The View of Male Students

75% of male students "somewhat" to "totally" agree that Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities because of the popularity of romance TV drama series. As Figure 3 shows, from the male group of extracted characteristic words, the two positive concepts were extracted.

The first concept is that broadcasting TV drama series depicting young gay male couple's romance helps reduce prejudice and discrimination against LGBTQ+ and helps Japanese people create closer connections with LGBTQ+ people. As Figure 3 showed, "society" is related to "LGBT," "currently," "broadcast," and "do" in a group. Another group is that "open-minded" is related to "works," "describe," "recognize," "men," "love," and "together." Male students wrote these comments:

"Since Japan's television broadcasting companies have produced LGBT-related drama series, it seems to me that the companies are less likely to take conservative positions. The recent popularity of LGBT-related drama series has led to increasing tolerance and acceptance of LGBT people."

> "Half a century ago, the television broadcasting companies might have refused to produce TV drama series depicting a gay male couple's romance because many people discriminated against LGBT people and didn't accept them. In recent years, the companies have produced gay male couples' romance TV drama series because many people are likely to understand and accept LGBT people."

The second concept is that broadcasting LGBT-related drama series helps raise some interest in discussion of the issues and problems facing LGBT communities. "People" is related to "LGBTQ," "many," "television," "increase," and "same sex." Male students wrote these comments:

> "The television broadcasting companies have produced many LGBTQ-related drama series because they want Japanese people to know how LGBTQ people live in our society. Social media provide an opportunity to discuss several issues faced by LGBTQ people."

> "In recent years, the media frequently reports that many countries have legalized same sex marriages, and also same sex partnership systems have spread across Japan. These social phenomena have led the television broadcasting companies to produce many LGBT-related TV programs. Many people have become concerned about the problems LGBT people have faced."



Figure 3: Co-occurrence Network of Male Students' Positive Responses

25% of male students "somewhat" to "totally" disagree that Japanese society appears to be growing increasingly tolerant and accepting of sexual and gender minorities at the peak of the popularity of LGBT-related drama series. As Figure 4 shows, from the male group of extracted characteristic words, two negative concepts were extracted.

The first concept is that the popularity of LGBT drama is a temporary phenomenon and has gone on for a few years. "LGBT" is related to "open-minded" and "many." Male students wrote these comments:

> "Many women are open-minded to LGBT people. Some of them like reading comic books depicting gay male couples and watch LGBT drama series, but many men are not interested in watching LGBT drama. I think the popular-

ity may be a temporary phenomenon among women."

"I think the popularity of LGBT drama series is a temporary phenomenon. I don't believe many Japanese people understand and accept LGBT people even at the peak of the popularity of LGBT drama series."



Figure 4: Co-occurrence Network of Male Students' Negative Responses

The second concept is that people accept homosexuality in fiction and dramas, but they don't recognize and accept LGBT people in the real world. In Figure 4, "homosexuality" is related to "accept" and "recognize." Male students wrote these comments.

"People accept romance among gay male couples in fictional stories on television, but many people reject seeing gay male couple's hand-holding and kissing in public in

the real world."

"I don't think homosexuality has been recognized in our real society even though many people have accepted homosexuality in fictional dramas. Broadcasting LGBT dramas hasn't become a solution for understanding and accepting LGBT people."

Discussion and Conclusion

This study has considered how college students have seen the popularity of gay male youths' romantic drama series and how much these social phenomena have affected their recognition of prejudice and discrimination toward LGBTQ+ people. Zerebecki et al. (2021) state that "TV shows can represent minorities in various ways, both positive and negative, thus affecting their levels of acceptance and diversity attitudes" (11). From the views of college students in the two private universities, the results of this study have revealed the positive and negative aspects of broadcasting romance TV drama series depicting gay male youths. The data show that female college students are likely to be less homophobic than male students. This may be because these drama series have been produced mainly for heterosexual women. The survey results of LGB-related TV viewing in the Netherlands also revealed that young heterosexual men have more negative attitudes toward LGB (Meer and Pollmann 2022, 659). In this study, I did not ask both male and female participants whether or not they have ever watched romantic drama series depicting gay male couples. It is possible that many men are less interested in romantic dramas and less interested in gay-related romantic dramas than women. Men with negative attitudes toward gay people are even less likely to watch such dramas.

In the study, approximately 75% of female and male students, respectively, believed that broadcasting TV drama series depicting gay male characters would positively influence people to understand gay male people's feelings of loneliness and social isolation in their everyday lives. Since cultivation theory suggests that repeated exposure to media influences one's beliefs about the

real world, I believe that repeated viewing of gay-related dramas may help one to accept gay people in the real world with less resistance. The data shows that some students who have negative responses in this study believe that heterosexuality is the only natural sexual orientation. The male college students tended to be reluctant to support sexual gender minorities, so they might not be interested in watching these drama series. The expansion of gay male youths' romantic drama series would be a great way to begin to understand the underground LGBTQ+ communities where many LGBTQ+ people enjoy their lives and live safely, and would move toward heterosexual people's understanding of LGBTQ+ people's experiences. Another way to think about this is that gay-related romantic dramas might not be viewed by heterosexual male students, so including romantic dramas for heterosexual youth that do not focus exclusively on gay relationships could make them more likely to reach these male students as well.

The students who gave negative responses state that the rise in the popularity of gay male couples' dramas among Japanese people is a temporary phenomenon, and that the tendency can easily change. Although the popularity of gay-related romantic dramas is likely to be temporary, a notable number of romantic dramas depicting gay male youths are now being broadcast compared to a few years ago. Kasuga (2022) suggests that the rise in the popularity of Japanese drama series depicting gay male couples' everyday lives helps Japanese people to accept and respect different ways of living, and that it also has led to passage of an anti-discrimination law that prohibits discrimination against sexual and gender minorities (279). Since 2016, romance TV drama series depicting gay male youths as main characters have gradually become popular in Thailand and Japan. Itakura (2020) conducted an interview with Yukari Fujimoto, a professor of Gender and Manga Cultural Studies, in which Fujimoto states that a wide range of romance TV drama series depicting gay male couples have been accepted by Thai people, and have offered a good connection between female fans and gay people in Thailand. Social media has influenced Thai society, and many Thai people have recognized LGBTQ+ people through watching romance TV

drama series depicting gay male couples' everyday lives. Likewise, female fans actively supported the movement to legally recognize same sex marriage in Taiwan, and Asia's first same sex marriage law was officially passed (Fujimoto 2019, 132). It has been proven that the power of female fans and the LGBTQ+ movement has led these societies to promote sexual and gender diversities and equal rights for all people. I believe that this phenomenon can be used as a catalyst for increasing acceptance of gay people without resistance only when gay-specific romantic dramas are produced under conditions like those of other romantic dramas, rather than as something special.

Another point is that these Japanese TV drama series depicting gay male couples do not focus on sexual content, but emphasize gay male couples' everyday lives (Fujimoto 2019, 150). Martin (2012) states, "there is an emphasis on the 'normality' of the characters: they declare explicitly that they are 'not homosexual' but simply in love with a unique individual who 'happens to be' male" (4). It is important to generate a clear message that regardless of people's gender or sexuality, everyone has the right to be in love with someone. Gay male youths' dramas would provide a valuable approach and play an important role in promoting change in college students' mindsets about sexual orientation and gender identity. Gerbner (1998) states, "Television is different from other media also in its centralized mass-production of a coherent set of images and messages produced for total populations, and in its relatively non-selective, almost ritualistic, use by viewers" (178). If many viewers use television in a relatively non-selective, almost ritualistic way, then airing more LGBTQ+ related TV dramas and other programs that include strong and recurring messages could change people's attitudes toward LGBT+ people. One way to perceive the real world, as cultivation theory says, is to repeatedly watch messages from the media, and to try to recognize that it is as natural for men to love men as it is for men to love women.

