[Footnote 1 actually is the two paragraphs below, following the author bio information—Ed.]
^* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University; williamr@tu.ac.th.

John Burgess, Temple in the Clouds: Faith and Conflict at Preah Vihear (River Books 2015) 9. This book is an invaluable contribution about the temple, as it combines both the archaeological history and modern events into an extremely readable and informative text.

In roman letters, the Cambodian spelling of the temple is “Preah Vihear,” while “Phra Viharn” is the Thai spelling. The latter spelling was used by Thailand in its initial pleadings to the International Court of Justice in 1960–1961 and was how the name appeared in the transcripts of Thailand’s oral arguments in 1962, suggesting that counsel used the Thai pronunciation when addressing the Court. Interestingly, just north of the temple is Thailand’s “Khao Phra Wihan National Park,” a spelling (by Wikipedia, though not the Tourism Authority of Thailand) that closely reflects how “Viharn” is actually pronounced in Thai. By contrast, the Cambodian pronunciation of Vihear appears to be vee-hear. “How to Say Preah Vihear,” Emma Saying, YouTube. This article will use the spelling “Preah Vihear” in conformity with common international usage and that employed by the International Court of Justice and UNESCO. For simplicity, the word “Thailand” generally is used even when reference is made to years when the country was known as “Siam,” though some exceptions are made for contextual purposes. In essence, the two words may be treated as synonyms. Also for simplicity, the word “Cambodia” is used to refer to this area of Indo-China that was under French administration prior to the country’s independence in 1953.↩︎

See generally Shane Strate, “A Pile of Stones? Preah Vihear as a Thai Symbol of National Humiliation” (2013) 21(1) South East Asia Research 41–68 <https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2013.0139>; P. Michael Rattanasengchanh, “The Role of Preah Vihear in Hun Sun’s Nationalistic Politics, 2008–2013” (2017) 36(3) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 63–89<https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341703600303>.↩︎

Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits [1962] ICJ Rep 6 <https://icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/045-19620615-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>.
Important Note on Pagination: The indicated URL is to a PDF of the English version of the judgment as it appears in the Court’s official bound volume of Reports for 1962. The PDF pages, however, confusingly have two page numbers on each page: those at the top of the page on the left margin (with the name of the case to the right), and a different stand-alone number at the bottom of the page on the left margin that is two numbers less than that of the top number. The difference occurs because the number in the headers at the top left correspond to the Court’s consecutive numbering throughout the entire year, while the numbers at the bottom of the page restart at “1” for each new case. The page numbers cited in this article for the 1962 Preah Vihear judgment are always to the larger number in the top header, as on a separate page the Court indicated that this judgment should be cited as beginning on page 6. The judgment itself actually begins with a “6” in the header, while the number at the bottom of the same page is a “4.”↩︎

Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat was furious with the decision, as was the whole country, but ultimately decided to abide by it because, in part, he knew that the judgment was final and binding, without appeal, and failure to comply could have meant sanctions against Thailand by the United Nations. But, in a radio address on 4 July 1962, he also urged his countrymen not to forget: “The Thai people will always remember that the temple of Preah Vihear was robbed from us by trickery of those who disregard honesty and justice,” and closed with “Beloved Thai brethren, one day in the future, the temple of Phra Viharn shall return to the Thai nation’s fold.” Annex 12 to Thailand’s Written Observations of 21 November 2011, filed in the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 case <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/151/17286.pdf> at 67–69. On 6 July 1962, Thanat Khoman, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to U Thant, the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, and acknowledged the Court’s 1962 decision. While stating that Thailand felt the decision was “contrary to the principles of law and justice,” he stated Thailand “will honour the obligations incumbent upon it under the said decision in fulfilment of its undertaking under Article 94 of the Charter.” Annex 14, ibid 77–79. However, the foreign minister went on to say that “in deciding to comply with the decision, . . . His Majesty’s Government desires to make an express reservation regarding whatever rights Thailand has, or may have in future, to recover the Temple of Phra Vihear by having recourse to any existing or subsequently applicable legal process.” ibid 79.↩︎

“Beginning with Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram’s irredentist campaign of 1940, the Thai have associated these ancient ruins with the legacy of Western imperialism, particularly the territory ‘lost’ to French Indochina. For Thai nationalists, the 1962 international court case that awarded sovereignty over the temple site to Cambodia is an example of neo-imperialism that is part of this legacy.” Strate, A Pile of Stones? (n 2) 41. A week after the United Nations inscribed the Temple as a World Heritage Site in 2008, three Thai protestors entered the temple grounds and tried to put up a Thai flag but were detained by Cambodian authorities. Shortly thereafter, armed Thai soldiers entered the area and moved to the foot of a Buddhist temple that had been built by the Cambodians. A tense standoff ensued with the Cambodian soldiers, as troops from the two sides stood just a few meters from each other, “daring the others to try something.” Burgess, Temple (n 1) 199.↩︎

For example, on 28 July 2008, Sondi Limthongkul spoke at a People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) rally near Government House and proposed his own way of solving the Preah Vihear dispute by force. Among other things, he insisted that Thailand resign from UNESCO and

officially notify the 7 member countries of the World Heritage Committee that we would not allow them to enter our country to restore the Preah Vihear temple. They would have to fly helicopters from Cambodia to reach the temple. We would not even allow them to come out to use toilets on Thai soil. This is the only thing for us to do, and we can do it, believe me. To negotiate with a rogue country like Cambodia cannot be done with our weaknesses and as long as we still have those traitors. We have to bring about unity of the nation on this issue of Preah Vihear temple and Thai sovereignty, and then we will take this “Strength of the Land” to talk with Cambodia. This is urgent. I believe that when we implement this, the worst-case scenario would be a reversion to 1962 when Cambodia could take only the temple, but nothing else.

