Thai Legal Studies (2025) Vol. 5 No. 2 | 175–197
https://doi.org/10.54157/tls.284746
© 2025 by William Roth

This is an open access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Commentary

Thailand’s MOUs: Are They Appropriate for a Referendum?

William Roth*

Abstract

The current Thai government has stated its intention to have the public vote on whether two Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between Thailand and Cambodia should be unilaterally revoked. The MOUs merely set forth an agreed upon “process” by which boundary discussions should be conducted concerning their land border (MoU 43) and their maritime border in the Gulf of Thailand (MoU 44). However, the plan to hold a referendum about them also appears to be an effort to stir nationalistic sentiment in favor of the government at a time of recent military and civilian clashes along the land border. This Commentary reviews the current border conflict that began on 13 February 2025 with an incident at the Ta Muen Thom temple. It then details the provisions of the MOUs, particularly MoU 43 regarding the land boundary, and highlights the benefits of keeping it. Along with others, the author concludes that the public not only is ill prepared to vote wisely on such a highly technical matter involving foreign relations, but that such a significant decision should only be taken by the government or parliament.

Keywords: Referendum — MOUs — Nationalism — Cambodia

I. INTRODUCTION

Once again, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU¹) between Thailand and Cambodia is in the news. Clashes along the border in the spring and summer of 2025² brought renewed attention to what is known colloquially as “MoU 43,”³ a 2000 agreement that sought to formulate a process to determine the boundary line between the two countries.⁴ In 2024, the heated discussion was all about “MoU 44,” signed in 2001, which dealt with overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand.⁵ In December 2024, this author wrote a comprehensive Commentary about MoU 44 and the then-related “Koh Kut Kerfuffle,” and the full text of MoU 44 is available there.⁶ Now, both MOUs are equally back in the spotlight, as the Thai government under new Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has announced its intention to hold a referendum on whether they should be revoked.⁷ Before examining that decision and its repercussions, a little further background might be helpful.

II. WHAT ARE MOUs ANYWAY?

In its simplest form, a “Memorandum of Understanding” is a document that “clearly outlines specific points of understanding. It names the parties, describes the project on which they are agreeing, defines its scope, and details each party’s roles and responsibilities. While not always legally enforceable, an MOU is a significant step because of the time and effort involved in negotiating and drafting an effective document.”⁸ However, when MOUs are signed between countries, they often are intended to be legally binding and, as such, are of the same status as a formal treaty.⁹ From what can be discerned, both the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Cambodian government consider these MOUs to be binding obligations under international law.¹⁰

III. THE CURRENT BORDER CONFLICT

A. A Disputed Map

The most recent controversy along the border began as the result of an “incident” (discussed below) that occurred at Prasat Ta Muen Thom (Thai spelling, but known as “Prasat Ta Moan Thom” in Cambodia,¹¹ though spelled “Prasat Ta Muan Thom” on Google Maps). It is an ancient temple, located in the border area of the Thai province of Surin and the Cambodian province of Oddar Meanchey (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Prasat Ta Muan Thom (Overview); Source: Google Maps (Accessed 7 November 2025)

Up close, Google Maps currently appears to “split the difference” between two nearby and closely-named temples in different countries: Prasat Ta Muen in Thailand, and Prasat Ta Muan Thom in Cambodia (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Prasats Ta Muen & Ta Muan Thom; Source: Google Maps; (Accessed 12 October 2025)

After Cambodia sent a letter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “several Thai social media users noticed that Google Maps had altered the border near Prasat Ta Muen Thom, showing the Cambodia boundary extending to include the temple.”¹² Unsurprisingly, on 2 July 2025 the Thai Army asserted that map boundaries shown on Google Maps “carry no legal weight,”¹³ and that Thailand had consistently exercised sovereignty over the temple.¹⁴

The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), however, has been a little bit more circumspect about the situation. While its webpage for the “Prasat Ta Muen Thom Archeological Site”¹⁵ provides a Thai address,¹⁶ it states that the complex is “on the Thai-Cambodian border” and is “a Khmer archaeological site of three buildings located nearby each other,” namely Prasat Ta Muen, Prasat Ta Muen Tot (“340 metres from Prasat Ta Muen”), and Prasat Ta Muen Thom (“located about 800 metres to the south of Prasat Ta Muen Tot”).¹⁷ Prasat Ta Muen Thom “was assumed to have been built around the 12th century, which is older than Prasat Ta Muen and Prasat Ta Muen Tot,” and it “is also the largest prasat in the Prasat Ta Muen group,” consisting of “three prasats: the principal prasat that is the largest and, in the centre, whereas the other two prasats are to the back on the right and left.”¹⁸

