The Authoritarian Consolidation A Comparative Study of Thanom Kiitikachorn and Prayuth Chan-o-cha

Abstract

               This article examines authoritarian consolidation in Thailand through a cross-period comparison of the governments of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and General Prayuth Chan-o-cha. It asks how the two regimes stabilized their rule, in what ways their strategies converged or diverged, and how these mechanisms evolved under different structural constraints. The study integrates framework of authoritarian consolidation with “three pillars of authoritarian stability”—legitimation, repression, and co-optation—operationalized across three levels of analysis: macro, meso, and micro. Methodologically, it employs a qualitative Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and relies on documentary analysis.

               The findings demonstrate continuity in the regimes’ reliance on the three pillars, alongside substantial transformation in the form and logic of these mechanisms. Thanom’s rule exemplifies a traditional military authoritarianism grounded in Cold War security legitimacy and characterized by overt coercion, with co-optation primarily channeled through bureaucratic–military networks. In contrast, Prayuth’s rule represents institutionalized authoritarianism: it invests in rule-based legitimacy and embeds authoritarian control within formal institutions, normalizes repression through lawfare and information governance, and expands co-optation beyond the state apparatus toward state–capital coalitions and mass constituencies via welfare and targeted benefits.