Implication

Through this survey, many participants expressed belief that gay-related romantic dramas could be a catalyst for eliminating

prejudice and discrimination against LGBTQ+ among young people, while others were pessimistic about this idea. Since the survey conducted this time did not confirm whether or not college students actually watched gay-related romantic dramas, the next survey should ask whether and how often they actually watch them to determine whether there is a change in college students' attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people depending on how often they watch such programs. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the results of this study to the changes in attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people among those who watched LGBTQ+-related TV programs in the Netherlands. It is also necessary to investigate the differences in attitudes toward and acceptance of LGBTQ+ people by different genders and age groups, and to analyze both the duration of viewing and the messages taken from the dramas.

In addition, the impact of LGBTQ+ media on young people should be investigated to determine how to incorporate the impact of gay-related romantic dramas on their prejudices and on attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people in the classroom. Gay male youths' romantic drama series may be a supplementary teaching material to encourage youths to respect LGBTQ+ people and appreciate difference. These drama series will likely help young people to accept LGBTQ+ people who have faced bullying, harassment, prejudice, and discrimination in their everyday lives.

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The Same Old Story: The collapse of the semi-democracy regime in 1930s Japan and 2006 Thailand

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Abstract—: Both Thailand and Japan have experienced turbulent democratic processes. In addition, both countries are considered as semi-democratic according to Dahl's framework. It is undeniable that both countries have failed in democratization itself, at one stage, despite being almost 100 years apart, and Lipset's prerequisite having been met. There were three main factors that led to such occurrences, these being too many unelected offices, which have considerable authority over the electoral force, politicians who side with the non-democratic side for their gain, and the belief that there existed a better alternative form of government. These have been accompanied by six circumstantial similarities that have made the situation in Thailand and Japan similar. Lastly, we can see that the military have played an important role as an undemocratic force or democratic force supporter depending on how much the civilian government can assert their control over them.

Keywords : Taisho democracy, 2006 Thai coup d'état, 1932 attempted coup, Civil-Military relations

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Introduction

History often repeats itself. The collapse of semi-democracy regimes in the 1930s in Japan and in 2006 in Thailand were no different despite being 70 years apart. Despite the bright prospects for democracy to thrive and mature in their respected times, both had failed. Both cases are interesting because, there are many similarities, both circumstantial and in the direct actions by the respective governments, that effect their strength. The operation of non-democratic forces in the political landscape appears in both cases and succeeded in reversing the course of democracy and injecting non-democratic forces into society for years to come. Although there are various reasons, this was due, mainly to the rise of non-democratic forces. Non-democratic forces can come in various ways and accumulate, waiting for the right trigger. The factors can be divided into three categories: internal, external and trigger.

For the first factor, in both countries, the structural problem of controlling unelected offices through election was one of the flaws in the system, which made it doomed to fail. Another factor was the existence of external influences, like the semi-loyal characters in the regime who were loyal to the side that offered greater gains. Lastly, the trigger came from the loss of legitimacy of the regime. When it lost legitimacy to a certain level, people started looking for the alternative, and military initiative against the government could also arise. Within this essay, the aforementioned will be discussed through the second-order of Dahl's Polyarchy.

It is very important to notice that both Thailand and Japan have their own uniqueness in the political landscape. The existence of the Network Monarchy in Thailand and the special regards given to the military by the constitution of Japan posed a challenge to the regime since it created another uncontrollable variable whose presence and decisions could shape the political landscape.

Apart from the three aforementioned factors that led to the collapse of the regimes, both cases can be seen as counter to

Lipset's notion of democratization; this will be discussed later. There are other circumstantial similarities between these two countries. For example, both countries failed to hand over the control of the military to the people, preventing a norm to discipline the military. There were also calls for a transcendentalist cabinet before the collapse of the regime and which appeared right after the collapse. Both regimes could have raised the representation of the lower classes and have demilitarized the armed forces while the government was legitimate, and during which the military was unpopular. Lastly, before semi-democracy could emerge, there was an powerful oligarchy in both countries. One of the things to be discussed is the timeframe of the beginning and the end of semi-democracy of both countries.

In the Japanese case, even though Takenaka (2014) pinpointed the start date to be the beginning of party cabinet by Okuma in Japan in 1914, continuing to the 1932 attempted coup, other authors suggest otherwise (52-65). Takayoshi (1966) points out that it could be between 1905 and 1925 because he looks at the trend of democracy, which died out in 1925, along with emperor Taisho, while Takenaka put more emphasis on the practice (1). Some other sources mark 1936 or 1940 as the end of democracy in Japan as political parties had virtually no power, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was established (Gordon 2003, 197-198; Jansen 2000, 618-619).

For Thailand, it is closer to a semi-competitive civilian regime, rather than the electoralism which Japan is closer to, as Takenaka (2014) argues in his book that Thailand during the 1980s was semi-democracy (19-21). Post-1997 Thailand was more aligned with the electoralism where elections were held, and competitions were fierce but the control over non-elected offices were minimal. The study timeframe ranges from the creation of party cabinet in Japan in 1914, to the rise of non-party cabinet in 1936 and, for Thailand, the adoption of the new constitution in 1997, to the 2006 coup. However, during the first few years of the 1997 constitution of Thailand, there were not a lot of issues, apart from the economic crisis.

It should be noted that Takenaka (2014) based on his book Japanese book in 2002, it is impossible for him to learn about the Thaksin administration, which is closer to 1930s Japan than the Prem administration. It was only after the Thaksin administration got elected that the constitution showed its flaws. The regime collapsed in 2006 when a coup took place. However, it could be argued that the semi-democracy tradition in Thailand still remains up until the 2014 coup or even today due to the enabling nature of the regime. However, if we look at the constitutional design, we can see that the 1997 constitution was the most democratic compared to the latter two. After the 2006 coup, the political parties were greatly limited in their power and control, bringing it closer to the inclusive hegemony where liberalization got limited. The author hopes that this work will contribute to the historiography of the fall of the transitional regime through the operation of non-democratic forces, as well as identifying the dynamics that led to 2006 coup in Thailand in comparative aspects.

Theoretical Framework

According to Lipset (1959), after the prerequisites of democracy, which are industrial growth, the level of education of its citizens and the spread of urbanization are met, democracy can be sustained. However, democracy is often put to the test, especially during its Developmental state period. In many cases, democracy at its early stage cannot withstand the challenge and collapses in the end (Dahl, 1989). Within this theoretical framework, we shall revisit the main theory of democratization and some factors that lead democratization to fail.

It is impossible to discuss democratization without mentioning Dahl's (1971) work. There are three possible ways to achieve Polyarchy, also known as democracy. In the first, a country will go through liberalization becoming a competitive oligarchy then through the development of inclusiveness, resulting in a polyarchal regime (Dahl 1971, 7-9). In the second, the country will go through inclusiveness first, then liberalization, which will

result in inclusive hegemonies before proceeding to be polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 7-9). The Third is to have both liberalization and inclusiveness developed together to achieve polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 7-9). However, there is a flaw in this framework since it does not account for the electoral control over political office. If we use Dahl's framework as an example, the 1930s Japan and 2000s Thailand would have been Polyarchies since there were protests and those protests could impose change on the government whereas is universal meaning that the participation rate was high (inclusiveness). Even though the voter turnout might be low in some elections, the inclusiveness of democracy was high, and it became the people's choice, not to participate in the election. Under the auspice of Diamond's suggestion, we could see the alternative interpretation of Polyarchy, to have electoralism in its framework (Karl, 1986).

Hence, Takenaka (2014) came up with his framework, which is the second order of Dahl's Polyarchy (74). With liberalization and inclusiveness developed, the political competition emerged. The political competition means that the parties have to compete to gain the vote. This cannot happen if there was no liberalization in the participation of the people. Therefore, both are combined as political competition in the second order framework. Another side of the framework is the electoral control over political offices, which shows the level that democracy actually works. It could be seen that, in Japan and Thailand, even though it fell into the Polyarchy path by Dahl, it was still considered semi-democracy. This is because the civilian government could not really control political offices, especially the military. Therefore, the regimes in both countries were more of an electoralism rather than democracy or semi-competitive civilian regimes.