“Sondhi Limthongkul’s Solution to the Preah Vihear Dispute” Prachatai English (2 August 2008) <https://prachatai.com/english/node/732>.↩︎

As noted by the ICJ, a map “was filed by Cambodia as Annex I to its Memorial, and has become known in the case (and will be referred to herein) as the Annex I map.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 21. It covered the “Dangrek” section of the frontier and was one of 11 maps produced during the delimitation process. ibid 20. In the Treaty of 13 February 1904 between France (the then protecting power of Cambodia) and Siam (present day Thailand), Article 1 had provided that the border between the two countries along the Dangrek mountain chain should be the “watershed”—the line on the ground where rain falling on one side of the line would drain into Siam (to the north) and on the other side of the line into Cambodia (to the south). However, Article 3 of the treaty went further and provided that there “shall be a delimitation of the frontiers between the Kingdom of Siam and territories making up French Indo-China. The delimitation will be carried out by Mixed Commissions composed of officers appointed by the two contracting countries.” ibid 16. “Delimitation,” in a cartographic sense, means drawing a boundary line on a map based upon on field observations, whereas “demarcation” refers to the physical marking of the boundary on the ground. Burgess, Temple (n 1) 71.↩︎

Apart from conclusions that can be drawn from subsequent events,

[t]he Court however considers that Thailand in 1908–1909 did accept the Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and hence recognized the line on that map as being the frontier line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory. The Court considers that, looked at as a whole, Thailand’s subsequent conduct confirms and bears out her original acceptance, and that Thailand’s acts on the ground do not suffice to negative this. Both parties, by their conduct, recognized the line and thereby in effect agreed to regard it as being the frontier line. . . . It must be asked why the Parties in this case provided for a delimitation, instead of relying on the Treaty clause indicating that the frontier line in this region would be the watershed. . . . This could only have been because they regarded a watershed indication as insufficient by itself to achieve certainty and finality. . . . Various factors support the view that the primary object of the Parties in the frontier settlements of 1904–1908 was to achieve certainty and finality.

ICJ Merits (n 3) 32–34.↩︎

ibid 20.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

ibid 22–23.↩︎

ibid 24.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

ibid 23. This basic point was significantly expanded upon in the concurring opinion of the judge from the United Kingdom, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. He noted that it was Siam that requested France to make the maps, and as a result,

everyone on the Siamese side relied on the skill and good faith of the French topographical officers producing the maps. There can equally be no doubt that the latter acted in complete good faith, used all their skill, and fully believed that the watershed in the Preah Vihear region ran as indicated by the Annex I line. . . . A man who consults a lawyer, doctor, architect, or other expert, is held (in the absence of fraud or negligence—not here in question) to accept the possibility that the expert may be mistaken in the advice he gives, or less than perfect in the work he does. Like all human beings, he is fallible. . . . The French officers in this case were of course fallible. They for instance (and both Parties were agreed about this) made an error over the course of the O'Tasem stream, which must have affected the whole question of how the watershed line ran in the Preah Vihear region. The authorities of French Indo-China were unaware of this error. They accepted the map as correct. Equally, the Siamese authorities, knowing the character and provenance of the map, being in a position to consult their Commissioners who had received it, or experts of their own choice, made no objection, and raised no query, in relation to a line which was clearly intended to represent and constitute the line of the frontier in this region, and which anyone looking at it must have seen at once placed Preah Vihear on the Cambodian side of the line. Today Thailand says the map was erroneous and that she was under a misapprehension about it. But the Siamese authorities of that date plainly accepted the risk that just such an error as this might in time be discovered: and whoever does that, must be held thereby also, and in advance, to have accepted such errors as do in fact eventually come to light.

Separate Opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice <https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/45/045-19620615-JUD-01-03-EN.pdf> at 57–59.↩︎

“Counsel for Thailand once again state that the map Annex I was never for one moment considered by Thailand a binding document. It has never been used by Thailand to show where the treaty boundary lies.” Oral Argument of M.R. Seni Pramoj (Rejoinder) 27 March 1962, ICJ Pleadings Vol. II, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/045-19620310-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf> at 564.↩︎

Rejoinder of Thailand, 2 February 1962 (para 67 at 578), ICJ Pleadings Vol. II, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/9257.pdf>:

The production of maps copied from Annex I obviously did not betoken any belief by the Government that the temple lay in Cambodian territory, for the acts of the Government throughout the period treated Phra Viharn as Thai territory. Various Thai officials concerned with the administration of the area, and the departments of the Government to which they belonged, were well aware throughout that Phra Viharn was in territory under their responsibility and treated it as subject to Thai jurisdiction. This is clearly shown by the records of governmental acts set out in paras. 62–69 of the Counter-Memorial and the Annexes there mentioned. Thailand was thus in effective and unchallenged occupation of the area, and there was no question of a territorial “claim” by her. The error as to the true position of the watershed was discovered in the Thai survey of 1934/35.

Not surprisingly, the Cambodian side strongly rejected the assertion that Thailand administered the area and introduced contrary evidence. See generally Burgess, Temple (n 1) 150–55.↩︎

Counter-Memorial of Thailand of 29 September 1961 (para 34 at 180) ICJ Pleadings Vol. II, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/9253.pdf>. The word ‘apocryphal’ means “of doubtful authenticity” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apocryphal>), as Thailand had contended that the map “was the work of French mapmakers alone and cannot be accepted as a substitute for the Treaty where it departs obviously from the Treaty’s terms.” Rejoinder of Thailand (para 2) 2 February 1962 (n 16). However, Thailand did concede that the portion of the Annex I map in question most likely was based upon sketches made by the French officers responsible for mapping this portion of the Dangrek range, but maintained that this work may never have been seen by the Mixed Commission, and, in any event, was never formally adopted by the Mixed Commission. ibid Rejoinder at para 37.↩︎

See sections III and IV below. The most significant of these documents are contained in an Appendix that immediately follows this article (pages 49–68). Other documents connected with this research but not otherwise available to the public are contained as Annexes in a special “Supplemental Documents” folder on Dropbox that interested readers can access:

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>.

