

## **The Variety of Lobbying: Comparison of FTA Politics and Farmers' Lobbying in South Korea and Japan**

Nawakura, Akio

Received November 16, 2018    Revised July 16, 2019    Accepted November 23, 2019

### **Abstract**

This study asks why the government of Korea paid 180 billion US dollars as agricultural subsidies in exchange for ratifying the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States despite the nation's farm lobby has had limited political resources. Compared with Japan, which the farm lobby has had rich political resources, two major Korean farm lobby of the Korea Advanced Farmers Federation (KAFF) and the Korea Peasant League (KPL) had poor resources and had to rely on the street demonstration to express their opposition to the FTA. While the Japanese farm lobby gained the government's concession as a result of conventional style of lobbying, however, the street demonstration by the KAFF and the KPL played the role of indirect lobbying and pressured the government to increase the subsidies. Theoretically this indicates diverse political channels to reflect political-economic interests on public policies.

**Keywords:** trade liberalization, farm lobby, Korea, Japan, indirect lobbying

### **Introduction**

This study asks why the government of South Korea (hereafter Korea) paid huge agricultural subsidies as the compensation of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) comparing with the political process of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Japan.

Korea and Japan have similar characteristics in terms of agriculture each other. Both of the two countries have mountainous landscape, which does not fit to use as farmlands. In both of the two countries, each farm household cultivates less than three hectares, while an average farmer in the United States cultivates more than one hundred hectares. And most part of the two countries has cold and long winter, which prevents agricultural works. Therefore, both Korean and Japanese agriculture has been less competitive in international trade of agricultural products. This has been the major reason why most Korean and Japanese farmers have resisted to trade liberalization.

On the other hand, the two countries' agriculture has a clear difference in terms of farmers' lobbying. In spite of its democratization in 1987, the farmers in Korea have not organized nationwide and influential political interest groups such as the Japan Agriculture Group (JA Group) in Japan or the Farm Bureau in the United States.

The JA Group has been one of the most influential lobbying groups in Japan and the powerful supporter for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Covering more than 10 million rural residents as its membership (“The JA-Zenchu”, n.d.), which is equal to 10% of the nation’s total voters, the JA Group has pressured the LDP government to protect Japanese agriculture. Its lobbying activity has gained huge concession from the government and the ruling party. In 1993, for example, the JA Group gained approximately half billion US dollars as agricultural subsidies in exchange for approving the Uruguay Round Agreement (Yoshida, 2012, pp. 233-245).

In Korea, meanwhile, two farmers’ organizations of the Korea Advanced Farmers Federation (KAFF) and the Korea Peasant League (KPL) have been politically marginalized in the nation’s political processes even after the democratization in 1987. The KAFF covers only 400 thousands farmers, one third of the farmers in Korea (KAFF, 2014). The KPL covers 20 thousand farmers, less than 2% of the nation’s farm population. Differently from the JA Group in Japan, these two Korean groups have no direct connections to the Office of the President, the National Assembly, or ruling parties. Therefore, instead of pressuring policymakers by financial donation and/or collective ballots, the KAFF and the KPL have employed street demonstration as a major tool of their political activities.

Since 2004, the government of Korea has launched a series of free trade agreements (FTAs) with its trade partners such as Chile, Australia, New Zealand, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Previous studies in political science have pointed out that the limited lobbying capacities of the farmers have encouraged the Korean government to promote trade liberalization rapidly (Nawakura, 2017).

While the farmers have not been able to organized influential lobbying groups, however, the government of Korea has paid huge compensation as agricultural subsidies in exchange for liberalizing the nation’s trade structure. In the case of the KORUS FTA, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) paid totally 21 trillion won, or 180 billion US dollars, from 2009 to 2018 (*The Chosun Ilbo* Dec. 18, 2008). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) of Japan paid 310 billion yen, or 30 billion US dollars, as agricultural subsidies on the TPP, de facto US-Japan TPP, in financial year 2016 (“Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery”, 2015). Even compared with Japan, Korea’s farm sector has gained much financial compensation from its government in the process of trade liberalization.