The TAT further notes that, because “it is an area near the Thai-Cambodian border, tourists should make enquiries with the military unit in charge of the area first and bring an ID card/passport with them every time.”¹⁹ So, it is not surprising that, because both countries consider Prasat Ta Muen Thom to be in their territory,²⁰ the area remains to be demarcated (i.e., physical marking of the boundary on the ground) and in the past the Thai military has allowed Cambodians “to visit the temple for worship on the condition that they do not engage in any actions that could be interpreted as a territorial claim.”²¹

B. Trouble at the Temple

This brings us to the “incident” at Prasat Muen Thom that began the 2025 border trouble. It occurred on 13 February 2025, when, according to one account, “a group of Cambodians” were spotted there “singing a nationalistic song.”²² Or was it “a group of Cambodian women”?²³ Or rather was it “a group of Cambodian women accompanied by soldiers”?²⁴ Or perhaps it was the other way around, when “a group of Cambodian troops escorted around 25 civilians to visit the temple,” during which “the group sang the Cambodian national anthem and were stopped by Thai troops.”²⁵ Then again, it might have been “when a Cambodian army general led a group of 25 spouses and other family members of Cambodian troops to Prasat Ta Muen Thom.”²⁶ Whatever it was, the incident resulted in the temple being temporarily closed, though it reopened at the start of March 2025.²⁷

However, that was not the end of “the trouble.” Over the next several months, things along the 817 km-long²⁸ border got progressively worse. In March 2025, in the Emerald Triangle area (a “tripoint” where the borders of Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia all meet), a pavilion built by Thailand as a symbol of friendship with Laos and Cambodia was burnt down in what was thought to be arson.²⁹ Then, on 28 May 2025 in the Ubon Ratchathani/Preah Vihear province area, a Cambodian soldier was reportedly shot and killed by Thai troops.³⁰ Then, on 16 July 2025, a Thai soldier lost a leg from a landmine,³¹ which, unfortunately, was not the last of such injuries.³² The following week things truly escalated, with conflict in six Thai provinces that extended from Trat on the Gulf of Thailand to Ubon Ratchathani in the east.³³ For five days, both sides fired heavy artillery at one another, resulting in at least 38 dead and 300,000 displaced on both sides of the border.³⁴ A cease fire was agreed to on 28 July 2025, brought about by Malaysian facilitation and the presence of ambassadors from China and the United States.³⁵ However, both sides have accused the other of violations.³⁶

IV. THE MOUs

Both MOUs can be said to simply set forth what the two parties had agreed to in regard to a “process” for further negotiations and actions, with the hope that, eventually, an agreement could be reached on the substantive issues involved.³⁷ Indeed, the simpler 2001 two-page MoU 44 (concerning the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Thailand) “has been aptly described as merely ‘an agreement to agree’ ”!³⁸ As noted above in the Introduction, a detailed analysis of that MoU can be found in a 2024 Commentary.³⁹

By contrast, MoU 43 is five pages in length (see Appendix A).⁴⁰ While being considerably more detailed than MoU 44, it similarly sets forth a “process” by which negotiations about the Thai–Cambodian land boundary can proceed. Following a four-paragraph preamble setting forth mutual aspirations and past agreements, there are nine Articles. Article I provides that the “survey and demarcation of [the] land boundary” “shall be jointly conducted with” certain documents, namely the Franco-Siamese treaties of 1904 and 1907, and maps and related documents from the Delimitation Commissions set up under the terms of those two treaties. While Thailand may well believe that these two treaties were and are “unfair” (as they resulted in a “loss” of land to France),⁴¹ they still remain valid treaties and binding on both countries under international law.⁴²

Article II provides for the creation of a “Joint Boundary Commission” (JBC), and outlines its duties. Article III provides for the creation of a “Joint Technical Sub-Commission” (JTSC), appointed by the JBC, that will carry out the “on the ground” activities of surveying and demarcating. Article IV requires that the common land boundary be divided into sectors by the JTC, and that, upon completion “of the survey and demarcation of each sector,” an MoU “shall be signed by the Co-Chairman” of the JBC, with a map “showing the completed sector” attached to the MoU.