For reference purposes, the words “Appendix” or “Annex,” followed by a capital letter, have been added to the upper left-hand corner of the PDF documents.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

“The allegation that Annex I, insofar as it was attributed to the Franco–Siamese Commission, was an apocryphal document is therefore clearly justified.” Rejoinder of Thailand (para 28 at 558) 2 February 1962 (n 16).↩︎

See section III below.↩︎

“All through the case, the Thais kept quiet about the so-called Incident of 1911, and the Cambodians’ lawyers seem never to have found out about it. Had they known, they could doubtless have used it to their advantage.” Burgess, Temple (n 1) 149. The ICJ never mentioned it either.↩︎

Encyclopedia.com <https://www.encyclopedia.com/reference/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/jessup-philip-caryl>; Philip C. Jessup Papers, A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress <https://findingaids.loc.gov/exist_collections/ead3pdf/mss/2004/ms004004.pdf>.↩︎

“Students Take Home Honors at World’s Largest Moot Court Contest after Winning U.S. Nationals,” News from Columbia Law (3 May 2012) <https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/students-take-home-honors-worlds-largest-moot-court-contest-after-winning-us-nationals>.↩︎

“About the Jessup” International Law Students Association <https://www.ilsa.org/about-jessup/>.↩︎

See Part II: Legal File, 1927–1976 in Box II:50–71 of “Philip C. Jessup Papers, A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress” <https://findingaids.loc.gov/exist_collections/ead3pdf/mss /2004/ms004004.pdf> 40–42.↩︎

See letter of 3 November 1959 by Jessup to the foreign minister of Nicaragua, a country he was then advising in its boundary case against Honduras. Jessup wished to obtain Nicaragua’s consent to also represent Thailand, noting that he did not believe there to be any conflict of interest. Annex A, Supplemental Documents located on Dropbox:

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>.↩︎

See letter of 1 December 1959 to Jessup from Thailand’s ambassador to the United States, Visutr Arthayukti, which also outlined the financial terms of the agreement. ibid Annex B.↩︎

See e.g., “List of Documents Forwarded to Professors Jessup and Hyde” (Appendix A) and “Materials to be Sent to Counsels,” Appendix B. While the page entitled “List of Documents Forwarded” consists only of one page, it is likely that the original list contained additional pages and referred to other documents. Support for this is found in other documents that are headed with a numeral in parenthesis, including numbers (4), (5), (6), and (7). The latter four are in Annex C of the Supplemental Documents (n 27).↩︎

Burgess, Temple (n 1) 114.↩︎

Page 1 of “Proceedings and Aide-Mémoires of the Meeting of Counsel and Thai Legal Team,” held at Government House in Bangkok, 18–23 January 1960, can be found in Appendix C. The entire 83-page document can be found as Annex D in the Supplemental Documents folder (n 27).↩︎

Article 10 section 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that “Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the Security Council shall be considered as elected.” <https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/charter-all-lang.pdf#page=23>.↩︎

See Minutes of the 909th Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, held on 16–17 November 1960 <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N60/044/71/PDF/N6004471.pdf>.↩︎

Copy of letter of 19 November 1960 (hand-dated) from Jessup to Thanat Khoman, the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs. Annex E, Supplemental Documents (n 27).↩︎

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) ICJ Press Release 1961/7 <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/12755.pdf>.↩︎

“1. No member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. 2. No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity. 3. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court.”↩︎

ICJ Press Release No. 1961/7 (n 35).↩︎

Burgess, Temple (n 1) 122.↩︎

Jessup Papers (n 26) 2, 4.↩︎

ibid 2.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

ibid 4.↩︎

ibid 40.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

See Appendix D, containing the first nine (and most important) documents. The remaining documents (numbered 10 through 17) are in Annex F of the Supplemental Documents (n 27).↩︎

This author inspected these documents in Washington, DC on 29–30 June 2022. At the time many “Top Secret” documents in the two boxes had previously been marked as declassified, but the “Incident of 1911” file had not been. When the author requested to scan the file to a PDF on 29 July 2022, the Manuscript Division held up the request until later in the day, during which time the U.S. State Department was contacted and authorized the declassification of the file. One can surmise, however, that the “Top Secret” designation had originally been applied to the documents by the Thai government at the time of their translation (most likely in late 1959 or early 1960), as obviously they were intended to be kept confidential within the legal team representing Thailand. As mentioned above in footnote 22, it appears that neither the Court nor the Cambodian legal team ever knew about the contents of this file.↩︎

See page 1 of “The Incident of 1911” in Appendix D.↩︎

See Appendix D(1).↩︎

Damrong Rajanubhab (1862–1943) was the son of King Mongkut and half-brother of King Chulalongkorn. He founded modern education and provincial administration and was considered Thailand’s leading intellectual of his generation. Because of his exceptional ability, in 1892 he was appointed the Minister of Interior, the most powerful position in the bureaucracy. Serving in this position until 1915, he modernized what had been a decentralized system of provincial administration, grouping the almost 100 provinces into only 14 “circles” and had them staffed by modern-educated young officers and royal commissioners. These efforts drastically reduced what had been often anarchical provincial autonomy. “Damrong Rajanubhab” Encyclopedia Britannica (27 November 2022) <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Damrong-Rajanubhab>; “Prince Damrong Rajanubhab” The British Museum <https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG9330>. “During his twenty-three years as interior minister, the prince visited seventy of Siam’s seventy-one provinces, often traveling by oxcart, elephant, and horse.” Burgess, Temple (n 1) 83.↩︎

Devawongse Varoprakar (1858–1923), a son of King Mongkut and the younger half-brother of King Chulalongkorn, was the Foreign Minister of Siam from 1885 to 1923. His policies enabled the kingdom to survive as an independent state. He established Siam’s first modern bureaucratic ministry, with a Western-style system of organization. “The chief characteristics of Devawongse’s foreign policy were genial accommodation and a determination that Siam should be treated as an equal by the Western countries with which the kingdom earlier had signed unequal treaties.” “Prince Devawongse Varoprakar” Encyclopedia Britannica (23 November 2022) <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Prince-Devawongse-Varoprakar>.↩︎