Then, why have Korean farmers gained the huge compensation in spite of their limited political resources for lobbying? In other words, why has the government of Korea paid huge agricultural subsidies despite it is free from the farmers’ political pressure? As a case study to seek the interest group politics of Korea, this study seeks the answers to these questions

comparing the Korea's political process on the KORUS FTA and the Japan's one on the TPP. These two free trade pacts are ideal for comparison. In terms of gross domestic products (GDP), the KORUS FTA is the largest FTA that Korea has launched. Also the TPP is also the largest FTA that Japan has launched<sup>1</sup>. The United States has pressured both Korea and Japan to import more American agricultural products in dealing with the KORUS FTA and the TPP. And these two pacts triggered the farmers' strong resistance to the trade liberalization with the United States both in Korea and Japan.

## **1. Previous Studies on FTAs and Farm Lobby in Korea and Japan**

Compared with those in the Western countries, empirical studies on farm lobby in Asian democratic countries have been minor. As one of the minor studies, Mulgan (2000) described that the JA Group had pressured the LDP by mobilizing its huge membership, which covers most rural population in Japan. She also pointed out that the JA Group has not only lobbied the government and the LDP but also led political campaign for the mass public to oppose unfavorable policies such as trade liberalization. From the perspective of a staff of the LDP, Yoshida (2012) revealed that the LDP lawmakers, particularly those who were elected in rural constituencies, had heavily depended on political support by the JA Group.

Both Mulgan and Yoshida mentioned to single non transferrable vote (SNTV) system, the election system employed in the House of Representatives before 1994 and the House of Councilors still today, as the major contributor for the JA Group's lobbying. The SNTV is the system to elect more than two representatives per constituency while each voter can write only one candidate's name on a ballot. Under this system, parties need to nominate more than two candidates in every constituency to win majority in the House. This encourages competition not only between parties but also among candidates who belong to the same party. The SNTV system has, therefore, let candidates to rely not only on party organization but also on interest groups such as the JA Group to secure their victory in election. This has made the JA Group influential on candidates in rural constituencies.

In addition, the Japan's election system has also worked to make rural constituencies over representative. In the House of Councilors election in 1992, for example, an urban constituency of Kanagawa had over 1.5 million voters per candidate while a rural constituency of Tottori had only 0.23 million voters per candidate ("The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications", n.d.). Saito and Asaba (2012) compared the FTA politics in Korea and Japan and concluded that the over representation of rural constituencies had prevented Japanese government from promoting free trade.

---

<sup>1</sup> For the detail of the TPP and the KORUS FTA, see World Policy (2016). For the comparative analysis, this paper does not mention to the TPP 11, the TPP after the dropout of the United States.

After the SNTV system was abolished in the House of Representatives in 1994, therefore, the JA Group lost one of the major tools to be influential on policymakers. Ida (2015) pointed out that the JA Zenchu's political influence had been weakened since the 1990s. In fact, Kobayashi Yasuyuki (personal communication, November 28, 2017), the chief of international planning in the Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (JA-Zenchu<sup>2</sup>) confessed that the abolishment of SNTV and the introduction of single member constituency system to the House of Representatives in 1994 weakened the JA Group's political channel to the LDP.

On the other hand, According to Otawara (2008), the JA Group has sought to change their way to achieve their goals since the 1980s. The Group has shifted their political action to gain the support by broader mass public.

Compared with academic works on the farm lobby in Japan, previous studies on farmers' political action in Korea have been rare. Though both the KAFF and the KPL have employed street demonstration as the main tool of their political activities<sup>3</sup>, the political influence and outcome of the street demonstration have been rarely analyzed in the field of political science.

A few works to analyze the Korean farmers' street demonstration have shown skeptical view on the achievement of their political action. Go and Ham (2009) and Nawakura (2017) saw the Korean farmers' street action as minor and less influential activities from political peripheries. The argument in the previous studies above, however, cannot explain why the Korean farmers' peripheral political actions have gained some concession by the government such as the subsidies of 180 billion US dollars as the compensation of the KORUS FTA.

Previous studies in political studies have offered insufficient explanation on the achievement of the Korean farmers' political action. Meanwhile, some recent studies in sociology pointed out that the street action by Korean farmers and their allies had been operated strategically to achieve their goals. Lee (2012) argued that the street demonstration in 2008 against the import of US beef was not simple bottom up networking activities but also collective action mobilized by top-down order to achieve a particular goal to cancel the US beef import and the KORUS FTA. Also Ho and Hong (2012) saw that the Korea's anti-US beef protest in 2008 aimed to gain particular political goal: Securing the food safety by shutting US beef from Korea<sup>4</sup>.