As Takenaka (2014) mainly uses a structural approach and having conditions as the trigger, we could see the importance of institutions. However, there is an important definition used in this paper which is the legitimacy that this paper will use the same definition as the book given by Juan Linz (1978) which is "the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the exist-

ing political institutions are better than any others that might be established" (16). By that, it does not need the legitimacy to be completely ruined for the regime to be changed. A significant distrust from the people is enough to overthrow the regime.

According to Takenaka (2014), there are three main factors that could lead a regime to its downfall. Those are the lack of legitimacy, the polarization of semi-loyal characters and the inability of electoral control over political office (33-44,73). As for the legitimacy, it is the belief of the people to believe that the regime is the most suitable regime for the country. We could see that when the legitimacy of the government was eroding, the call for alternative regimes such as authoritarian arose. The semi-loyal characters are those who are not totally loyal to the regime. By that, if the chances arises, they can resort to using undemocratic moves for their gain. Lastly, the electoral control over political office is highly important because if the government retains a high level of control, it can exercise its power as it wants and it will answer to the pressure from the people. However, if the electoral control over political office is not high, there will be many autonomous bodies within the government which will make the government unable to control them (Veerayooth 2016). As a result, the government will be just a representative body with no power. We can see that during the time that the civilian government was strong, it could exert more control over such autonomous bodies e.g. the military.

In order to understand Thai politics, it is impossible to neglect the existence of the Network Monarchy (Veerayooth & Hewison 2016). The Network Monarchy is the loose body of a different group of people that have the same interest (Harris 2015; McCargo 2005). Therefore, the main duty of the Network Monarchy is to make sure that every party will continue supporting the network in exchange for the benefits (McCargo 2005). As a result, we could see that the Network Monarchy in Thailand was really strong as we could see several interventions by the Network Monarchy through the king and his proxies (McCargo 2005, 501). The king, as the deal broker, constantly manipulates the politics (McCargo 2005, 502). Whenever it found an obstacle, it could

intervene in order to change the status quo or to put pressure on the target through its apparatus (McCargo 2005, 501). We could find it intervening in the Thaksin administration several times to express its discontent, such as by promoting dismissed public officials to the privy council (McCargo 2005, 505).

As a matter of fact, Thaksin, himself, was a part of the Network Monarchy (Tejapira 2016, 229). However, he created another network of his own during his tenure. By that, there was another network which could threaten the existing Network Monarchy. Also, with the even more popularity of the Thaksin administration, it was clear that Thaksin became a threat to the network (Tejapira 2016, 228-229). By that, there was an unintentional race between the rising power and the incumbent power for the hegemony leading to the hegemony crisis.

The Network Monarchy used the War of Position through various means such as giving implicit support to the protest and showing its discontent in public to the Thaksin administration (Veerayooth & Hewison 2016). At the same time, Thaksin, himself, started to commit to this war of position to many parts of the Network Monarchy such as the business oligarch (Pasuk & Baker 2009, 266-270). He also elevated himself by organizing a making merit ceremony at the Grand Palace which was practically reserved only for the royal family ("Chabkohhok "Thaksin" maimeephrabaromrachanuyathainangprachan 'thambun' naiwatphrakeaw " 2005). With the hegemony crisis, the king decided to commit to the war of manoeuver by ratifying the coup. As a result, we could see that the Network Monarchy played an important role in Thai politics, something that does not happen much in Japan, apart from the royal intervention that the military have to be disciplined which partly resolved the Taisho Political Crisis and that Kato had to find who was responsible for the assassination of Zhang-Tso Lin (Ryota 2014).

Similarities

Against Lipsett's notion that after prerequisite are meet, democracy will be sustained

Thailand and Japan have several similarities. One of them is the failure of democracy, even though this took place at different times. It is contrasted with the notion provided by Lipsett (1959) that once literacy rate, economic performance and urbanization reach a certain level, democracy will be sustained. However, it is evident that both Thailand during the 2000s and Japan During the 1930s achieved, these prerequisites. For the case of Japan, it reflects from the rise of the Minseito party, the urban party, to be the incumbent government and the Japanese economic performance during the First World War (Jansen 2000, 510, Halliday 1975, 115). As for Thailand, Thailand experienced exponential growth in the 1980s and economic growth in the 2000s (Baker & Phongphaichit 2009, 241-246). The dominance of the urban population in national politics should also have contributed. These prerequisites should sustain democracy; yet, democracy could not be sustained. This can be seen in the collapse of the party cabinet after 1932 in Japan and the coup d'etat in Thailand in 2006. Therefore, it could be seen that the prerequisites that commonly sustain democracy cannot be applied in this case.

Politicians who side with non-democratic force (Semi-loyalty)

According to Takenaka's (2014) framework, there are three main factors that led to the collapse of semi-democracy. Those are: Semi-loyalty, Lack of legitimacy and exceeding a critical mass of un-elected incumbents in the office (Takenaka 2014, 33-44,73).

First, the polarization of the partisan, as we could observe in both Thailand and Japan, that are the minority party, would do anything to gain premiership (Conference on Taisho Japan 1974; Phongpaichit & Baker 2009). This forces semi-loyal characters to be disloyal. The best example came from the Seiyukai during Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki cabinets that opposed as much legislation as possible so the government would fail to deliver the

promised policies to the people (Takenaka 2014, 131). During the London Naval Treaty, they even went as far as to fabricate a constitutional crisis by convincing the Navy Chief of Staff to go against the ratification by Hamaguchi (Takenaka 2014, 125-126). In addition, when the Kwantung army fabricated the Manchurian incident. The Seiyukai justified this uncontrollable behavior of the army which weakens the ability of the government to curb the situation (Takenaka 2014, 127-128). All of these occurred because the Seiyukai admitted more non-democratic forces to the democratic regime. In other words, they were disloyal toward the regime, which eventually diminished their power.

On the other hand, in Thailand, the Democrat party is known to be majority-seekers since the Prem Tinsulanonda cabinet (McCargo 2005, 507-509). During the Thaksin Shinawatra era, the Democrat party became the minority. And in the subsequent election in 2005 they lost more seats. Without help, the Thai Rak Thai would be able to establish a one-party majority cabinet. This fear, together with other parties led the Democrat and some other parties to boycott the election, since they knew that they would not get a chance to be the government ("Opposition may boycott Thai election; demonstrators want Thaksin out" 2006). With this course of action, they were disloyal to the regime since they were denying participation in the system that gives the power and legitimacy to them. By denying it, they were fabricating a political deadlock that required non-democratic force to intervene. Moreover, there were protests on the street by the People's Alliance for Democracy or "PAD", asking for the resignation of Thaksin Shinawatra ("Thaksin rebuffs resignation calls while elite call for appointed PM" 2006). Many politicians were supporting PAD's protest. The PAD protest per se was not disloyal to the regime, in the beginning. But later, the proposal demanding the incumbent government to return their power to the king and let the king chooses the new Prime Minister according to their interpretation of section 7 of the constitution that "Whenever no provision under this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional practice in the democratic regime of government with the King

as Head of the State." similar to the use of section 5 during the Sarit regime (Preechakul 2013; Thai 1997 Constitution). Even though the king declined to use such authority, the government legitimacy was already undermined by the rise of non-democratic forces (Threesuwan, 2017). In other words, the disloyal gave the non-democratic forces political power which created an alternative choice for the current democratic regime which undermined its legitimacy, since some saw the alternative as a new and better choice.

The Lack of Legitimacy of the Government (Belief that there is another better regime)

The second point that Takenaka (2014) made was the lack of legitimacy that contributes to the fall of a democratic regime. In Japan, it was obvious that the regime's economic performance from 1929 was poor, judging from the unemployment rate and number of strikes (Halliday 1975). The situation became even worse during the Japan banking crisis, which gave rise to the Zaibatsu and its decision to go back to the Gold Standard during the Showa depression, which put pressure on the government to levy tax on the people (Halliday 1975). By having a poor economic performance, it prompted people to yearn for a past alternative such as being ruled like the Genro's era (The founding oligarch of Japanese modern politics). Moreover, the government between 1929 and 1932 issued and ratified their policy decisions without the consultation of the parliament (Takenaka 2014, 168-169). This made the situation worse when the parliament was not content with their role. As a result, many members of the parliament criticized the government harshly, followed by a series of scandals from the government and parliament.