The letter itself used the phrase “in the territory of the Kingdom.”↩︎

The translated letter spells the name with a capital “W,” but it is spelled with a “V” in other documents, such as in the footnote on Appendix D(6).↩︎

Appendix D(5).↩︎

The reference is to Jens Westengard, a Danish–American legal scholar who, after first teaching at Harvard Law School, moved to Siam in 1903 to initially become the Assistant General Advisor to the government, later the Acting General Advisor, and from 1909 to 1915 the General Advisor. He held the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, received numerous royal honors, and was uniformly known and referred to as “Phya Kalyan” (or “Phya Kalyana Maitri”). See Joseph H. Beale, Porter E. Sargent, A Siamese Student, and John Raeburn Green, “Jens Iverson Westengard” (1918) 32(2) Harvard Law Review 93–113 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1327639>.↩︎

“As [Westengard] came to exert an influence in the government second only to the King, every problem of internal administration and foreign diplomacy passed through his office.” ibid 99.↩︎

The reference is to Henri Ponsot, a French diplomat who, early in his career, was posted to Bangkok. Information about him during this period has been difficult to locate, but it appears at some point he may have been somewhat of an advisor to King Chulalongkorn. “A French official named Ponsot had actually been appointed by Chulalongkorn as Siamese Royal Commissioner at Battambang. That official had already talked the matter over with the King of Siam and they had decided to liquidate the whole matter, if France would give them a fair return.” Lawrence Palmer Briggs, “The Treaty of March 23, 1907 between France and Siam and the Return of Battambang and Angkor to Cambodia” (1946) 5(4) The Far Eastern Quarterly 439, 451 <https://doi.org/10.2307/2049791>. In Annex No. 50 of Thailand’s Rejoinder of 2 March 1962 to the ICJ, a letter in French of 17 March 1907 by Colonel Bernard, the President of the French Delimitation Commission, mentions Ponsot thusly (from Google Translate): “Ponsot, former Secretary of the Legation of France in Siam, currently Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, had already made it possible to adopt the main provisions of the treaty and the protocols.” [“Ponsot, ancien Secrétaire de la Légation de France au Siam, actuellement Conseiller au Ministère de l’Intérieur, avaient permis d’arrêter déjà les principales dispositions du traité et des protocoles.”] Rejoinder of Thailand, 2 February 1962 (n 16) at 603. Ponsot’s name also appears as being present, and part of the Siamese delegation, at the 2 December 1906 meeting of the Franco–Siamese Commission of Delimitation held at Angkor-Wat. See Annex H of Supplemental Documents (n 27).↩︎

The Note from Mr. Ponsot is item #4, discussed next.↩︎

Appendix D(4).↩︎

Appendix D(2).↩︎

ibid.↩︎

The final paragraph of the letter (Appendix D(2)) states that Prince Devawongse had heard back from the Ministry of Defense, “indicating certain points on which clarification should be sought from the French Minister,” and that Prince Devawongse had “sent a reply to the French Minister,” was enclosing for Prince Damrong “the four copies of correspondence,” and would inform Prince Damrong of any reply back from the French minister. Copies of this “correspondence” have not been obtained, so it is unknown exactly what was said to the French minister. However, in light of subsequent events (see Document (6), discussed below), it seems plausible that the “certain points on which clarification should be sought” from the French were merely enquires (quite possibly those mentioned by Mr. Ponsot in his Note (Document (4)) that in no way suggested any protest—or “representation”—that questioned the propriety of the French activities at the temple.↩︎

Appendix D(3).↩︎

The quotations are verbatim from the letter, but the quoted words are those of the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, summarizing what Phya Vongsa had written to the ministry.↩︎

This was the scale of the map, entitled “DANGREK” and included Preah Vihear, copies of which were provided in 1908 by the French to the Thai government. It was also the “Annex I” map that Cambodia submitted to the ICJ at the time it filed its case against Thailand on 6 October 1959.↩︎

The original Annex I map, printed and distributed in 1908, was at the scale of 1:200000 (1 centimeter on the map = 2 kilometers on the ground) and can be viewed (in four sections) at the very end of the Court’s PDF file that begins with Cambodia’s Application Instituting Proceedings of 6 October 1959 <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/9249.pdf>. Moreover, in a report prepared for Thailand and filed in the second Preah Vihear case, it was noted that

there is a need to consider the technical limitations of a small scale map such as the Annex I map. Even if the map is accurate, the scale will define the precision with which the position of any feature on the map can be determined. The arms of the cross symbols used to mark the boundary on the Annex I map are about 0.6 millimetres wide, which is 120 metres on the ground.

Alastair Macdonald and Martin Pratt, “Assessment of the Task of Translating the Cambodia–Thailand Boundary Depicted on the ‘Annex I’ Map onto the Ground,” International Boundaries Research Unit (Durham University, October 2011) Annex 96 of the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Written Observations of Thailand) para 36 at 643 <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/151/17286.pdf>.↩︎

Appendix D(3).↩︎

ibid.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

ibid. It can be surmised that “the valley” refers to the vast, flat Cambodian plain that stretches south of the temple, which is located some 525 meters above the plain. The report being referenced is that of “Report No. II” and can be found as Annex F(11) in the Supplemental Documents folder <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>.↩︎

Appendix D(6).↩︎

The letter itself is dated 19 March 1911, but the header to Document (6) states a date of “March 18, 1911,” a date that also appears in the index to the file on page 1 of The Incident of 1911 file in Appendix D.↩︎

Appendix D(6).↩︎

Appendix D(9).↩︎

Document (9) mentions that these men were “the officials who had been assigned to patrol highwaymen” and “had also been instructed to make maps of Phra Viharn.”↩︎