The literature review above suggests that this study needs some framework to see street demonstration, which the KAFF and KPL have mainly employed in their political activities, as a political action to achieve some particular goal by influencing policymakers.

---

<sup>2</sup> JA-Zenchu works as the national center of the JA-Group.

<sup>3</sup> In the case of the protest to the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1993, for example, the KPL mostly depended on street demonstration to express their anger on trade liberalization.

<sup>4</sup> However, Ho and Hong could not show clear causal relation between the anti-US beef protest and the Korean government's counteractions.

## 2. Theoretical Framework, Hypotheses, and Analytical Methods


This study employs the concept of indirect lobbying.

Indirect lobbying is a framework to see social movement as a kind of lobbying. While traditional concept of lobbying employed in political science has focused on direct transaction between policymakers and interest groups, indirect lobbying defines social movement such as street demonstration, public relations, and petitions as lobbying because they *indirectly* influence the decision of policy makers *via* the promotion of public opinion. In order to achieve their goals, interest groups employ indirect lobbying to mobilize media such as TV, newspapers and/or social networking sites. The media spreads the voice of the lobbying actors and promote public opinion to sympathize with the interest groups. Through huge street demonstration, opinion polls, and/or some other means, the public opinion pressures policymakers as indicated in Figure 1. And, as indicated in Figure 2, indirect lobbying forms a part of lobbying activities as well as direct lobbying.

Direct Lobbying	Indirect Lobbying
Interest Groups ↓ Pressure on Policymakers	Interest Groups ↓ Spread of Information via Media ↓ Promotion of Public Opinion ↓ Pressure on Policy Makers
Actors of Lobbying = Actors of Pressuring	Actors of Lobbying ≠ Actors of Pressuring

Figure 1: Difference of Direct and Indirect Lobbying

Source: Original



*Figure 2: Concept of Indirect Lobbying*

Source: Nawakura (2018)

The framework of indirect lobbying emerged in the studies of the European Union (EU) to ask why lobbying is active in Brussels despite most EU officers are not elected by the citizens' poll. Bruycker (2015) and Duer (2015) pointed out that the interest groups in Brussels promoted public opinion by appearing on mass media's news programs, advertisement, and/or social networking sites on the Internet.

In their history of mostly two decades, the studies on lobbying in the EU have revealed some important feature of indirect lobbying. First, though indirect lobbying can gain political concession from the government with lower cost than direct lobbying, there can be gaps between the content of the policymakers' concession and the lobbying actors' request (Binderkrantz, 2015). Second, while direct lobbying is the influential activity to change the fundamental direction of policies, indirect lobbying can be useful to gain more governmental budget such as subsidies (Nelson, 2012). Third, in Europe, while newly emerged interest group coalitions often employ indirect lobbying in the EU level, most conventional interest groups remain to act in national level and to concentrate on direct lobbying on the governmental officials and/or lawmakers in the member states (Rasmussen, 2012). This fact suggests the difficulties or some obstacle to implement 'dual' lobbying, which means that one interest group attempts both direct and indirect lobbying at the same time.

As seen above, indirect lobbying is likely to be an optimal framework to review the recent farm lobby in Korea and Japan. Based on the feature of indirect lobbying, the hypotheses of this study are launched as below.

H1: In the resistance to the KORUS FTA, the KAFF and the KPL employed street demonstration and it played the role as indirect lobbying. Because the indirect lobbying worked,

the government of Korea paid huge subsidies as the compensation for farmers.

H2: In the resistance to the TPP, the JA employed both direct and indirect lobbying. However, the dual strategy did not contribute to achieve the JA's goal. Rather, the JA gained the compensation of 30 billion dollars as an achievement of direct lobbying.

The following two chapters test whether the hypotheses above are approved. As a case study to answer the questions on interest group politics, the analysis below employs two methods. The first method is literature review. Reviewing the official statements of farmers' groups, newspaper articles, and opinion poll surveys, the following two chapters clarify how farmers in Korea and Japan acted to resist to trade liberalization and how it worked. The second method is fieldworks, particularly interviews on interest group activists and the members of parliament. The method of fieldworks is expected to clarify the political bargaining between interest groups and politicians.

