A Critique on Rational Choice Theory: Limitations on Explanations of Social Phenomenon
Keywords:
Rational Choice Theory, Positivism, Game Theory, Jon ElsterAbstract
Rational Choice Theory has been theoretically beneficial on explaining a social phenomenon, particularly in unveiling logic behind preferences of agency. In practically, Rational Choice Theory, nevertheless, has some critical limitations; those are, level of analysis narrowly focusing on methodological individualism, formalization of theory itself containing excessive conditions, problem on normative concern based solely on pre-given interests, lack of empirical data for testing theory, and abandonment on agency’s identity probably prevailing pre-given interests. These limitations have raised some questions on applying Rational Choice Theory to effectively explain a complex social phenomenon. Because of this, those theories influenced by Rational Choice Theory: such as, Robert Koehane’s Neoliberal Institutionalism; Deterrence Theory in Criminology, and Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom’s Public Choice Theory, would definitely embark on analogous limitations.
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