The report and five memoranda referred to are Document Nos. (10) to (15) inclusive from “The Incident of 1911” file, located online as Annex F in the Supplemental Documents folder <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>. The reports are each dated 21 April 1911, though the translation for Report No. II (Document (11)) misstates the month as being November. In the reports, “Nai Kleub” is described as a “clerk,” and “Nai Mao” as a “probationer in Government Service” and also “student – recorder.” The documents are fascinating to read in respect to their detail. Report No. I (Document (10)) is a summary of the day-to-day itinerary as the men traveled to Preah Vihear and back over the period of 20 February–1 March 1911. Report No. II (Document (11)), among other things, is “on reasons for and purposes of clearing of the woods by the French.” Report No. III (Document (12)) is “on the Position of Ta Thao pass (or Phra Chai pass),” Report No. IV (Document (13)) is “on the position of Sra Trao (Sra: pool),” Report No. V (Document (14)) is “on the description of Don-Ao pass and on the route to Ban Don-Ao,” and Report No. VI (Document 15)) is “on events around Dam Pak Ka and Chan Daeng-Chan Hom Passes.” While there is mention of four maps being created, only two maps (Document nos. (16) and (17)) appear in The Incident of 1911 file (Annex F).↩︎

Appendix D(8).↩︎

ibid.↩︎

Appendix D(7).↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 22.↩︎

ibid 16–17.↩︎

See Report by Professor W. Schermerhorn, Dean of the International Training Center for Aerial Survey in Annex No. 46 of Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Counter-Memorial of the Royal Government of Thailand) 432–36 <https://icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/9253.pdf>: “It is obvious that the border line shown on the ‘annex I’ map was drawn by constructing the watershed line in accordance with the contour lines represented there. This construction was done correctly on the basis of the given contour lines. However, due to the mistake about the O’Tasem river the line of the watershed is shifted incorrectly to the north, placing the Pnom Trap mountain completely in Cambodian territory i.e. south of the border line as drawn in the ‘annex I’ map. . . . If this mistake is rectified in the ‘annex I’ map then . . . the watershed would run over the Pnom Trap mountain and go from there along the southern rim of Phra Viharn mountain to the temple.” ibid 435–36.↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 17. While Article I of the Treaty of 1904 spoke of “Mixed Commissions” (plural), they were commonly viewed as a singular entity: “In due course, a Mixed Commission composed of French and Siamese members was set up, charged with the task of delimiting the eastern sector of the Dangrek range in which Preah Vihear is situated. This Mixed Commission was composed of two sections, one French and one Siamese, sitting together.” ibid.↩︎

“[W]hat had to be delimited was ‘the frontiers’ between Siam and French Indo-China; . . . In consequence, the line of the frontier would, to all intents and purposes, be the line resulting from the work of delimitation, unless the delimitation were shown to be invalid.” ibid.↩︎

“[A]ttention in both countries . . . was directed towards the conclusion of the Treaty of 23 March 1907.” ibid 20.↩︎

“[A]fter the minutes of the meeting of the First Commission on 2 December 1906, there is no further reference whatever, in any minutes of later meetings, to the question of the frontier in the Dangrek region.” ibid 18.↩︎

“What is certain is that the map must have had a basis of some sort, and the Court thinks there can be no reasonable doubt that it was based on the work of the surveying officers in the Dangrek sector.” ibid 21. And see Burgess, Temple (n 1) 79: “What is undisputable is that someone from the commission team visited the area and made extensive observations. The map depicts the shape of the promontory and the temple’s presence there. An elevation reading at the peak is reasonably accurate at six hundred twenty six metres. The adjacent hill is shown, as is its name, Phnom Trap. Even if not fully accurate, the map has a level of detail that would not have been possible had commission members remained on those cart tracks ten or fifteen kilometers to the north.”↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 22. As further noted by the Court, “Even if there was no delimitation of the frontier in the eastern sector of the Dangrek approved and adopted by the Mixed Commission, it was obviously open to the Governments themselves to adopt a delimitation for that region, making use of the work of the technical members of the Mixed Commissions.” ibid.↩︎

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the verb “adopt” (n. adoption) means “to take up and practice or use,” while the verb “accept” (n. acceptance) means “to give admittance or approval to.” “Adopt” Merriam-Webster Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adopt>; “Accept” Merriam-Webster Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accept>. In the context of this case, the words appear to have been used synonymously with one another.↩︎

“The Government of Cambodia has not produced any express statement by the Government of Thailand that the line marked on Annex I is the correct line of the boundary.” Written Rejoinder of Thailand, 2 February 1962 (n 16) para 77 at 583; “Counsel for Thailand once again state that the map Annex I was never for one moment considered by Thailand a binding document. It has never been used by Thailand to show where the treaty boundary lies.” Oral Argument of M.R. Seni Pramoj (Rejoinder) 27 March 1962 (n 15).↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 23, Latin italics in original. “Acquiesced” is the past tense of the verb “acquiesce,” meaning “to accept, comply, or submit tacitly or passively.” “Acquiesce” Merriam-Webster Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/acquiesce>. See also the comments from the concurring opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, at footnote 14.↩︎

Burgess, Temple (n 1) 156.↩︎

Sally Tyler, “Of Temples and Territory: The ICJ’s Preah Vihear Decision and Implications for Regional Dispute Resolution” (2016) 19(1) University of the District of Columbia Law Review <https://digitalcommons.law.udc.edu/udclr/vol19/iss1/5> 133, 146.↩︎

ibid.↩︎

Observation of 19 January 1960, Annex G(1), Supplemental Documents <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>.↩︎

Burgess, Temple (n 1) 158–59.↩︎

ibid 159.↩︎

See footnote 22.↩︎

“Phya Vongsa was formerly M.C. Chatidej Udom, chairman of the Siamese Delimitation Commission 1904–1907.” Footnote 1 in translated letter of 19 March 1911 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ministry of Interior, Appendix D(6). In the Minutes of the 2 December 1906 Meeting of the Franco–Siamese Commission of Delimitation, his name appeared as “General Mom Chatidej Udom, President.” Annex H of Supplemental Documents folder: <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>.↩︎

Letter of 10 March 1911 from the Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Appendix D(3). The Court also observed that “It has not been contested that the Presidents of the French and Siamese sections of the Commission, as representing it, duly made this journey, and that in the course of it they visited the Temple of Preah Vihear. But there is no record of any decision that they may have taken.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 18.↩︎