### **3. Korean Farmers' Lobbying against the Korea-US FTA**

The government of Korea agreed with the United States on the KORUS FTA at the end of March 2007. A few days later, the KAFF and the KPL began their protest against the FTA. Pointing out the fear of mad cow diseases and some other risks of imported foods, the two farmers' associations mobilized street demonstration insisting 'The KORUS FTA threatens our food safety(*The Chosun Ilbo*, April 2, 2007).' However, the two groups had limited political resources to pressure governmental officials or the members of the National Assembly. The KAFF and the KPL, therefore, had only one tool to express their opposition to the FTA in national level: The attention of public opinion. Though the KAFF had built its own political channels to policymakers, they formed communication channels to only municipal and provincial levels<sup>5</sup>. The KPL, with the membership of only twenty thousand, had no organizational capacity to lobby or to build platforms for lobbying by itself. In the highly limited resources, the KAFF and the KPL attempted to promote the mass public's opposition to the KORUS FTA.

The public disputes in spring 2008 on the import of US beef played the role of turning point for the KAFF and the KPL's activities against the KORUS FTA. Though Korea had banned the import of beef from the United States since 2004 due to the risk of mad cow disease, the newly inaugurated conservative President Lee Myung-bak decided to cancel the import ban

---

<sup>5</sup> Since the end of the 1980s, large numbers of KAFF members have run municipal or provincial elections and some of them have won. The elected members have acted as channels to connect the farmers and policymakers. However, these KAFF's activities have not reached to the level of the National Assembly (KAFF, 2014).

and resume the import of US beef for smooth ratification of the KORUS FTA in both Seoul and Washington<sup>6</sup>. This decision triggered the anger of public opinion of Korea because most opinion polls by major newspapers in early 2008 had indicated that the majority of Koreans had opposed to import risky beef from the United States (*The Chosun Ilbo*, April 2, 2007). In May, twenty thousand citizens assembled to central Seoul and held candlelight demonstration to protest the government's FTA policies (*The Chosun Ilbo*, May 31, 2008).

The KAFF and the KPL joined the candlelight demonstration and insisted that the KORUS FTA encouraged the import of dangerous food such as infected beef (KAFF, 2014).

The government had correctly recognized that the KORUS FTA could cause serious damage on Korean agriculture. Compared with the United States, Korean agriculture is extremely less competitive. Prior to the demonstration in spring 2008, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) estimated the annual damage of Korean agriculture caused by the KORUS FTA as 1.2 trillion won, or 10 billion US dollars (*The Dong-a Ilbo*, December 19, 2008). Based on the estimation, the MAFRA launched the domestic compensation plan for farmers to pay 20 trillion won, or 165 billion US dollars, during the ten years following the FTA. According to Lee Jung-hyuk (personal communication, September 16, 2016), however, both the KAFF and the KPL refused the governmental proposal because the compensation could not contribute to the sustainable production of Korean agriculture after the KORUS FTA. Setting 'sustainable production of Korean agriculture' as the goal, the two farmers' associations continued their anti-FTA demonstration even after the government's proposal of financial compensation.

The anti-US beef candlelight protest expanded its size by forming networks encouraged by some Internet tools such as chatting. Though the networks had not had particular headquarters or leaders in their early stage, some social activists launched the National Headquarters to Protest the Import of the Infected US Beef (hereafter the National Headquarters) in April 2008 (*The Dong-a Ilbo*, April 28, 2008). This was an *ad hoc* but nationwide organization to cover most social groups to oppose the import of US beef. Following the broad protest against the import of US beef, most opinion polls conducted by major newspapers in early summer of 2008 indicated that the majority of public opinion was anxious to import risky food from overseas ("Realmeter", 2008).

The KAFF and the KPL joined the nationwide action by the National Headquarters and insisted that the KORUS FTA could encourage the flood of imported risky foods such as infected beef (KAFF, 2014). This argument contributed to link the beef import disputes and the KORUS FTA. The street protest opposed to not only beef import but also the KORUS FTA (*The Dong-a Ilbo*, August 18, 2008).

---

<sup>6</sup> To avoid the risk of infected beef, the government of Korea permitted to import the beef from only cow less than thirty month old and introduced the inspection on the imported beef.



The broad opposition against the KORUS FTA appeared on TV news and newspapers almost every day from spring to summer in 2008. It gradually influenced the behavior of major opposition parties in the National Assembly. In the meeting between the President and the opposition parties on April 24 2008, Son Hak-gyu, the Chairman of the opposition Democratic Party, told the President Lee that the ratification of the KORUS FTA was 'difficult due to the beef import disputes (*The Chosun Ilbo*, April 25, 2008).'

