The Time of Janus-Faced Russia: Two Faces of State Action in the Russo-Ukrainian War
Keywords:
Russo-Ukrainian War, Special Military Operation, Siloviki, PutinismAbstract
This research article aims to comprehend the causes and dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian war through an analysis of the relationships between internal and external factors based on the conceptual framework developed from the proposition of Peter Gourevitch's second image reversed and the two faces of state action by Michael Mastanduno et al. The article is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on domestic strategies for international goals, spanning from the pre-war period to the initial phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It encompasses the strategies of President Vladimir Putin's power consolidation and Putinism, along with the rise of the siloviki as the new political alliance of the ruling elite in the Kremlin. These domestic strategies aim to regain Russia's great power status to distribute power and wealth in the new international system under a multi-polar world. The second section addresses the international strategies for domestic goals during the war's expansion with a prospect of continuous escalation. The strategies involve external extraction and mobilization of legitimacy at the international level to achieve the internal objective of preserving the status quo of the Putin-Siloviki alliance and countering challenges posed by other political factions.
References
BBC. (2023). Nato's border with Russia doubles as Finland joins. BBC. Retrieved 4 April from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65173043
Beaumont, P. (2023). Iran becoming global drone producer on back of Ukraine war, says US. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/14/us-says-iran-becoming-a-drone-leader-as-russia-uses-its-craft-in-ukraine
Belton, C., & Miller, G. (2022). Cracks emerge in Russian elite as tycoons start to bemoan invasion. The Washington Post. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/29/russia-oligarchs-ukraine-invasion-dissent/
Castillo, E. E., & Keaten, J. (2022). Putin says Ukraine fight is taking longer than expected. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-europe-nuclear-weapons-donetsk-312b7e2b961e413148c3e52de7534913
Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University. (2023, 21 February 2023). Ambassador's Talk One Year in Ruins: The Russo-Ukrainian War and Prospects of Peace?,
Chernova, A. (2023). Russian oligarch criticizes "terrible" war in Ukraine. CNN. Retrieved 8 May from https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-08-23/h_9698fd44debdbc9dfb95ff93a8ad7ae5
Clark, M. (2020). Russian Hybrid Warfare. Institute for the Study of War.
Faiola, A., & Bennett, D. (2022). In the Ukraine war, a battle for the nation’s mineral and energy wealth. Washington post. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/10/ukraine-russia-energy-mineral-wealth/
Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Farrar Straus & Giroux.
Gioe, D. V., & Styles, W. (2022). Vladimir Putin’s Russian World Turned Upside Down. Armed Forces & Society, 1-14.
Gourevitch, P. (1978). The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. International Organization, 32(4), 881-912.
Green, J. A., Henderson, C., & Ruys, T. (2022). Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the jus ad bellum. Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 9(1), 4-30.
Illarionov, A. (2009a). Reading Russia: The Siloviki in Charge. Journal of Democracy, 20(2), 69-72.
Illarionov, A. (2009b). The Siloviki in charge. Journal of Democracy, 20(2), 69-72.
International Press Institute. (2023). Putin’s war against Ukraine is also a war on the media. International Press Institute,. Retrieved 22 February from https://ipi.media/putins-war-against-ukraine-is-also-a-war-on-the-press/
Ivanova, A., & Dik, S. (2023). Russia eyes stricter censorship. DW. Retrieved 30 March from https://www.dw.com/en/russia-eyes-stricter-censorship/a-64938859
Jamieson, K. H. (2019). How Russian Hackers and Trolls Exploited U.S. Media in 2016. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 163(2), 122-135.
Jenkins, B. M. (2023). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html
Kessler, B. R. (1997). Bush's New World Order: The Meaning Behind the Words ACSC].
Kusa, I. (2022). Russia-Ukraine War: Harbinger of a Global Shift A Perspective from Ukraine. Policy Perspectives, 19(1), 7-12.
Kuzio, T. (2022a). Why Russia Invaded Ukraine. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, 21, 40-51.
_______. (2022b). Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War. London: Routledge.
_______. (2020). Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing.
Lawrence, P. (2022). Russia’s War in Ukraine: State Patriotism or Economic Gain? Journal of Global Faultlines, 9(2), 198-211.
Masri, L. (2023). A Reuters review of more than 2,000 court cases shows how Russia uses facial recognition to identify and sweep up the Kremlin's opponents. Reuters. Retrieved 30 March from https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-detentions/
Mastanduno, M., Lake, D. A., & Ikenberry, G. J. (1989). Toward a Realist Theory of State Action. International Studies Quarterly, 33, 457-474.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2022). The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, 21, 12-27. https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-summer-2022-issue-no.21/the-causes-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-war
Muggah, R. (2022). Russia’s Resource Grab in Ukraine. Foreign Policy. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/28/ukraine-war-russia-resources-energy-oil-gas-commodities-agriculture/
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022a). NATO Secretary General statement on Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved 1 September from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_192401.htm
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022b). Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Russia's attack on Ukraine. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved 1 September from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192404.htm?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=smc&utm_id=220224%2Bukraine%2Bnac%2Bstatement
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2023). Ratification of Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved 30 March from https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession
Preeprang Thanomsakchai. (2022). The Internal Sources of International Politics: Russo-Ukrainian War as the Extension of Domestic Politics in Russia. Journal of East Asian and ASEAN Studies, 22(2), 1-50.
