中国国有和非国有上市公司高管持股对投资及投资现金流敏感度的影响比较研究
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摘要
代理理论认为，高管持股作为公司治理的一种激励方式，由公司管理层持有股权，旨在将股东利益与管理者利益更有效的结合，以减少代理冲突。本研究以中国上市公司为基础，将样本数据分为国有上市和非国有上市公司，针对高管持股对其投资及投资现金流敏感度的影响进行比较研究。研究发现，虽然从中国上市公司总体样本来看，引入高管持股变量对于投资有显著正向影响，对于降低投资现金流敏感度有显著影响。但将国有上市公司及非国有上市公司分开进行比较发现，在引入高管持股变量后，高管股权持股对于国有上市公司投资却不存在显著影响，而对于非国有上市公司投资正向影响显著。同时，高管持股在降低投资现金敏感流敏感度方面对国有上市公司不存在显著影响，而对于非国有上市公司的影响显著。本结果的现实意义旨在中国深化国有上市公司高管激励改革的时代背景下，能为政策制定者提供一定参考。
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Chinese Journal of Social Science and Management Editorial Division
The Office of Research and Development, Panyapiwat Institute of Management
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Tel. 02 855 01048 E-mail: cjssm@pim.ac.th
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