While opposition parties began to oppose the ratification of the KORUS FTA, the social activists including the KAFF and the KPL continued the street protest. The continuous protest was broadcasted on TV news, newspapers, and chatting sites. It encouraged opposition parties. When the government formally proposed the National Assembly to ratify the KORUS FTA, two major opposition parties of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party expressed their joint will to prevent the FTA (*The Chosun Ilbo*, September 30, 2008).

The opposition parties justified their protest against the KORUS FTA to gain broader public support in coming elections (*The Dong-a Ilbo*, December 19, 2008). However, the government and the ruling Grand National party sustained its policy to push the KORUS FTA. In the end of October 2008, a task force of the Office of the President declared to push the KORUS FTA by strengthening public relation in spite of the broad opposition (*The Chosun Ilbo*, October 28, 2008). The government's attitude encouraged the criticism by the opposition parties. Won Hye-yeong, the Democratic Party's leader in the National Assembly, criticized the government was 'stealing the people' (*The Dong-a Ilbo*, November 1, 2008). The opposition parties' strong resistance indicated the needs to make some compromise the government.

As the resistance had been strong, some government officials began to feel the needs to do something to reconcile the farmers and their supporters (Choi, 2016). This worked as intra-governmental pressures on the supreme policymaker, the President, to make some concession not only to persuade the opposition parties but also to sustain the motivation of the executive officials to promote the KORUS FTA.

On December 18, 2008, Chang Tae-pyung, the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs held a press conference and the MAFRA would pay extra one trillion won, or eight billion US dollars, as domestic compensation to care the damage on agriculture caused by the KORUS FTA (*The Dong-a Ilbo*, December 19, 2008). This did not satisfy the opposition parties and farmers. The KAFF and the KPL demanded to prevent the FTA itself and refused the financial compensation. However, it is fact that the two farmers associations' protest on the street influenced the behavior of opposition parties in the National Assembly and it contributed to the financial compromise of the government on the KORUS FTA.

#### 4. Japanese Farmers' Lobbying against the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Since November 2010, when Prime Minister Kan Naoto officially expressed his interest in joining the TPP, the JA Group has resisted to the multilateral trade liberalization pact of Asia-Pacific region. In July 2011, JA-Zenchu President Motegi Shigeru declared to resist the TPP without any compromise (*The Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Shimbun*, June 22, 2011).

Following the Motegi's declaration, the JA group activated its opposition to the TPP. In December 2012, a JA Group's branch in Miyagi Prefecture held a joint meeting to oppose the TPP with the Democratic Medical Institution of Miyagi and Consumers' Co-operative branches in Miyagi Prefecture ("JA Miyagi", 2013). This joint meeting was remarkable for the JA Group because the Democratic Medical Institution has been a traditional supporter for the Japan Communist Party, the most hostile opposition party in the Diet. This meant the JA Groups attempted broader coalition to prevent the TPP across the boundaries of political parties. Also, joint action by the JA Group and the Consumers' Co-operative was distinctive event in the history of Japanese politics because the Consumers' Co-operative Act of Japan restricts the Co-op's political activity. Kobayashi Yasuyuki (personal communication, November 28, 2017), chief of international planning in the JA-Zenchu, said that the JA Group made the effort to encourage anti-TPP public opinion because conventional direct lobbying has been difficult since the reform of election system of the Diet in the 1990s.

After the government officially joined the TPP negotiation in March 2013, the JA Group began to lobby the LDP directly while continuing the promotion of public opinion against the TPP. As a result of the contact of the cadres of the JA Group and the LDP lawmakers, in April 2013, the Standing Committee of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery in the House of Councilors passed a resolution on the TPP. This resolution demands the government to exclude sensitive agricultural products such as rice, wheat, meat, dairy products, and sugar from the TPP negotiation ("House of Councilors", 2013). This resolution worked as a 'defense line' for the JA Group to lobby against the TPP directly and indirectly.

Based on the resolution in the Diet, the JA Group pressured the LDP lawmakers. Particularly in the Diet elections, the JA Group demanded every LDP candidates to approve the resolution and oppose the TPP (*The Sankei Shimbun* December 6, 2014). As mentioned above, the JA Group's political influence has been weakened for the last two decades. Mass media reported the JA Group's lobbying was not powerful as ever (*The Sankei Shimbun* December 6, 2014). As Ida (2015) pointed out, however, prefectural branches of the JA Group had sustained its organizational resources of huge membership. Based on its resources, the JA Group lobbied the election candidates of the LDP to oppose the TPP in exchange for collective voting.