Appendix D(3).↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 20.↩︎

Letter of 10 March 1911 from the Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Appendix D(3), and letter of 19 March 1911 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ministry of Interior, Appendix D(6).↩︎

Letter of 24 February 1911 from Prince Damrong to Prince Devawongse, Appendix D(1), and letter of 26 February 1911 from Prince Devawongse to Prince Damrong, Appendix D(2).↩︎

“I understand Phra Viharn to be in the territory of the Kingdom, and am therefore of opinion that for clarity sake the French Minister should be informed or enquiry should be made from him regarding this matter.” Appendix D(1)(Prince Damrong to Prince Devawongse, 24 February 1911).↩︎

Appendix D(3)(Interior to Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1911), and Appendix D(6)( Foreign Affairs to Interior, 19 March 1911). And see Appendix D(2) (Prince Devawongse to Prince Damrong, 26 February 1911): “If it [Preah Vihear] is in French territory, it would be improper to make any representation to the French Minister.”↩︎

Appendix D(3)(Interior to Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1911).↩︎

See footnote 89.↩︎

See chronology in footnote 113.↩︎

Appendix D(3) Interior to Foreign Affairs, 10 March 1911.↩︎

“If it is in French territory, it would be improper to make any representation to the French Minister.” Letter by the foreign minister, Prince Devawongse, to Prince Damrong (26 February 1911), Appendix D(2).↩︎

“The Court however considers that Thailand in 1908–1909 did accept the Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and hence recognized the line on that map as being the frontier line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 32.↩︎

ibid 23.↩︎

1909: Mixed Franco–Siamese Commission of Transcription set up to convert existing maps into atlas form, provide names in equivalent Siamese script, and create Siamese geographical service. No mention of Preah Vihear. 1925: Friendship treaty negotiations, but no mention of Preah Vihear. 1930: Prince Damrong visits Temple and is received by the French Resident in full dress uniform with the French flag flying from a flagpole (“A clearer affirmation of title on the French Indo–Chinese side can scarcely be imagined. It demanded a reaction. Thailand did nothing.” ICJ Merits [1962] (n 3) 30.) 1934–1935: Thai cartographic survey shows Annex I line is not the watershed line, but this finding not conveyed to the French. 1937: Franco–Siamese Treaty negotiations confirm existing frontiers and Royal Thai Survey Department publishes map showing Preah Vihear in Cambodia (and did so up until 1958). 1947: Franco-Thai Conciliation Commission meets in Washington, DC to work out any revisions to the frontier settlements of 1904 and 1907; Thailand introduces a map in regard to its numerous complaints about other locations along the border, nothing is said about Preah Vihear, but the map shows Temple as being in Cambodia; 1958: Thailand makes first formal objection to the Annex I map. The above dates, and their significance, can be found in the ICJ Merits decision of 1962 (n 3).↩︎

“Thailand’s subsequent conduct confirms and bears out her original acceptance.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 33.↩︎

ibid 27–28.↩︎

The Court pointed out that Thailand had argued that it had never accepted the Annex I map or the border shown on it “at any rate so far as Preah Vihear is concerned, in such a way to become bound thereby; or, alternatively that, if she did accept the map, she did so only under, and because of, a mistaken belief (upon which she relied) that the map was correctly drawn to correspond with the watershed line.” ibid 21.↩︎

ibid 27.↩︎

See Observation of M.R. Seni Pramoj, referenced at footnote 94.↩︎

Letter of 24 February 1911 from Prince Damrong to Prince Devawongse, Appendix D(1).↩︎

The Court seemed to think so. It noted that “it would have been natural for Thailand to raise the matter” in connection with negotiations for the 1937 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation “if she considered the map indicating the frontier at Preah Vihear to be incorrect.” Instead, in the same year, Thailand “produced a map of her own showing Preah Vihear as being in Cambodia. That this map may have been intended for internal military use does not seem to the Court to make it any less evidence of Thailand’s state of mind. The inference must be—particularly in regard to the 1937 occasion—that she accepted or still accepted the Annex I map, and the line it indicated, even if she believed it incorrect, even if, after her own survey of 1934–1935, she thought she knew it was incorrect.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 27–28.↩︎

Thailand “has, for fifty years, enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only the benefit of a stable frontier. France, and through her Cambodia, relied on Thailand's acceptance of the map.” ibid 32. It can be observed that “a stable frontier” is no minor thing. The east–west Dangrek mountain range is 320 km long (200 miles). “Dângrêk Mountains” Encyclopedia Britannica <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia>. Had the Court ruled that Thailand should have sovereignty over the temple because its watershed turned out actually to be in Thailand, presumably that would then permit either party to claim that this or that place along the entire length of the Dangrek range was not properly delimited on the map, and that the “real” watershed needed to be conclusively determined. Indeed, M.R. Seni Promoj expressed a related fear of how the Court’s judgment could impact the entire Dangrek range. In arguing on behalf of Thailand that the proper subject of the 1962 case was only sovereignty over the temple itself, and not the surrounding area or the boundary line as indicated on the Annex I map, he noted that “if the Court pronounces judgment on the basis of Annex I, the Court must necessarily uphold the frontier line as drawn on the other maps in the same series as well.” Oral Argument of 7 March 1962, ICJ Pleadings, Vol. II, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/045-19620310-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf> at 216. Even today there is still no agreement as to exactly where the watershed line is at Preah Vihear, and it is doubtful that anyone would wish that same confusion to exist along all 320 km of the border.↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 32. The Court was asserting the doctrine of estoppel, which “operates so as to preclude a party from denying before a tribunal the truth of a statement of fact made previously by that party to another whereby that other has acted to his detriment or the party making the statement has secured some benefit.” Derek W. Bowett, “Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its Relation to Acquiescence” (1957) 33 British Yearbook of International Law 176. In this case, the “statement of fact made previously” really was the absence of any statement—the “acquiescence”—which, under the circumstances, the Court found to be tantamount to Thailand having said it accepted the Annex I map. As observed by the Court, Thailand “has, for fifty years, enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only the benefit of a stable frontier. France, and through her Cambodia, relied on Thailand's acceptance of the map.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 32. As such, “it is immaterial whether or not this reliance was based on a belief that the map was correct. It is not now open to Thailand, while continuing to claim and enjoy the benefits of the settlement, to deny that she was ever a consenting party to it.” ibid.↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 30. The prince ceased being Minister of Interior in 1915 (footnote 49).↩︎

ibid. And see footnote 113, which describes the circumstances in 1930 and the Court’s comments.↩︎