Article V provides that neither government may now “carry out any work resulting in changes of [the] environment of the frontier zone” unless it is done by the JTC “in the interest of the survey and demarcation.” Article VI provides that each government is responsible for its own expenses in conjunction with the survey and demarcation, but that the “costs of materials for the boundary pillars or markers and the production of maps” is to be shared equally. Article VII provides that both governments must facilitate the activities of the JTC—i.e., ease of access of going and coming across what might be deemed a border—and that goods in that movement not be considered as imports or exports.

Article VIII provides that any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the MoU “shall be settled peacefully by consultation and negotiation.” And Article IX provides that the MoU will come into force on the date of its signature “by the duly authorized representatives” of the two countries, which occurred on 14 October 2000.

In the view of this author, it would be difficult to find anything that is objectionable in MoU 43, though there are, perhaps, a few areas of ambiguity, discussed below.⁴³ Even when both of the Co-Chairmen of the JBC sign an MoU regarding a particular sector, there is nothing in the MoU to suggest that such agreement between the two Co-Chairs would have any sort of “binding effect” upon their respective governments. Rather, in all likelihood, there would need to be some sort of treaty formally adopting the agreed JBC MOUs and ratified by the parliaments of both countries.⁴⁴

V. THE REFERENDUM DEBATE

A. The Press Reports

After an oblique reference in parliament on 29 September 2025 about a referendum on the MOUs,⁴⁵ the following days saw an avalanche of increasing commentary about the matter. A selected chronological recitation of the titles and sub-titles of the articles will suggest the tenor of the times: “PM confirms government’s referendum plan to scrap MOUs 43 and 44 with Cambodia. Top People’s Party MP shocked”;⁴⁶ “NSC urged to study Cambodia MoUs: Deals enable talks on border disputes”;⁴⁷ “FM to be summoned over referendum bid: Revoking memorandums may hurt Cambodia talks.”⁴⁸

On the same page of the 6 October 2025 print edition in the Bangkok Post was the heading “Poll says 44% doesn’t get Cambodia MoUs,” with the percentage (actually 44.1%) referring just to people who “did not understand it [MoU 43] at all,” while 24.9% said “they understood it only slightly,” 23.1% said they “somewhat understood it,” but only 7.7% said they understood MoU 43 well.⁴⁹ The responses about MoU 44 (overlapping maritime zones) were similar.⁵⁰ The poll also asked about the respondents desire “to gain a clearer understanding of both MoUs” and of “holding a referendum on repealing both MoUs.”⁵¹ The entire article about the poll results is reproduced in Appendix B.⁵²

The next day, 7 October 2025, brought the story “MoU vote faces stiff opposition: Issue ‘too complex’ for a referendum: PP,”⁵³ and, just two days after the poll results had appeared, came this not unexpected headline: “PM’s Office to explain Cambodian MoUs.”⁵⁴ The article also noted that, on 7 October 2025, protestors had gathered at the bridge in front of Government House and demanded, among other things, that the government cancel the two MOUs and avoid a referendum, which they viewed as “offloading responsibility to citizens.”⁵⁵ Perhaps picking up on the sentiments of the protestors, the following day brought the news that “Gov’t ‘has legal grounds’ to end MoU with Cambodia.”⁵⁶ The argument, by Panthep Puapongpan of the Thailand Watch Foundation, was that there was no need for a referendum because Cambodia had seriously breached the terms of MoU 43 (e.g., by using military weapons and explosive devices on Thai soil), and that, under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, there were solid grounds for unilateral termination.⁵⁷

But, as is common in Thailand, things do take time to reach consensus. Thus, on 10 October 2025 we had the headline, “MoU referendum plans to face review.”⁵⁸ While the Foreign Affairs Minister, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, told parliament that the government planned to review procedures on holding a referendum and “to ensure the public is fully informed,”⁵⁹ the leader of the People’s Party, Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, “stressed the importance of educating the public before any vote, highlighting the need to balance transparency with protecting sensitive information from reaching Cambodia.”⁶⁰

Nonetheless, the government stood its ground, as on 14 October 2025 was the headline “Anutin reaffirms MoUs referendum,” with the prime minister stressing that his administration “will never allow Thailand to be put at a disadvantage.”⁶¹ There was no reported mention of what that “disadvantage” might be. However, when the prime minister was asked whether Thailand was able to unilaterally withdraw from the MOUs, he replied that “[w]e must weigh all possible benefits and disadvantages,” adding that “we have teams negotiating, studying and assessing the implications before any decision is made.”⁶²