After the resolution in the Diet, the JA Group and the LDP played power game on the TPP. Because the LDP had decreased its dependence on rural collective ballots, the Party rejected the requests by the JA Group. Koizumi Shinjiro, chief of the Agricultural Policy Unit of the

LDP, warned the JA Group on May 2016 that the Group needed to reform its inefficient retailing networks to fight competition following the TPP (*The Mainichi Shimbun* May 2, 2016). The Party's approach to the JA Group was based on the confidence that the Party no longer needs necessarily the support from the JA Group because of urbanization and the reform of election system while the JA Group needs legal protection on agriculture provided by the LDP government. Based on the confidence, in the elections of the Diet, the LDP even demanded the JA Group to support some candidates who approved the TPP<sup>7</sup>. The JA Group, on the other hand, mobilized its huge membership to be influential on the LDP government. While supporting some pro-TPP LDP candidates officially, the Group practically supported opposition parties which resisted to the TPP in some prefectures in the 2014 general election<sup>8</sup>. Through these power games, the JA Group demanded the LDP government to protect Japanese agriculture in the TPP negotiation.

On the other hand, the JA Group's efforts to gain the support of wider public opinion in grass roots level fell into the deadlock until the end of 2013. First of all, the cooperation with pro-Communist Party associations was not sustainable. As the Diet elections were repeatedly held in 2013, 2014, and 2016, the JA Group officially supported the LDP candidates. It prevented to strengthen the cooperation with pro-opposition party organizations. Also, the cooperation with Consumers' Co-operatives and trade unions faced the gap of ideology. While the JA Group has been one of the core supporters for the conservative LDP, Consumers' Co-operatives and trade unions have been politically neutral or pro-opposition parties<sup>9</sup>. Due to the lack of cross-sectional coalition as seen in Korea, the JA Group's action to promote anti-TPP did not work substantially. Differently from Korea, anti-TPP street action with tens of thousands of participants did not occur in Tokyo. Though fifty to hundred JA youth members organized street demonstration in Tokyo or their home town, the small size of protest did not attract mass media<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, the JA Group's street demonstration changed its message frequently. In the case of the protest in Yamagata Prefecture in summer 2015, for example, some local JA units insisted that the government had to follow the Diet resolution in 2013, while other units insisted to reject the TPP without any compromise ("JA Okitama", 2015). It caused the

---

<sup>7</sup> Mr. X (personal communication, October 10, 2017), a JA cadre in Miyagi prefecture, confessed the author that the JA branches in Miyagi prefecture supported some LDP candidates, including the supporters for the TPP, against their will in the past elections.

<sup>8</sup> Haraguchi Kazuhiro (personal communication, May 30, 2018), a lawmaker in opposition National Democratic Party elected in Saga Prefecture, confessed to the author's interview that he had gained 'substantial but unofficial' support from farmers' organizations in his home constituency.

<sup>9</sup> Kobayashi Yasuyuki (personal communication November 28, 2017) said that the Consumers' Co-operatives and trade unions had demanded the JA Group to sympathize their ideology despite not a few JA cadres have had allergy on progressive activism.

<sup>10</sup> From 2012 to 2014, only a few anti-TPP street demonstrations by the JA Group appeared as the headlines of nationwide-issued daily newspapers.

confusion of mass public in knowing the JA Group's opinion on the TPP. In short, the partisanship and poor knowhow to organize street action prevented the JA Group's activities from grassroots level.

Though the indirect lobbying by the JA Group did not work substantially, its direct lobbying on the LDP government functioned. While sustaining the TPP negotiation, the LDP began to launch financial support to protect farm sector under the TPP. On November 2015, the LDP lawmakers held a meeting to demand the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) to prepare the budget for protecting agriculture (*The Shokuhin Sangyo Shimbun* November 22, 2015). Besides the meeting the LDP lawmakers also held the meeting with the delegates of the JA Group ("MP Maeda Kazuo's Website", 2015). Though Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his government pushed the TPP, individual lawmakers in the LDP needed collective ballots of the farmers for coming elections. Finally the Party decided to demand the MAFF to implement agriculture protection measures following the TPP and to pay more than 30 billion dollars in financial year 2016 (*The Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Shimbun*, December 18, 2015). Because the government estimated the agricultural sector's damage caused by the TPP as 130 to 210 billion yen, or 12 to 19 billion US dollars, per year ("Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery", n.d.), the size of the budget of 30 billion dollars was sufficient to cure the damage. The MAFF accepted the LDP's plan and declared to secure the 30 billion dollars of budget not only the financial year 2016 but also following several years.