The translated letter in French appears as “Annexe VIII” of Cambodia’s Application Instituting Proceedings (6 October 1959) at 96 <https://icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/9249.pdf>. It, and a Google translation into English, appear as Annex K in the Supplemental Documents folder: <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ctwpls0swh6ck2a/AADzgSnEaZT3_K_KIpPi9zpRa?dl=0>.↩︎

Annex K, ibid.↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 30.↩︎

Appendix D(3).↩︎

Note from Mr. Ponsot on 25 February 1911, Appendix D(4). The Note was forwarded by Mr. Westengard to Prince Devawongse on the same date (Appendix D(5)) and the contents made known to Prince Damrong in Prince Devawongse’s letter to Prince Damrong on 26 February 1911 (Appendix D(2).↩︎

ibid.↩︎

“Counsel for Thailand once again state that the map Annex I was never for one moment considered by Thailand a binding document. It has never been used by Thailand to show where the treaty boundary lies.” Oral Argument of M.R. Seni Pramoj (Rejoinder) 27 March 1962 (n 15).↩︎

“As for the future, Thailand has repeatedly re-affirmed that it does not seek to reverse the Court’s determination that the Temple belongs to Cambodia.” Further Written Explanations of Thailand, Vol. 1, para 4.100 at 215 (21 June 2012) Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) accessible from <https://icj-cij.org/en/case/151>.↩︎

See generally Burgess, Temple (Chapter 12: “A Conflict Reborn”) (n 1) 193–203.↩︎

An “Overview” of the case and links to its documents can be found on the ICJ website: <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/151>. In the event of a dispute over the meaning or scope of a previous judgement, the court always retains jurisdiction to clarify the matter (ICJ Statute, art 60).↩︎

Application Instituting Proceedings (6 October 1959) Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/45>; <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/45/9249.pdf> at 15.↩︎

ICJ Merits (n 3) 36.↩︎

ibid 32: “The Court however considers that Thailand in 1908–1909 did accept the Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and hence recognized the line on that map as being the frontier line, the effect of which is to situate Preah Vihear in Cambodian territory.”↩︎

Application Instituting Proceedings (n 135).↩︎

See ICJ Merits (n 3) 11, 13–14, 36.↩︎

ibid 37.↩︎

This was a striking ambiguity in the judgment, as the ICJ generally is meticulous in addressing every minute detail and had just done so in its opinion. This author surmises, however, that the ambiguity might well have been intentional. The Court had rejected Cambodia’s attempt in 1962 to enlarge its original submissions of 1959 to include a determination of the boundary line, undoubtedly because the request had come so late in the proceedings. But, by leaving the word “vicinity” ambiguous, the Court may have assumed, or at least hoped, that after a judgment which was limited in scope to what Cambodia had originally requested—the sovereignty of the temple—Thailand would then graciously accept the line on the map as being the actual boundary. After all, the earlier “acceptance” by Thailand of that boundary line was the very rationale on which the Court had based its decision that the temple thus belonged to Cambodia. If such was the Court’s hope, it turned out to be quite illusory.↩︎

See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Judgment [2013] ICJ Rep 311–12 (para 84) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/151/151-20131111-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>.↩︎

ibid 311 (para 83).↩︎

ibid 313–14 (para 89). The Court defined the promontory area in Paragraph 98 of its judgment on page 315.↩︎

ibid 306 (para 66): “Accordingly [under Article 60 of the ICJ Statute], the Court must keep strictly within the limits of the original judgment and cannot question matters that were settled therein with binding force, nor can it provide answers to questions the Court did not decide in the original judgment.”↩︎

Referring to the 1962 judgment, “the Court did not address the issue of sovereignty over Phnom Trap, or any other area beyond the limits of the promontory of Preah Vihear.” ibid 315 (para 97).↩︎

ibid 316 (para 99).↩︎

The Court, in defining the scope of the “vicinity” of the temple, said: “In the north, the limit of the promontory is the Annex I map line, from a point to the north-east of the Temple where that line abuts the escarpment to a point in the north-west where the ground begins to rise from the valley, at the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap.” ibid 315 (para 98), emphasis added. See Figure 11, above.↩︎

“Assessment of the Task of Translating the Cambodia–Thailand Boundary Depicted on the ‘Annex I’ Map onto the Ground” <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/151/17286.pdf> (para 63 at 670). The Court was well aware of the practical difficulties involved in transposing the Annex I map line onto a precise location on the ground, but said that it “cannot now, in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 60 to interpret the 1962 Judgment, deal with a matter which was not addressed by that Judgment.” ICJ Interpretation (n 142) at 316 (para 99). The Court, however, then stated that all parties to an ICJ case “have an obligation to implement the judgment of the Court in good faith. It is of the essence of that obligation that it does not permit either party to impose a unilateral solution.” ibid.↩︎

“[T]he Annex I map played a central role in the reasoning of the Court.” ICJ Interpretation (n 142) at 308 (para 77).↩︎

Protestors at the Ministry of Defense. “Bangkok Rocked by Protests: As It Happened” Khaosod English (11 November 2013) <https://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2013/11/11/1384154117/>. This basic sentiment appears to have originated from a news conference in 1958. Reporters were wondering “whether it was prudent to jeopardize trade and risk possible military conflict over a few square kilometres of territory” and one reporter asked the then Minister of Interior, Praphas Charusatrhien, “ ‘Is not commerce and trade more important? Preah Vihear is just a pile of stones.’ ” Praphas replied, “ ‘I will never allow one stone of Thai territory to be surrendered.’ ” Strate, “Pile of Stones?” (n 2) 42. According to Strate, “From the perspective of the Thai state, Preah Vihear’s importance has less to do with its architectural or religious significance than its connection to the ‘lost territories’ and the legacy of Western imperialism in Thailand.” ibid 43.↩︎