The very next day saw the headline, “PM urged to axe Cambodian MoUs.”⁶³ This time, Panthip Puapongpan, the chairman of the Thailand Watch Foundation, now joined by Thai Pakdee Party leader Warong Dechgitvigrom, submitted an actual petition to the prime minister urging revocation of the two MOUs.⁶⁴ Mr. Panthip again asserted that Cambodia had materially breached MOU 43, citing its Articles 3, 5, and 8, and that under Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,⁶⁵ the breaches warranted immediate termination.⁶⁶ However, in this case “immediate termination” really meant “immediate formal written notification to Cambodia of Thailand’s intention to terminate MoU 43,” as Article 65 of the Vienna Convention requires that notice be given in order for a cancellation to come into effect at a later time.⁶⁷ According to the Bangkok Post news article, Mr. Panthip said the cancellation would take effect eight months later.⁶⁸ A similar article, posted the day before by Thai PBS World,⁶⁹ reported that Mr. Panthip’s foundation “also said that to protect such rights under the Vienna Convention, the Thai government must exercise such a right immediately, instead of hesitating through the holding of a referendum to seek a public consensus or the holding further talks with Cambodia.”⁷⁰ The petition also asserted that MoU 44 (maritime boundaries) was an interim or temporary document, “impractical” under Article 56 of the Vienna Convention, and was unconstitutional because the negotiators who signed it lacked authority.⁷¹

B. The Value of the MOUs

Consider some rhetorical questions. For example, if these MoUs are so “problematic,” why is it they have lasted for 25 and 24 years, respectively?⁷² Moreover, if these MOUs are eliminated (either by unilateral cancellation or by referendum), what is the alternative—i.e., what happens now?⁷³ And how, exactly, might Thailand somehow be “disadvantaged” by keeping these MOUs?⁷⁴ Any rational consideration of this situation needs cogent answers to these questions.

1. MoU 43 (Land Boundary Demarcation).

The new Anutin government did not come into existence until early September 2025,⁷⁵ and the first mention about a possible referendum to cancel the MOUs was not made until 29 September 2025, in parliament.⁷⁶ But in August 2025, before the change in government occurred, the Public Relations Department published a detailed statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that outlined the “practical benefits” of MoU 43.⁷⁷ The release, entitled “Thailand Stresses MOU43 as Key Framework for Border Demarcation,” noted that the MoU “provides a structured framework for border surveys, mine clearance, and joint mapping based on the historical Franco-Siamese treat[ies] of 1904 and 1907.⁷⁸ It is worth reprinting the rest of the statement verbatim:⁷⁹

MOU43 formalizes the use of original documents and maps produced by the Siam-France Boundary Commission and tasks the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) with overseeing the demarcation process. Supporting the JBC is the Joint Technical Sub-Committee (JTSC), which conducts on-site surveys, verifies the locations of boundary pillars, and prepares reports for review. The ultimate goal is to produce an official map that represents mutual agreement and is consistent with international legal standards.

A key condition under MOU43 prohibits both countries from altering the physical state of the border area in ways that could obstruct demarcation, such as digging trenches, stationing troops, or modifying the terrain. The MOU also requires cooperation in mine clearance to ensure safe access for survey teams. All disputes arising under the agreement must be resolved through bilateral negotiation, excluding involvement from third countries or international bodies.

Officials cautioned that terminating MOU43 would not release Thailand from its obligations under the 1904 and 1907 treaties. The 1:200,000-scale map associated with those treaties would still be relevant, and any attempt to bypass the current framework would ultimately return both sides to the same starting point under existing legal conditions.

The agreement also allows for the identification of violations based on environmental changes along the border, creating a practical standard for assessing compliance. Without MOU43, this mechanism would be lost, and accountability would be more difficult to enforce.

Following the most recent JBC meeting in June 2025, the JTSC has begun surveying 29 of the 74 unresolved boundary pillar sites. The progress underscores continued cooperation under the MOU framework and a functioning mechanism for advancing border demarcation through established bilateral channels.

2. MoU 44 (Overlapping Maritime Boundaries).

On 6 October 2025, the Bangkok Post published a superb “Explainer” about both MOUs and included an excellent, albeit brief, overview of the referendum debate.⁸⁰ However, here it describes MoU 44:

What is MOU 44?

MoU 44—the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia Concerning the Area of Their Overlapping Maritime Claims to the Continental Shelf—was signed on June 18, 2001, under the government of Thaksin Shinawatra. It addresses the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, covering about 26,000 square kilometres, where both countries have laid claim to the continental shelf since the 1970s.