In the TPP politics, the JA Group attempted both direct and indirect lobbying to protect its interests. While conventional direct lobbying worked and brought the Group the subsidies more than 30 billion dollars, indirect lobbying did not work due to the Group's partisanship. In other words, the JA Group's strong tie with the conservative LDP prevented its indirect lobbying while the tie encouraged the JA Group's direct lobbying. This indicates indirect lobbying requires different resources from direct one.

## 5. Conclusion and Theoretical Implication

Korea and Japan have similar their agricultural structure and, in recent years, have faced similar challenge: Trade liberalization including agricultural products. While the government of Korea launched the KORUS FTA, also Japan joined the TPP. In addition, both the two countries have paid huge budget as compensation for agriculture in exchange for ratifying the free trade pacts with the United States despite the two countries have different structure in terms of farm lobby. Setting two hypotheses, this study has asked why Korean government paid huge agricultural subsidies in the absence of influential farm lobby in comparison with Japan.

The analysis above indicates the answer to the question. First, the political process of Korea indicates that the Hypothesis 1 is approved. While the KAFF and the KPL had poor political resources, the two farm associations organized street protest to oppose the KORUS

FTA. Encouraged by the beef import disputes, their street protest got broader social sympathy to oppose the FTA. The mass public's protest influenced the opposition parties and contributed the government's concession to pay another one billion won for the compensation for agricultural sector. Second, the Hypothesis 2 is also approved. The JA's dual lobbying failed because of partisanship and poor knowhow. Instead, the JA Group gained the government's expenditure of 30 billion dollars as the result of conventional direct lobbying on the ruling LDP.

From the perspective of the theory of lobbying, the comparative analysis in this study indicates that indirect lobbying can maximize the influence of interest groups with limited political resources when they have sufficient knowhow to approach mass public and its opinion. The previous studies in European politics indicate that indirect lobbying can be a useful tool to make interest groups influential on government organizations whose officers are not elected by the citizens' vote. On the other hand, this study shows that the interest groups with poor resources such as the KAFF and the KPL can be as influential as direct lobbying actors if they succeed to operate indirect lobbying effectively. This means that the lobbying channels can be more diverse than the studies of classic direct lobbying studies have thought.

However, the KAFF and the KPL's indirect lobbying observed in this case study was encouraged by some intervening variables such as the beef import disputes prior to the ratification of the KORUS FTA. It is the future's subject to generalize the achievement of the two groups' indirect lobbying.

### **Acknowledgements**

This work was supported by Japan's governmental grant of *KAKENHI* (Project No. 17H07159).

## References

### Books & Articles

- Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær. et al (2015) 'Interest Group across to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media' *Governance*, 28(1), 95-112
- Bruycker, Iskander de. (2015) 'Balanced or Biased?' Interest Groups and Legislative Lobbying in the European News Media' *Political Communication*, 32(3), 453-474
- Choi, Suk-yung. (2016) *Choi Suk-yung's FTA Note* Seoul Baekyeong-sa (in Korean)
- Duer, Andreas. (2015) 'Interest Group Influence on Public Opinion: A Survey Experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership' Paper presented at the 2015 ECPR Joint Sessions on Workshops, Warsaw, Poland, March 29-April 5, 2015
- Go, Myong-hyun and Chai-bong Ham. (2009) 'Social Epidemic: Korean Beef Protest' Paper Presented at the World Convention of the International Political Science Association in Santiago de Chile in 2009
- Ho, Ming-sho. and Chen-shuo Hong. (2012) 'Challenging New Conservative Regimes in South Korea and Taiwan: Comparison of the Anti-American Beef Protest' *Asian Survey*, 52(4), 643-665
- Ida, Yasumichi. (2015) *The Reform of the JA-Zenchu* Tokyo: Kyodo Press (in Japanese)
- KAFF. (2014) *The Korea Advanced Farmers Federation* Seoul: Korea Advanced Farmers' Federation (in Korean)
- Lee, Hang-woo. (2012) 'Networking Social Movement and Top-down Collective Activity' *Economy and Society*, 93, 1-19 (in Korean)
- Mulgan, Aurelia George. (2000) *The politics of agriculture in Japan* New York: Routledge
- Nawakura, Akio. (2017) 'The Impact of Farmers' Resistance to Trade Liberalization: A Comparative Study on Political Process around FTAs in Korea and Japan' *IAFOR Journal of Politics, Economics and Law*, 4(1), 30-39
- . (2018) 'South Korea's Protection on Agricultural Sector under Free Trade System: Impact of Indirect Lobbying by Farm Sector' *Journal of Northeast Asian Regional Studies*, 24, 1-16 (in Japanese)
- Nelson, D. (2011) *How Do Interest Groups Set Their Lobbying Agendas?* Madison: Wisconsin State University
- Otawara, Takaaki. (2008) 'Agricultural Cooperatives in the Global Age' *Hokkai Gakuen University Economics Journal*, 55(4), 21-47
- Rasmussen, Anne. (2012) 'Interest Group-Party Interaction in EU Politics' *Party Politics*, 18(1), 81-98
- Saito, Jun. and Yuki Asaba. (2012) 'Clientalism and Trade Liberalization' *Journal of Election Studies*, 28(1), 114-134 (in Japanese)
- Yoshida, Osamu. (2012) *The History of the LDP Agricultural Policies* Tokyo: Taisei Publishing