The most prominent one was the meeting in which the president of Seiyukai, Minseito and Rikken Doshikai met and agreed to withdraw the motion of no confidence (Takenaka 2014, 109). This enflamed the distrust between the people and the regime and the feeling of indifference, since all the parties were colluding anyway. Much of the press expressed its discontent with the regime. Yet, some critics still said that despite the flaws

in democracy, the system was still the best regime Japan could adopt (Takenaka 2014, 148); nevertheless, the country there were significant minorities who wanted an alternative regime. However, the true extent of the dissent cannot be measured due to the fact that the Peace Preservation law was enacted during that time which imposed a ban on political public gathering and arrested protestors as though criminals. This favoured the calls by ultranationalist groups for the military to intervene in the politics. Some groups believed that the emperor was surrounded by a group of corrupt politicians and these people must be killed in order to liberate the emperor (Halliday 1975). We could observe that the dissent was growing significantly and providing reasons for the non-democratic force to intervene in politics.

In Thailand, as we could observe from the previous point, there are disloyal politicians that have boycotted elections and have invited non-democratic forces to intervene. After the 2005 election, the Thaksin administration finally gained the absolute majority in the parliament which allowed it to be a majority government, since the opposition boycotted the election (Treesuwan 2018). By that, the government could issue policies at its will. At the same time, there were series of scandals regarding the government such as Shincorp shares and Ms.Potjaman's land deed transfer, that gave cause for demonstrations and the opposition to go against the government and act with disloyalty (Phongpaichit & Baker 2009, 160-165).

As we could observe from the protest on the streets, there were significant minorities that wanted an alternative regime. While some called for a new prime minister according to the section 7, others pleaded for the military to intervene ("Kerdaraikhuenbangkorn-lang "ratthapraharn 19 kor.yor. 47"chakprakotkarnlaithaksin thueng pholmaipis kormorchor " 2020). All of these reflect that the legitimacy of the government was problematic and ,thus, gave rise to the belief in the alternative regime.

Too many un-electorate offices that have considerable authority

The Last among the list in Takenaka's framework is the number of un-elected officers that have considerable authority. In Japan, the most prestigious and the most powerful institutions are Genro, a group of elder statesmen. However, the Genro were dying and left Prince Saionji as the only Genro after the death of Matsukata (Gordon 2003, 166). Genro was the one who recommended the next prime minister to the emperor who would appoint him (Gordon 2003, 166). After an attempted coup in 1932, the Genro felt that they needed someone not affiliated with any political party who would enjoy more legitimacy to discipline the military, resulting in the end of the party cabinet (Takenaka 2014, 142). The next one was the Privy council. The Privy council was responsible for giving advice to the emperor (Takenaka 2014, 57). Their main duty was to ratify treaties and emergency decrees (Takenaka 2014, 79). However, their decision not to ratify the financial emergency decree led to the chronic state of the banking crisis and the collapse of the first Wakatsuki cabinet (Jansen 2000, 503). It reflects that the elected body was still subject greatly to the unelected body in Japan. Thirdly, the House of Peers, all of them came from the election within the peers (Gordon 2003, 126). They were ultra conservative and turned down several progressive bills such as the universal suffrage bill and others (Takenaka 2014).

Lastly, the military, they were the greatest obstacle in the exercising of power by the government. It is true that during the Takaaki cabinet, even though the government cut down 4 army divisions along with ratification of the Washington naval treaty a year prior (Takenaka 2014, 89), the influence of the military was not reduced. They just chose to obey the government which had more legitimacy than them. The scale balance between the military and the civilian government existed because the Meiji constitution aimed at limiting the civilian government from interfering with the military. The Minister of Army and Navy did not report to the Prime Minister but directly to the emperor

(Takenaka 2014, 83). Moreover, the Army and the Navy also havda choice to withdraw their minister if they were not satisfied with government policies (Takenaka 2014, 77). If the government did not receive the substitute minister, the cabinet would collapse automatically, since it was the Prime Minister's duty to fill all of the post (Jansen 2000, 77). Moreover, since Genro controlled the politics, the Military Ministers to be Active-Duty Officers Law was installed by Yamagata Aritomo, from the Choshu clique to limit the possible influence of the party politicians on these posts (Edgerton 1999). However, this law was repealed by Prime Minister Yamamoto from the Satsuma clique (Takenaka 2014, 84).

Nevertheless, the practice that military ministers had to be an active-duty officer still remained and there were no civilians appointed in such positions except during the Washington Naval treaty, in which Prime Minister Hara also served this post in lieu of the actual minister that went to negotiate the treaty (Takenaka 2014, 88-89). The division of responsibility within the armed forces was also problematic to the system. The problem was the division of works in the military ministry were ambiguous. The minister oversaw the resources the military possessed (organizational matters) while the chief of staff utilized those resources (operational matters) (Edgerton 1999). This made it hard to distinguish between the duties of the two positions. During the time when the party cabinet was strong, the military ministry could control the resources while the chief of staff had to allocate their personnel according to what they had, for example, during the Washington Naval treaty negotiations. However, as the party cabinet weakened, the chief of staff had more power and coerced the minister to increase the personnel. These balances between civilian and military and within the military made it harder for the cabinet to control the armed forces.

In Thailand 's case, there were many un-elected officers that were not subject to the control of democratic forces. First of all, it is true that the judges in the constitutional court came from the nomination of a Senate's committee and were approved by the Senate, which came from the election of the people. However, out

of fifteen, seven judges came from a small candidate pool among civil judges, while the rest came from the recommendation of the Senate (Thai 1997 Constitution). As a result, the significant minority of them were not elected. Moreover, one of the most significant aspects of Thai 1997 constitution was that it gave vast power to the independent organization which could bring down the government. The ombudsman, the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the State Audit Office of the Kingdom of Thailand came from the recommendation of the Senate. However, the choosing procedure minimally involved the Senate and usually came from selection by the chief of the supreme court, the chief of administrative court and the chief of the constitutional court ("Theemakhong por.por.chor. chakratthathummanun 40 tueng ratthathummanun korsorchor " 2018). All of them had vast power and were able to sue the cabinet in the constitutional court, which resulted in the verdicts to withdraw members of parliament or members of the cabinet.

The next one is the privy council. The members of the privy council are appointed by the king at his wishes and is consulted by the king on the state affairs ("Botbathnatheekhongkamontriphaitairatthathummanun " 2007). However, the monarch usually demonstrates his discontent in the state affairs. For example, the ousted cabinet members were appointed to the privy council members which acted as the royal's personal messenger (McCargo 2005, 505). Many times, the monarchy also expresses its discontent verbally through their birthday speeches or the speeches in front of official servants (McCargo 2005, 501). Both the privy council, who acts as the king's messenger and the monarch himself are not under the democratic forces.

Lastly, there are the military and the police. It is true that in Thailand the Minister of Defence controls both organizational and operational matters of the armed forces while the Office of Prime Minister controls the police. However, their board of executives which control the appointment of the personnel is totally different. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence get only one vote each. They are the minority in the voting since the

board of executives consists of many others unelected members such as the chief of staff and the chief commander of each armed force ("Bigtu"reakporborlaothap thokboard 7 suakalahome kuyphotaharnklangpee " 2021). By that the appointment of armed force personnel is not subject to democratic force. Lastly, even though Thailand allows civilians to serve in the defence post, no civilians actually have ever been posted as the minister of defence apart from the Prime Minister who appointed himself for the role. Meaning military force has never truly been in the hand of the people before.

The Failure to Make Civilian Control of the Military Become a Norm, and to Discipline the Armed Forces.

