Feasibility, Prospect, & Expectation of Non-Vote-Buying Cooperation Agreement

An Analysis under the Game Theory Perspective

Abstract

This academic article aims to analyze the tendency and feasibility of a non-vote-buying cooperation agreement by applying the cooperative and non-cooperative game theory in economics to explain. The result of the study found that there is very little chance that each political party will cooperate and comply with the non-vote-buying cooperation agreement. This is because the payoffs received from the non-vote-buying cooperation agreement are lesser than those received from the vote-buying. It shows that vote-buying is the dominant strategy of each political party because all parties receive the best payoffs under the decision-making based on utility maximization. However, to make a non-vote-buying cooperation agreement effective and enable (no more vote-buying), personal problems must be solved by infusing morals and conscience into the political parties, candidates, and voters. Moreover, the structural problems must be included, particularly an effective monitoring system.