(in Japanese)

*The Chosun Ilbo* (in Korean)

*The Dong-a Ilbo* (in Korean)

*The Mainichi Shimbun* (in Japanese)

*The Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Shimbun* (in Japanese)

*The Sankei Shimbun* (in Japanese)

*The Shokuhin Sangyo Shimbun* (in Japanese)

## Websites

House of Councilors of Japan: Resolutions of the 193<sup>rd</sup> Diet (2013). Retrieved July 4, 2018, from [http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/gianjoho/ketsugi/183/iin\\_chousa\\_ind.html](http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/gianjoho/ketsugi/183/iin_chousa_ind.html) (in Japanese)

JA Miyagi: The Report of an anti-TPP rally (2013). Retrieved July 1, 2018, from <http://www.ja-mg.or.jp/top/newstopics/important/tpp201301.html> (in Japanese)

JA Okitama: A Protest on the TPP Held (2015). Retrieved July 5, 2018, from [http://www.okitama-yt-ja.or.jp/news/news150521\\_01.html](http://www.okitama-yt-ja.or.jp/news/news150521_01.html) (in Japanese)

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery: Annual Agricultural Budget 2016 (2015). Retrieved July 1, 2018 from <http://www.maff.go.jp/j/budget/2016/> (in Japanese)

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: Database of the House of Councilor elections (n.d.). Retrieved August 30, 2018, from [http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo\\_s/data/sangiin/ichiran.html](http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/data/sangiin/ichiran.html) (in Japanese)

MP Maeda Kazuo's Website: The Report of the Meeting with the Cadres of the MAFF (2015). Retrieved July 4, 2018, from <https://www.maedakazuo.jp/blog/?p=3464> (in Japanese)

Realmeter: Public Opinion on the KORUS FTA (2008). Retrieved July 6, 2018 from <http://www.realmeter.net/2008/05/%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%B8-fta-%EB%B9%84%EC%A4%80-%EB%B0%98%EB%8C%80-%EC%97%AC%EB%A1%A0-%EA%B8%89%EC%A6%9D-55-4/?ckattempt=1> (in Korean)

The JA-Zenchu: Our Organization (n.d.) Retrieved June 30, 2018 from <https://org.ja-group.jp> (in Japanese)

World Policy: Trade Matters the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement and TPP (2016). Retrieved July 9, 2018 from <https://worldpolicy.org/2016/10/06/trade-matters-the-u-s-korea-free-trade-agreement-and-tpp/>

### Interviewees List

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Venue</b>
Han, Min-soo	Policy Coordinator, Korea Advanced Farmers' Federation	May 13, 2016	Seoul
Lee, Jung-hyuk	Chief Policy Planner, Korea Peasants' League	September 6, 2016	Seoul
X (anonymous)	Advertisement Bureau, JA Miyagi Prefecture	October 10, 2017	(telephone)
Kobayashi, Yasuyuki	Chief of International Planning, JA-Zenchu	November 28, 2017	Tokyo
Haraguchi, Kazuhiro	Member of the House of Representative of Japan	May 31, 2018	Tokyo