Although civilian control over the military is not pointed out as one of the pillars according to Takenaka's (2014) framework, it is an important aspect across literature on democratization. It is clear that both Thailand and Japan failed to hand over the military to the people. Since whenever the civilian government is stable and secure, the military would usually comply with the government and be more disciplined. Despite that some of the Prime Ministers of both countries such as Thaksin and Tanaka had military backgrounds and used to work in the armed forces, both of them failed to earn respect from the military. As a result, both governments experienced the insubordination from their own military.

In Japan's case, the most prominent example was the Manchurian incident in which the military was completely against the standpoint of the Tokyo government that favored a pacifist stance against China (Takenaka 2014, 103-105). The Kwantung army, without consultation with the ministry or the cabinet, acted on its own accord because it believed that it was best for Japan's interest (Jansen 2000, 525-526). The same happened in the Jinan incident, when the Kwantung army went to disrupt Chiang-Kai Shek's Northern expedition. The government's hands were tied and they had to let the situation play out (Takenaka 2014, 104). In short, the government was unable to stop the military from invading China and was only able to accept the consequence. As

a result, the military's lack of obedience grew and started its own initiatives such as the formation of the state of Manchukuo, which was contrary to the policy of the Tokyo government (Takenaka 2014, 128). The most prominent evidence is the assasination of Zhang Tso Lin, the warlord in the Northern part of China, who lost the war against Chiang-Kai Shek and withdrew to his stronghold in Manchuria, which was under the sphere of influence of Japan (Jansen 2000, 526-528). A group of a few military officers defied their commander and placed a bomb on Zhang Tso lin's train carriage (Jansen 2000, 526). This was for Japan to expand its controlled area over Manchuria. However, the policy from Tokyo was that Tokyo needed Zhang Tso Lin to be a buffer state from the Nationalist army (Takenaka 2014, 104). After the act of terror, Zhang Tso Lin's son chose to side with the Nationalist led by Chiang-Kai Shek (Takenaka 2014, 198).

Both the Jinan incident and the assassination of Zhang Tso Lin deteroriated Japan's international relations among neighboring countries and annulled the non-interventionist approach advocated by Shidehara and the government's pacifist policy. Prime Minister General Tanaka was tasked to investigate this act of terror by the emperor Showa. However, the military, fearing losing prestige, outright denied the investigation to take place (Takenaka 2014, 121). Failing to hold the military accountable, Prime Minister Takana had to resign. Even with all his power as the representative of the people and past backgrounds, Prime Minister Takana was still unable to question the army. Thus, a significant signal that the military was a force of its own but not for the people it should be serving. The level of insubordination against the government within the armed forces had also been documented throughout the period. There were three Prime Ministers of Japan assassinated during that time namely, Hara, Hamaguchi and Inukai (Jansen 2000, 503). The former two were assassinated by ultranationalist navy officers while the latter was assassinated by the army. In addition to all of these, mostly came from the mid-ranking officer from major to colonel which demonstrated the reality that the government could only control the generals and admirals while the lower-ranked officers still had

some authority and were able to revolt on their own (Halliday 1975). Lastly, although the "Military Ministers to be Active-Duty Officers Law '' installed by Yamagata was repealed, the military posts in the cabinet were still occupied by the military, which reflected the failure to make civilian control over the military become a norm.

In Thailand, it is well-known that the military has several prerogatives. One of them is the fact that the military is always run by a general who is appointed by the civilian government to govern itself (Chambers & Waitoolkiat 2016, 427). In times when the government wants to exert more control over the military, the Prime Minister tends to serve in the post himself, or commissions a general close to the Prime Minister instead. Even though the army was quite autonomous, there were attempts to lessen army's influence and hand the command to the public such as the Thaksin government cutting the budget ("20 Pi chak Thaksin Shinnawatra tueng Prayut Chan O-cha Chai "Ngobklang" 5 lanlan 14.5% khongngobruem " 2016). However, the armed forces, led by General Surayut launched an attack on Myanmar's border in 2001 (Hewison, 2006). The attack on the border furthered the crisis and caused casualties which was not what the government ordered or planned. As a result, the government had to investigate this matter. The result was that General Surayut was transferred from the Commander-in-chief of the Army to Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, a less influential post ("Perdprawat 'polake Surayuth Chulanon prathanongkamontrikhonlasud'" 2020) General Surayut, later, served as the Prime Minister after the 2006 coup. It shows that the civilian government tended to be more lenient with insubordinations of the armed forces similar to Japan which allowed them to expand their influence and network over the politics without fear of repercussion. By the time of his retirement, he was appointed as privy council member immediately, showing the king's favour to General Surayut ("Perdprawat 'polake Surayuth Chulanon prathanongkamontrikhonlasud" 2020). By showing tolerance towards the military's misconduct to avoid conflict within the country, the government was enabling the defiance to go on. As a result, the military staged a coup in

2006. After that, General Surayut served as the transcendentalist Prime Minister by the appointment of the king.

The Appeal for Non-party Cabinet Before the Coup/attempted Coup

In both Thailand and Japan, the unpopularity of the government and the loss of legitimacy of the democratic regime raised a motion for a non-party cabinet. It was popularized because it was believed to solve the political deadlock within the society. In Japan, the call for a non-party cabinet was popularized by the mass and the intellectuals, who learned about the government's scandals (Takenaka 2014, 135). They were discontent by the acts of the government that did not respect the people, such as having a back-door deal to prevent the vote of no confidence (Takenaka 2014, 109). It became worse when the semi-loyal politicians also inflamed this discontent and appealed for the military to intervene (Takenaka 2014). In Thailand, the call for transcendentalists was predominated by the PAD and semi-loyal politicians. Their demand was to enact section 7 of the constitution so that the king could select the new Prime Minister without election. However, the king denied the proposal (Niemsorn 2018). Nevertheless, with the significant minority joining the PAD cause and the lack of legitimacy of the 2006 election, the non-party government became a more viable choice. In the end, it gave a justification for the military to execute a coup in order to break the political deadlock.

The Appearance of the Transcendentalist Cabinet After the Coup/attempted Coup

After the 1932 attempted coup in Japan and the 2006 coup in Thailand, the transcendentalist cabinet emerged. This was to remove the military and politicians from the scene. It was believed that the transcendentalist government would generate less fric-tion and discontent in society (Takenaka 2014, 143). Following the 1932 attempted coup in Japan, Saionji, the last remaining Genro who was also on the hit-list, decided to end the era of the party cabinet and named Saito Makoto as the next prime minister (Takenaka 2014, 155-157). This is because Saionji believed that

a transcendentalist cabinet was the only way to reduce friction and the insubordination of the Armed force (Takenaka 2014, 143-144). Also, to act as leverage on the growing influence of the Army, the new Prime Minister came from the Navy. The practice of transcendentalist government continued until the end of the Second World War (Gordon 2003).

It is clear, although beyond the scope of Takenaka's work, that the practice of transcendentalist government failed to accommodate the growing ultra-nationalist sentiment. It became clear after February 26 incident or the 1936 attempted coup lead by the military, that the amount of the military's influence over the cabinet decision still existed and the military could even order a "government by assassination" by eradicating the influence of politicians from the arena (Gordon 2003, 166). Another significance of the 1936 attempted coup was that it marked the end of Kodo-ha faction or the imperial way faction which was those who believed that the emperor was righteous and only surrounded by corrupted officers, which was popular among the middle-rank officers (Jansen 2000, 600-601). It marked the end of the factionalism in the army and the rise of Tosei-ha or the control faction led by the generals (Jansen 2000, 656-657).

In Thailand, the transcendentalist government was established after the 2006 coup in order to lower the friction within the society. The coup was welcomed by PAD supporters while opposed by the government's supporters. General Sondhi decided not to serve as Prime Minister and the post was given to General Surayuth, who previously served as a privy council member. This move reflected that the army could not control the overall hegemony and had to resort to the royal hegemony of the king (Sattayanurak 2014). Moreover, it shows the influence the king had, through his proxies, over the armed force.