While the Court’s description of the “vicinity” of Preah Vihear in its paragraph 98 may seem precise, its implementation would involve transposing the Annex I line onto the ground—not an easy task (see footnote 149). But assuming this task could be accomplished, the area would include a significant portion northwest of the temple up until the westward Annex I line intersected with the foot of the hill of Phnom Trap. (See Figure 11.) Interestingly, Judge ad hoc Jean-Pierre Cot (appointed by Thailand) said in his concurring declaration that “I note that the solution adopted by the Court corresponds closely to one of the options put to the Thai Council of Ministers on 10 July 1962 [see the enhanced yellow line in Figure 12]. It was thus a possible interpretation of the 1962 Judgment according to the views of the Thai administration at the time. And that is the interpretation given by the Court today.” ICJ Interpretation (n 142) at 151 (para 15) <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/151/151-20131111-JUD-01-04-EN.pdf>. However, such option by the Thai government—which resulted in an almost perfect triangle of land—seems difficult to reconcile with the shape of the Court-defined promontory illustrated in Figure 11. Moreover, the resulting odd shape of the now-defined promontory is somewhat difficult to match with the Court’s simpler description in 1962: “the main Temple buildings stand in the apex of a triangular piece of high ground jutting out into the plain.” ICJ Merits (n 3) 15.

Other areas along the border with Cambodia, however, including some with “overlapping claims,” appear to enjoy a much more cordial relationship. See Wassana Nanuam, “Cambodian Border Growing Clearer” Bangkok Post (2 September 2022) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2382191/cambodian-border-growing-clearer>.↩︎

For a brief, but insightful, overview of the concept of an international peace park, see Jurgen Brauer, “Border Politics: Finding the Answer in a ‘Park of Peace’ ” Bangkok Post (1 July 2008) available at <https://ln5.sync.com/dl/39d7efed0/zt47xu2z-3q5b8jtp-r3wfg4p3-hgin3q22/view/doc/6266150600009>. The following day, in its editorial, the Bangkok Post endorsed this idea of a peace park in regard to the Preah Vihear situation. A reprint of the editorial appeared on page 21 of the July–August issue of AsiaView and can be downloaded and viewed from <https://ln5.sync.com/dl/3bd8a0170/fgub9iru-yzj8kp9g-cgh3fbx4-qzsxe4zj/view/default/6266150830009>.↩︎

William Roth, “The Preah Vihear Temple Dispute: A Way Out of the Impasse” Bangkok Post (22 July 2008). The idea of some sort of joint management of the temple area to obviate the need for a precise boundary determination is by no means a new one. Indeed, during the August 1958 negotiations in Bangkok between Cambodia and Thailand, the U.S. ambassador to Thailand, U. Alexis Johnson, suggested in a private meeting with Son Sann, the Cambodian foreign minister, the idea of putting the issue of sovereignty on hold and agreeing instead to joint development. Johnson also met with General Thanom Kittikachorn, the Thai Prime Minister, to urge that a settlement with Cambodia be found. However, “he got no pledge from Thanom to do anything more than Thailand had already done. ‘Major factor in Thai attitude is basic chauvinism, particularly vis a vis Cambodia,’ Johnson told Washington.” Burgess, Temple (n 1) 107. A statement released in Phnom Penh on 7 October 1959, the day after proceedings were instituted at the ICJ against Thailand, Cambodia said it was proceeding in court as, after three months, Thailand had made no reply to Cambodia’s offer of joint administration. ibid 108.↩︎

William Roth, “Negotiate Toward Success, Not Stalemate” Bangkok Post (19 February 2011).↩︎

ibid.↩︎

Andreas Buss, “The Preah Vihear Case and Regional Customary Law” (2010) 9(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 111, 124 <https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmp038>.↩︎

Brauer, “Border Politics” (n 153).↩︎

See “Malaysia and Thailand Celebrate 40th Anniversary of Shared Prosperity” Royal Thai Embassy Kuala Lumpur (7 October 2019) <https://kualalumpur.thaiembassy.org/en/content/109735-malaysia-and-thailand-celebrate-40th-anniversary-of-shared-prosperity?cate=5d7538ea15e39c1e60003438>; “Malaysia–Thailand Joint Development Area” <https://www.dmf.go.th/bid19/annaul/08.html>.↩︎

“Sea Riches Prompt New Talks” Bangkok Post (14 September 2022) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2390876/sea-riches-prompt-new-talks>; Wassana Nanuam, “Joint Gulf Plan Moves Closer” Bangkok Post (5 January 2023) News 1 <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2475454/joint-gulf-plan-moves-closer>. An editorial in the Bangkok Post strongly supported the reopening of talks “as a good sign for the energy security of both countries amid the global energy crisis,” but urged that the talks be limited to economic cooperation and not address territorial sovereignty lest it “bring about domestic political turbulence in the two countries.” “Care Vital For Energy Deal” Bangkok Post (20 September 2022) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2395843/care-vital-for-energy-deal>.↩︎

Pichaya Svasti, “A Fine Line” Bangkok Post (22 May 2008), republished as “Preah Vihear: An Overview” Southeast Asian Archaeology (23 May 2008) <https://www.southeastasianarchaeology.com/2008/05/23/preah-vihear-an-overview/>. See also UNESCO’s Operational Guidelines concerning buffer zones in its World Heritage Compendium (subdivision 2.2.6.2) <https://whc.unesco.org/en/compendium/action=list&id_faq_themes=1528&extracts=131>.↩︎

William Roth, “Preah Vihear Decision is Not the End of Territorial Row” Bangkok Post (18 November 2013) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/380347/>.↩︎

“Khao Phra Viharn National Park” Tourism Authority of Thailand <https://www.tourismthailand.org/Attraction/khao-phra-viharn-national-park>.↩︎