Randolph, K. (2023). Lavrov in Latin America: Russia’s Bid for a Multipolar World. Retrieved 30 April 2023 from https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/lavrov-latin-america-russias-bid-multipolar-world
Ray, S. (2022). Here Are The Three Russian Oligarchs Who Have Spoken Out Against The War In Ukraine. Forbes. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2022/07/01/here-are-the-three-russian-oligarchs-who-have-spoken-out-against-the-war-in-ukraine/?sh=5e57ac2157fd
Recchi, L. (2023). The War in Ukraine and its Consequences on the Lives of Russian Oligarchs. csactu. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.csactu.fr/the-war-in-ukraine-and-its-consequences-on-the-lives-of-russian-oligarchs/
Reuters. (2023). China's trade with Russia surges at double-digit pace in Jan-Feb. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.reuters.com/business/chinas-trade-with-russia-surges-double-digit-pace-jan-feb-2023-03-07/
Safranchuk, I. (2022). The Conflict in Ukraine: Regional and Global Contexts – A Perspective from Russia. Policy Perspectives, 19(1), 1-5.
Schmitt, M. N. (2022). Russia’s “Special military operation” and the (claimed) right of self-defense. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://lieber.westpoint.edu/russia-special-military-operation-claimed-right-self-defense/
Sestanovich, S. (2020). The Day After Putin: Russia’s Deep State Holds the Key to Succession. foreign affairs. Retrieved 30 March from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2020-03-04/day-after-putin
Soldatov, A., & Borogan, I. (2022). Vicious Blame Game Erupts Among Putin’s Security Forces: President Putin and his security institutions are no longer a united front. The Moscow Times. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/27/vicious-blame-game-erupts-among-putins-security-forces-a77508
Soldatov, A., & Borogan, I. (2023). Could the Siloviki Challenge Putin? What It Would Take for a Coup by Kremlin Insiders. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 30 April 2023 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-04-11/could-siloviki-challenge-putin
Soldatov, A., & Rochlitz, M. (2018). The Siloviki in Russian Politics
In D. Treisman (Ed.), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin's Russia (pp. 83-108). Brookings Institution Press.
Stanton, A. (2022). Russian Oligarch Admits War Is Hurting Russia in Rare Break With Putin. Newsweek. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from https://www.newsweek.com/russian-oligarch-admits-war-hurting-russia-break-putin-oleg-deripaska-1720014
TASS. (2023). West to step up attempts to interfere in Russia’s 2024 presidential election — Kremlin. TASS,. Retrieved 24 April from https://tass.com/politics/1608639
The Kremlin. (2018). Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. The Kremlin. Retrieved 30 March from http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56957
The Kremlin. (2021a). Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“. The Kremlin. Retrieved 30 March from http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
The Kremlin. (2021b). Vladimir Putin answered questions on the article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. The Kremlin. Retrieved 30 March from http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66191
The Kremlin. (2022a). Address by the President of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin. Retrieved 1 September from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843
The Kremlin. (2022b). Address by the President of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843
The Kremlin. (2023). Presidential Address to Federal Assembly. Retrieved 30 March 2023 from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565
U.S. Embasay Tbilisi. (2022). Russia’s media crackdown hides war in Ukraine. U.S. Embassy in Georgia. Retrieved 30 March from https://ge.usembassy.gov/russias-media-crackdown-hides-war-in-ukraine/
Vysotskaya, A. (2014). The Politico-Military Alliance of Russia and Belarus: Re-Examining the Role of NATO and the EU in Light of the Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma. Europe-Asia Studies, 66(4), 557-577.
Подволоцкий, А. (2023). Главные события за год спецоперации на Украине: хронология. Retrieved 30 March from https://ura.news/news/1052628790
Ривера, Д. В., & Ривера, Ш. В. (2021). Силовики и демократия по-прежнему несовместимы? Анализ данных Исследования российских элит 2016 года Мониторинг общественного мнения: экономические и социальные перемены(5), 163-176.
Downloads
Published
Versions
- 2023-07-05 (2)
- 2023-06-30 (1)
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 Journal of East Asian and ASEAN Studies
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
บทความที่ตีพิมพ์ได้ผ่านการพิจารณาจากผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิ ทัศนะและข้อคิดเห็นจาก บทความในวารสารเป็นของผู้เขียน ไม่ถือเป็นความรับผิดชอบของคณะผู้จัดทำและศูนย์การเมือง สังคม และอาณาบริเวณศึกษา การนำบทความในวารสารไปตีพิมพ์ซ้ำต้องได้รับอนุญาตจาก กองบรรณาธิการ