Government's Empowerment of the Lower Class

It is clear that one of the achievements of the government prior to the coup or attempted coup was that it contributed greatly to the lower class. Japan was not egalitarian in terms of

representation. Prior to universal suffrage, the representation of the urban mass area was outweighed by the representation of the rural area (Gordon 2003, 162-167). The universal suffrage greatly benefitted the Seiyukai party since its popular base was set in the rural area (Gordon 2003, 162-167). Moreover, as the minimum tax constraint was set, only people with assets such as those who owned lands in the rural area could meet (Gordon 2003, 162-167). This threw off the balance between the urban and the rural. Nevertheless, under the auspice of Kato Takaaki's cabinet, universal male suffrage was finally passed, despite many attempts by the house of peers to delay it (Takenaka 2014, 100). At the same time, the true universal suffrage was proposed (Takenaka 2014). This made the representation of the people in the urban area and the rural area became more egalitarian.

For Thailand, the transfer of representation was set in the totally opposite way. It is believed that the people in the urban area have more representative power (Laothammatas 2013). According to Two democracies in Thailand by Laothammatas (2013), the rural people elect the government while the urban masses were the group that oust the government. It means that the representation of the urban mass was bigger than the geographical record. However, everything changed during the Thaksin cabinet since the rural mass became empowered greatly. The empowerment could come in terms of prevention of out-of-pocket healthcare, village funds and several schemes which lifted the rural area from impoverishment (Phongpaichit & Baker 2009, 93-94). These became an incentive for rural people to vote for Thaksin-affiliated candidate and rallied people to vote. It is best reflected in the 2010 political crisis in Thailand that these people started to protest for an election. In both cases, the empowerment of the lower class contributed to the popularity of the government while generating discontent among those who were losing their influence. The rural mass in Japan wanted to retain its representation to maintain the favourable policy from the government while the urban mass in Thailand had discontent to see the rural community get more benefit.

The demilitarization of the armed force during the healthy government

One of the achievements of both governments before the collapse of the democratic regime was that they were able to demilitarize the armed forces. In Japan, despite the trend that the armed forces got bigger, the government was able to reduce its size by four divisions in exchange for the re-equipping of the army in 1924 (Takenaka 2014, 89). As a result, it is evident that at that time the government was in complete control over the army, since it was subjected to ordinance from the government and made the fullest of their operational matter. The same happened to the Navy in that it was subjected to the implementation of the Washington Naval treaty and the London Naval treaty (Takenaka 2014). Nevertheless, the changes also received substantial criticisms that it was unpatriotic to do so (Takenaka 2014, 87-89). Prime Minister Hara and Hamaguchi also got assassinated due to these issues (Takenaka 2014, 137).

As for Thailand, the Thaksin cabinet was able to promote General Surayuth to the position of the commander-in-chief at its own will (Hewison 2006). That represents the ability of the government to control the armed forces. In addition, the Thaksin cabinet was also able to reduce the budget of the military for the first time in many years ("20 Pi chak Thaksin Shinnawatra tueng Prayut Chan O-cha Chai "Ngobklang" 5 lanlan 14.5% khongngobruem" 2016). The armed forces were no longer an autonomous part of the cabinet but rather an integral branch. However, as the situation worsened in both Japan and Thailand when their government's legitimacy declined, the influence of the armed forces grew back and the civilian government could no longer control the armed forces.

The Unpopularity of the Military in the Beginning of the Semi-democratic Regime

During the beginning of the semi-democratic regime, the military was unpopular. That might be the reason why the military was obedient to the civilian government. From sources, it is clear that the Japanese military was unpopular during and after the Siberian intervention in 1922. So much that the military was discouraged from wearing military uniforms outside their barracks (Halliday 1975; Jansen 2000; Takenaka 2014). With the legitimacy of the military so low, the civilian government could enforce its power on the military through various means such as cutting down the budget and signing international disarmament treaties. However, as the discontent toward the civilian government grew, the influence of the military also grew since the military was the protector of the regime.

In Thailand, the military was also unpopular after the Black May incident which resulted in the resignation of General Suchinda (Baker & Phongpaichit 2014, 248-250). As the military's popularity hit rock bottom, the people gave their support to the civilian government which was the opposite of the military's authoritarian regime. As a result, the military withdrew itself from the political scene but still retained its previous form as an autonomous body within the government, up until an effort to control the military by the Thaksin administration (Kanchoochat 2016).

The existence of competitive oligarchy before the Semi-democracy era

Lastly, it was before the era of Semi-democracy that there were oligarchies with election rule in both Japan and Thailand. It is true that Takenaka's book rules out the Prem administration as semi-democracy (Takenaka 2014, 20). It is worth noting that Semi-democracy is a spectrum. It depends on which side of the spectrum the regime will fall into. Prem's administration fell nearer to the Semi-competitive civilian regime than the Japanese case which was electoralism. This is because in Thailand the participation of the citizens is universal whereas in Japan, during the

party cabinet, it is limited to male voters. However, the public contestation in Japan was different since it was full of protest whereas in Thailand, during Prem's era, there were less protests. Moreover, the political competition between Genro during their era in Japan was greatly intense since all parties were willing to win the house seats. The legacy of this intensity continued to be intense during the party cabinet era since each party was also associated with the Genro during the early party cabinet era (Halliday 1975). In Thailand 's case, it was different since the political competition during Prem's era was low due to the fact that, in the end, the premiership would be awarded to Prem as a head of coalition government according to the favor of the king (Handley 2006, 283). It was no difference who was running in the competition since the result would remain the same. However, there is another factor that determines the side the regime leans towards, which is the electoral control over political office. The electoral control over political office in Japan was low as we know from the existence of many extra-constitutional organs such as Genro, the Privy council and the military minister. However, in Thailand during the Prem government, the electoral office which ended with Prem being the Prime Minister could control the political office almost completely under the support of the king himself (Handley 2006, 284). The best reflection was the Young Turk rebellion which reflects that the government could control most of the military against the rebellion (Bunnag 2020). As a result, both regimes were oligarchy with the electoral rule. Lastly, as Dahl (1989) stated, the young age democracy is more prone to collapse. As a result, both semi-democracy in Thailand and Japan which were young did not survive.

Conclusion

All in all, we could see that there are many similarities between the collapse of semi-democratic regime in 1930s Japan and 2006 Thailand. It proves that Lipsett's notion is not universally applicable. We see that semi-loyal characters are dangerous to the regime since they are willing to change sides just for personal gain. Semi-loyal characters are prone to invite the undemocratic force

to the system and provoke them to action that is undemocratic. The legitimacy of the government is important since it is the basis of power. The belief that the regime is the best regime possible can boost the regime's legitimacy and maintain it ,while, on the contrary, the disbelief could make the regime lose its legitimacy rapidly. The disbelief is also equal to the invitation for the non-democratic forces to make a move. The number of un-elected offices also needed to be watched since too many of them could make the government dysfunctional because its will and policies could not be implemented or even obstructed by these un-elected forces. To maintain democracy, the military have to be disciplined or else they could be a threat to the regime itself. The appeal for a non-party cabinet usually arises when the regime's legitimacy is low and it is dangerous when a significant number of people agree with that idea. Transcendentalist cabinet is a viable choice when the friction in the society needs to be lowered, but it usually does not work out and, in turn, imposes more undemocratic forces. The empowerment of the lower class could contribute hugely to the popularity of the government but it can create a shift in the representation. The unpopularity of the military could be one force that leads to the demilitarization. It greatly contributes to the democratic force. We can see that the competitive oligarchy existed in both countries. They are an undemocratic force, but with the inner conflict and rising awareness of the people, the transfer of power to semi-democracy is possible. Overall, we can see the vicious cycle within this loop of power. Whenever the civilian regime is weak, the undemocratic force will arise and it will leave undemocratic legacies to the country, even the transcendentalist, the dark valley in Japan and the 2007 constitution in Thailand. It is always a race between the civilian and military. All in all, these similarities reflect the lesson we could learn from the repeated history that legitimacy of the government is important as much as controlling number of unelected officers and semi-loyalty characters.

