VOTES OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Abstract

This article examines problems of provisions related to votes of Members of the House of Representatives and Senators to amend the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Buddhist Era 2560 (2017). Related provisions of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Buddhist Era 2560 (2017) were studied and compared to the provisions of the Constitutions of France, Germany, Austria and Japan in order to find solutions for Thailand.

The study finds that the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Buddhist Era 2560 (2017) provides that the deliberation and approval of a draft Constitutional Amendment shall be done by a joint sitting of the National Assembly. This provision causes three problems. Firstly, both the House of Representatives and the Senate lose their respective functions. Secondly, the constitutional amendment process lacks democratic legitimacy. And thirdly, the Constitution may be easier to amend than ordinary legislation. Moreover, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Buddhist Era 2560 (2017) also provides that a draft Constitutional Amendment must be approved by opposition Members of House of Representatives in the number of not less than 20 percent of the total number of existing opposition Members of House of Representatives. This provision causes two problems. Firstly, this provision is an inappropriate minority protection. And secondly, this provision has a gap which allows a draft Constitutional Amendment to be approved by the National Assembly although the number of opposition Members of House of Representatives who approve the draft Constitutional Amendment is less than 20 percent of the total number of existing opposition Members of House of Representatives.

In order to solve these problems, this article recommends that the examples of France, Germany, Austria and Japan should be applied, and these examples can develop into three recommendations. Firstly, provides that the deliberation and approval of a draft Constitutional Amendment shall be done by the House of Representatives and the Senate separately instead of being done by a joint sitting of the National Assembly. Secondly, provides that the Senate does not have a power to lapse a draft Constitutional Amendment; if the Senate disapproves the draft Constitutional Amendment, the consequence is only that the draft Constitutional Amendment is withheld. And thirdly, repeals the provision which provides that a draft Constitutional Amendment must be approved by opposition Members of House of Representatives in the number of not less than 20 percent of the total number of existing opposition Members of House of Representatives, and instead provides that a draft Constitutional Amendment must be approved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total existing members of each House.