Why it was Signed

Both nations declared their respective continental shelves in 1972–1973, but the boundaries overlapped significantly. The area was later found to contain abundant petroleum and natural gas reserves, making cooperation not only economically desirable but also politically sensitive.

Core Principles

MoU 44 established two main frameworks. First, both countries agreed to negotiate an arrangement for joint petroleum exploration and production within a designated Joint Development Area (JDA), with the aim of sharing economic benefits from natural resources. Second, the two sides committed to continuing talks to establish a permanent maritime boundary. The Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, jointly claimed by Thailand and Cambodia, spans approximately 26,000 square kilometres.

Most crucially, Article 5 of the MoU stipulates that until delimitation is completed, neither party’s signature affects its legal claim—meaning no sovereignty was surrendered by either side. In essence, MoU 44 created a framework for future negotiation, rather than a binding concession of territory or rights.

If these two MOUs are such “positive” and productive documents, why then should there be a referendum about them?

C. The “Politics” Involved

Simply put, “pre-election politics and rationality sometimes clash”!⁸¹ And that could well be the situation here. The Anutin government has agreed to call for a parliamentary election after it will have served in office for only four months, which will occur in January 2026.⁸² With so little time to prepare for new elections, it seems quite possible that the surprise call for a referendum on the two MOUs is simply a way to help the Bhumjaitai party’s chances in the upcoming poll.⁸³ Emeritus Professor Dr. Surachart Bamrungsuk, from the Faculty of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University, has written a detailed article explaining how this scenario would fit together.⁸⁴ While acknowledging that the government should, at times, “consult the public on foreign policy,” he noted that “a meaningful referendum requires citizens to have at least a basic understanding of the issue. Decisions should be made based on comprehension, not emotion or momentum.”⁸⁵ The remainder of his remarks are worth reproducing in full:

In the current climate of Thai-Cambodian tensions, nationalist sentiment can easily be inflamed. Discontent over Cambodia’s perceived provocations has fuelled public frustration—and whenever Thailand faces disputes with its neighbours, nationalism naturally resurfaces.

Nationalist fervour has also reinforced a growing sense of militarism, with the public showing sympathy for soldiers guarding the border. This sentiment has been amplified by political–military rifts revealed in a leaked audio clip of a conversation between two political leaders at the time.

With nationalism and militarism now surging together, it is almost certain that a referendum on these MoUs would see voters reject them overwhelmingly.

The Far-Right Tide

The rise of nationalism and militarism clearly benefits the far-right faction in Thai politics, which has long taken a hardline stance on Cambodia. Since the Phra Wihan Temple dispute erupted in 2008, this camp has consistently called for the revocation of the MoUs.

Prime Minister’s proposal for a referendum plays neatly into their hands. Given that anti-Cambodian sentiment is running high, the chances of the MoUs surviving are minimal. One can safely predict that the pro-MoU side would lose decisively.

The right-wing movement’s central message is simple: “oppose Cambodia.” In this atmosphere, anyone expressing a dissenting view risks being branded “unpatriotic.” Many will thus vote “no” simply out of a belief that rejecting the MoUs equates to “loving the nation.” As the referendum draws near, expect far-right campaigns to urge people to “tear up the MoU,” while labelling opponents as “traitors.”

The People’s Current

Critics of the referendum warn that voters lack sufficient understanding of the two MoUs, each of which will require a separate ballot—one for the 2000 land boundary MoU and another for the 2001 maritime boundary MoU.

The referendum will also coincide with votes on constitutional amendments and parliamentary elections, meaning voters may need to fill out six ballots in total—a recipe for confusion.

This complexity is further compounded by the lack of clear public understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of each MoU. Most voters are likely to cast their ballots under the influence of prevailing nationalist and militarist sentiment rather than informed analysis. 

One must also acknowledge the reality that public sentiment has been largely shaped by the “media current” driving society—a current that tends to flow in a distinctly nationalist direction.

Few academics specialise in this issue, and those who do often disagree. Meanwhile, public trust in official information from the Foreign Ministry or the Royal Thai Survey Department is low. Bureaucrats themselves tend to align with political winds, leaving Thailand with no credible “neutral party” on the matter.

Conclusion

All signs point to one outcome—the MoUs will be rejected. Yet this poses a critical question: if the MoUs are scrapped, how will future boundary negotiations proceed? Would the two sides draft new agreements, and who would dare take responsibility for signing them?