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Information Communication Technologies in Thailand: The influence of social structure and the autonomy of use

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Abstract—: There has never been digital equality as we face social inequality. This paper aims to examine the uses of information communication technologies (ICTs) and the social structure of the digital divide in Thailand to compare the findings with those reported in more developed countries. Multiple correspondence analysis was conducted to form the scales of internet use and autonomy of use. Linear regressions were used to test the scales' effects on the social structure of ICT use in Thailand.

The findings indicate that Internet use can be categorized into the intensity of internet use and commercial and leisure use. The intensity of internet use is positively related to the autonomy of use and social position indicators. However, social positions are mainly associated with the type of use. This study also emphasizes the influence of the autonomy of use and its social structure on internet use and access. Our research contributes further insights into the social production of the digital gap, particularly in developing countries.

Keywords : *Internet use, Social position, Digital divide, Digital Inequality, Social inequality*

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Introduction

The presence of information, communication, and technology (ICT) can be met in different forms, and it has become a prerequisite for human progress. The digital economy has altered the present scenario's economic processes, systems, industries, consumer behavior, business interactions, and business models. The digital economy is also known as the "new economy," "internet economy," or "information economy," representing e-commerce, e-governance, e-payment systems, e-banking, e-learning, mobile banking, and payment wallets.

As the internet has become a part of everyday life, many pieces of research have studied its effects on society and how the internet is adopted and used (Dimaggio et al. 2004; Selwyn 2004; van Dijk 2005; 2020). Three main lines of research have been developed into the use of the internet. The studies have started with indicators of having or not having an internet connection as the first-level digital divide (Attewell 2001). With Internet connection reaching high levels, the studies move to internet skill and usage as the second-level digital divide (Hargittai 2002). More recently, the study focused on the outcomes of Internet use or tangible benefits as the third-level digital divide (van Deursen and Helsper 2018).

Besides the internet connection, differences in social position have been considered. The studies have provided evidence of differences in adopting digital technologies among individuals in underprivileged and those in privileged social positions (Zillien and Hargittai 2009; van Deursen and van Dijk 2014). However, disparities in ICT diffusion are also found among Asian countries. The internet is still unequal among all populations in developed and less developed countries. In some places, a different level of diffusion has prompted interest in understanding second-level digital divides (Wong 2002; Nipo, Bujang, and King 2014).

There have been many individual country analyses of internet use. The studies explored multiple dimensions such as

technological access, the autonomy of use, social support, skills, and types of uses (Gonzales 2016; van Deursen and van Dijk 2019; Hassani 2006).– Some international studies comparing, synthesizing, and interpreting the worldwide digital divide have shown the different gaps and inequality in internet use and access within countries (Chen and Wellman 2004; Chinn and Fairlie 2007). Therefore, studying internet use and access between developed and developing countries is already occurring..

This article concretely examines the social structure of the second digital divide in developing countries, using a sample of the Thai population. This article aims 1) to analyze the uses of the internet. How are these similar or different, especially comparing the findings with those reported in more developed countries? 2) to consider the autonomy of use and the differences in equipment along with socio-demographic variables.

Theoretical background

Social inequality

After the internet spread across homes, researchers were concerned with examining social differences in the digital context, the so-called "digital divide." The division between the individuals connected and those not connected to the internet is a fact that would let the former enjoy the advantages of the internet and reinforce social inequalities (Hargittai 2010). According to Ono and Zavodny (2007), social and economic inequalities would be transformed into unequal access to ICT, and the latter may favor individuals in privileged social positions. This point suggests that the individual who enjoys a better endowment of resources; a better social position will have more opportunities for social advancement.

The studies on the first digital divide have focused their research interest on social differences in access to ICT (Riggins and Dewan 2005). Chinn and Fairlie (2004) found that young males living in affluent regions, with better education, were more likely

to access the internet. Although the discussion around the digital divide was based on access to the internet, when the first digital divide started to close, researchers have shown that there remain differences in internet use that are correlated to social position (Dimaggio et al. 2004; van Deursen and van Dijk 2019; 2014; van Dijk 2020; Tewathia, Kamath, and Ilavarasan 2020). Hassani (2006) found that education and income are the strongest predictors of Internet use. Those with higher education levels do more online banking, e-commerce, and search for health and product information than individuals in families with low income. People with high education use the internet for different purposes—health and transaction, for instance—while people with a lower educated use the internet for playing games or gambling online (Deursen and Dijk, 2014).

Internet use

The interest in explaining social differences in internet use has moved researchers to focus on the causality chain that ends in using the internet. A causality chain may start with differences in equipment, the autonomy of use, social support, skills, and the internet's purposes. Many factors have been linked to access, skills, and internet use inequalities, with demographic characteristics (Dutton and Reisdorf 2019; Reisdorf and Groselj 2017; van Dijk 2020; Hargittai, Piper, and Morris 2019). Hargittai and Hinnant (2008) have proposed the concept of "autonomy of use," meaning freedom to use technology whenever and wherever the users want. They have suggested that the most autonomous users can be considered those individuals with home access to the internet and a fast connection.

To measure, interpret, and compare internet use, a classification of internet uses was needed, which makes possible the reduction of many indicators into a few interpretable ones. There are several ways of reducing the observed indicators. Some are based on a theory, while others use a descriptive and inductive approach to classify the indicators of internet use. On the other hand, most data available on the uses of the internet is not based on theories. However, Researchers are just interested in collecting a battery

of indicators on the uses of the internet. In this case, researchers need to group Internet uses with the help of interdependence models (Livingstone and Helsper 2007; Brandtzæg, Heim, and Karahasanović 2011). Other researchers looked for a relationship between social status and locations that access the Internet (Hassani 2006; Hargittai and Hinnant 2008; van Deursen and van Dijk 2019; Gonzales 2016). Their findings indicate that upper-class individuals have better equipment at home. The relationship between social status and internet use has also been studied by Zillien and Hargittai (2009). These researchers found that social position plays a determining role in different Internet activities. Deursen and Dijk (2014) found that individuals with privileged social positions in the Netherlands are reaping the benefits of their time spent online more than users from lower underprivileged social positions. This finding was similar to Serrano-Cinca, Muñoz-Soro, and Brusca (2018) that the higher levels of education have a higher level of Internet use. The young user is the largest group. Men are more likely to use the internet than women. However, when the researchers controlled the employment and education variables, women use the internet more than men. . The urban environment scores are higher than the rural areas except that the urban area uses the internet more than the rural area. Accordingly, this article proposes the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: For people, the more autonomy of use they have, the more they cooperate with internet use

Hypothesis 2: For people living in privileged positions, the more they cooperate with the internet use

Methodology and Data

Data

The dataset was derived from a study conducted by the National statistic office Thailand in 2017 on information and communication technology. The respondents included individuals aged six years and over from different parts of Thailand. As we

received the raw data, missing values were imputed as necessary from the mean value or the most frequent After we had cleaned and selected appropriate data, Our data consisted of 217,217 individuals. Most were female (52.6 percent). The mean age was 40 years (SD = 22.14). The elementary and lower level of education background represents (59.9 percent). The central region represents (30 percent).

Table 1: The summary of Socio-demographic

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Male	108,300	47.4
Female	108,917	52.6
Education		
University degree	20,789	10.7
Post-secondary	6,557	3.4
Upper secondary	24,096	12.4
Lower Secondary	26,323	13.6
Elementary and lower	116,282	59.9
Region		
Bangkok	11,412	5.3
Central	65,193	30.0
North	45,061	20.7
Northeast	57,477	26.5
South	38,074	17.5

Variable	Mean	SD
Age	40.93	22.14

Scales and measurements

Following the proposed research, the indicators contained the measures of internet use, computer access locations, internet access locations, mobile use, and socio-demographics were selected to analyze. We performed it by using multiple correspondence analyses (MCA)(Greenacre 1993). MCA is a data analysis technique for categorical variables that the scores of individuals form an optimal scale when those scores are far apart, thereby maximizing differences between individuals. Linear regression was used to analyze the relationship between internet use with a set of material access scales (computer access locations, internet access locations, mobile use) and social position indicators. Linear regression looks for the association between two or more variables, from which outcome variables can be predicted.