Ultimately, repealing the MoUs paves the way for Cambodia’s preferred outcome—taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice. In that sense, “tearing up” the MoUs would mark Cambodia’s victory, achieved with the enthusiastic help of Thailand’s far-right, and facilitated by a government-sanctioned referendum.⁸⁶

D. Are There Any Disadvantages to the MOUs?

Perhaps, as there are at least two arguable ambiguities in MoU 43. Its Article I specifically provides that the survey and demarcation of the land boundary are to be based on “Maps which are the results of demarcation works of the Commission of Delimitation” undertaken pursuant to the treaties of 1904 and 1907.⁸⁷ The use of the word “demarcation” (rather than “delimitation”) in the MoU phrase “Maps which are the results of demarcation works of the Commission of Delimitation” creates a linguistic ambiguity.

“Delimitation,” in a cartographic sense, means drawing a boundary line on a map based upon on field observations, whereas “demarcation” refers to the physical marking of the boundary on the ground.⁸⁸ Read literally, “Maps which are the results of demarcation works” seem restricted to maps that arose out of demarcation activities done by the Commission of Delimitation, rather than maps that arose merely out of the Commission’s delimitation activities. That would be a very odd restriction, and most likely was not at all intended, but the words are there nonetheless.

Moreover, there is no provision providing for the consideration of any other maps than those done pursuant to the two treaties, which appears to be the basis for Cambodia’s refusal “to recognize the map that the Thai side has drawn unilaterally and used as a reference.”⁸⁹ However, there is also nothing in MoU 43 that specifically prohibits the use of other maps. Inasmuch as Article I also says that the survey and demarcation of the land boundary are to be based on the treaties themselves—treaties that provide for the “watershed” to be the boundary in many places—Thailand could reasonably demand that later, more detailed and accurate maps most definitely should be considered. After all, if the watershed is the boundary, then each country certainly ought to be able to offer evidence of where that watershed actually is.

Then, too, it might be argued that the MOUs should be cancelled simply because nothing much has happened pursuant to them.⁹⁰ For example, when the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) met in Phnom Penh in mid-June 2025, it was their first meeting in 13 years!⁹¹ However, in the interim period, the Cambodia-Thailand Joint Technical Sub-Committee had been meeting, and the JBC now adopted the findings of the JTSC in which the location of 45 boundary pillars were agreed to.⁹² Moreover, since then “Thai and Cambodian teams have completed the placement of temporary boundary markers in Sa Kaeo province, confirming that the Joint Border Commission (JBC) remains effective in upholding bilateral agreements.”⁹³

VI. CONCLUSION

Whatever downsides either of these two MOUs might possibly have, they seem minimal at best. By contrast, the positive aspects have been explicitly described above. As pointed out at the outset, both MOUs simply establish a “process” by which negotiations can continue in an orderly fashion. Were they to be annulled, things would be back to “square one” and both countries would have to start everything all over again. It’s really hard to see any advantage in that.

Moreover, the idea of letting the public decide on whether these two laboriously negotiated MOUs should be revoked really does seem ludicrous. There is no conceivable way the public could ever become sufficiently—let alone impartially—educated about the situation that would enable them to make a sound and well-reasoned decision. Making complicated decisions such as this is precisely the responsibility of an elected government. To pawn the decision off to the public not only represents a dereliction of governmental duty, but, as suggested above, it may well be simply a naked political gambit designed to favor the party in power. Whether or not a referendum will actually achieve that desired end remains unknown, but certainly, in the process, “Thai democracy” will have suffered yet another unfortunate blow.

The always erudite contributor to the “Letters” section of the Bangkok Post, Khun Burin Kantabutra, summed up the issue most concisely in this three-paragraph submission:⁹⁴

Voting on what you don’t understand is meaningless and could easily mislead. Prime Minister Anutin wants a referendum on the two Cambodia-related MoUs, but are our voters capable of comprehending the multi-faceted issues at stake?

We must not only know what we are against but what we are for, lest we jump from the frying pan into the fire. If we say “no,” would we evict all Cambodians from Thailand? Impose 100% tariffs on Cambodian products?

Mr Anutin says not to worry: he’ll teach us all we need to know. We have 52.2 million voters. Any good teacher gives students ample opportunities to ask questions. Dump the referendum, and work through parliament, Mr Anutin. That’s what our MPs are for.

Suggested Bibliographic Citation:

Roth, William. “Thailand’s MOUs: Are They Appropriate for a Referendum?” (2025) 5(2) Thai Legal Studies 175–197. https://doi.org/10.54157/tls.284746