Findings

1) To analyze the uses of the internet.

The in Figure 1 showed that the internet is used for a variety of reasons, both for business, such as using the internet for offering products or services (Offering), internet banking (Banking), ordering products or services (Ordering), and leisure, such as using the internet for entertainment propose (Entertainment), uploaded or shared online photo (Photo), using the internet for social networking purpose (SocialNetwork).



Figure 1: Scale of Internet use

2) To consider the autonomy of use and the differences in equipment along with socio-demographic variables
To compute optimal scales, we used the dimension of MCA, with results as summarized in Table 2, while social categories are those listed in Table 1

Table 2: Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) results

Scale	Definition	% variance
Computer access locations	The individual accesses a computer in many locations	28.4%
Computer social locations	The individual accesses a computer at Internet Café, Public Service	17%

Internet access locations	The individual connects to the internet in many locations	32.8%
Internet social locations	The individual connects to the internet at Internet Café, Public Service	17.2%
Mobile use	Mobile device diversity	29.1%
Types of mobile and activities	The individual use mobile on better equipment (Smartphone)	14.8%

We performed the linear regression along with the socio-demographic (The details in Table 1) and the differences in equipment (The scale in Table 2). Findings are reported in Table 3. Regarding the type of internet use, several significant differences can be observed. As expected, when individuals have computer access in many locations, their internet use is more frequent (β=0.147). Moreover, It suggests that internet use is largest use among people using a computer in non-social areas (Home or Workplace) as the coefficient is negative (β=-0.135). The previous interpretation is backed by the fact that the influence of accessing the internet in many locations has the same sign is four times as strong (β=0.408). However, accessing the internet in social places negatively correlates (β=-0.057). It means that access to the internet in social locations may have less stable opportunities to access the internet. The influence of mobile phones (β=0.221) and smart phone (β=0.184) on the internet is positive. Still, they have half the importance that accessing the internet in many locations has on the internet uses—the convenience of big screens in comparison with phones outweigh the accessibility of phones. Smartphones, instead, add to mobile phones a higher consumption of the internet. So, one expects that people who have access to the smartphone with a touch screen and high quality use the internet more. Therefore, this finding supports hypothesis 1.

On the other hand, the social indicator of education is related to the intensity (The most frequently of use and the most time consumed), as expected. As people get more educated, their use of the internet increases (lower secondary (β=0.098); upper secondary (β=0.129); post-secondary (β=0.204); university degree (β=0.296)). This relationship is particularly strong and significant for individuals with a university degree. The result suggests that highly educated individuals have more chances of developing the skills and competencies needed to be confident using the internet. Men are the gender that seems to use the internet more for any purpose (β=0.034). These findings suggest that as the internet privatized interactions and transactions for individuals who have been educated, Men may have chosen more online activities. As expected, age is negatively related to the intensity of internet use. The negative correlation to internet use increases as individuals age (β=-0.001). The use of the internet is reduced as individuals age, suggesting that the older a person is, the less its chances of the use of the internet. The context of where individuals live influences the intensity of internet usage. (Central (β=-0.040); North (β=-0.046); North East (β=-0.055); South (β=-0.054) residing in Bangkok, the capital city, increases the chances of using the internet, particularly themost frequently of use and most time consumed. The coefficient estimated for the other areas has a negative sign for the intensity of internet use. Therefore, this finding supports hypothesis 2.

Table 3: Linear Regression analysis to predict the internet use

Coefficients	**Dependent variable: Intensity of internet use**
Computer many locations	0.147***
Computer Social locations	-0.135***
Internet many locations	0.408***

Internet Social locations	-0.057***
Mobile phone use	0.221***
Smartphones	0.184***
Age	-0.001***
Gender (ref = Female)	
Male	0.034***
Education (ref = Elementary and lower)	
Lower Secondary	0.098***
Upper secondary	0.129***
Post-secondary	0.204***
University degree	0.296***
Region (ref = Bangkok)	
Central	-0.040***
North	-0.046***
North East	-0.055***
South	-0.054***
Constant	0.010**
Adjusted R2	0.705

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Discussion and recommendation

Good material conditions are possible when individuals enjoy a good income stream. Material living conditions have been represented by how people access computers, the internet, and mobile phones. These findings support the theories that good material living conditions increase the chances of using the internet and its use intensity. However, the way that material conditions are used depends on other social properties of individuals, such as education, gender, age, and geographical area. This is reflected in the variety of uses in Thailand, that is similar to internet use in developed countries (van Deursen and van

Dijk 2019; Gonzales 2016; Dimaggio et al. 2004).

In line with DiMaggio et al. (2004), the digital divide has gone from unequal access to differentiated use. The results suggested that the locations where individuals use the computer and the internet shape their online pursuits. That is, individuals may access the internet with many alternatives. Some are situated in institutional settings—employees might connect to the internet at work, students at their school, and others might join in public places. As the number of places through which individuals access the internet grows, the intensity of using the internet grows as well.

Consequently, Individuals who can access the internet are most likely to take advantage of Internet technology. The types of use will depend on individuals' chances of accessing computers and the internet, as reported by (Hassani 2006; Hargittai and Hinnant 2008; Mascheroni and Ólafsson 2016). Additionally, we show the influence of mobile phone use on how the internet is used. The future growth in mobile phone internet connections (5G technology) might provide faster and more convenient ways to access the internet from any place, especially for individuals with smartphones (Mascheroni and Ólafsson 2016; van Dijk 2020, p111).

We found that internet use is influenced by social position. That is, online activities vary depending on the social status of individuals, as suggested by (van Dijk 2020; van Deursen and van Dijk 2019; Hargittai, Piper, and Morris 2019; van Deursen and van Dijk 2014; Dutton and Reisdorf 2019). The education, age, gender, and socio-economic context (proxied by the region living in) were relevant in identifying the individuals' internet uses, as shown in previous studies (Hargittai and Hinnant 2008; van Deursen and van Dijk 2014). Findings suggest that education is the most relevant factor associated with using the internet: better-educated individuals use the internet more for many different purposes (Zillien and Hargittai 2009). better-educated individuals might have more chances of having developed the skills and competencies to use the internet. As a result, better-educated individuals might have more confidence in using the internet, as

other pieces of research have shown (Hargittai 2010; Hargittai, Piper, and Morris 2019).

Age is a proxy for many conceptual things: cognitive development, generational differences, and even chances of having developed technological skills. We cannot differentiate between them as the gap in internet use between younger and older is not as wide as twenty years ago. Age seems to influence how the internet is used positively. Even though older people have shown a less use of the internet, they use it more frequently As the behavior has changed, the diffusion of digital media tends to be universal as the elderly generations are adopting it (van Dijk 2020).

The evidence suggests that men may use the internet more than women. Finally, as the socio-economic context is concerned, our findings suggest that living in the capital city increases the chances of using the internet, its general intensity, and the intensity of using the internet for entertainment purposes. The capital city is the center of commercial and technological activities, and individuals may have higher chances of enjoying a higher level of income and education in comparison to other cities. Their inhabitants may even be younger, having more chances of enjoying a higher level of computer skills.

Conclusions

We contribute to research on the digital divide by reporting evidence that the autonomy of using digital technologies is mainly related to the intensity of internet use. Although the autonomy of use is associated with internet use, social position is mainly related to internet use. Our findings have accepted both hypotheses that the more people living in privileged positions, the more they cooperate with internet use and the autonomy of use. We suggest that as countries get more developed in social-economic terms, the uses of the internet become more varied. We conclude that as individuals gain more autonomy in using digital technologies, their uses will become more diversified and differentiated, increasing the gap in the second digital divide.

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