Aircraft Accidents in Commercial Aviation Part 2 The Cause and Root of the Problem
Keywords:
aircraft accident, human factor, human error, accident preventionAbstract
Most reported accidents in commercial aviation have concluded that they were caused by human error. However, after analyzing the root causes of the problem, it was found that human error was similar to the tip of the iceberg which was quite overt while there were many other causes that were relatively unnoticeable. This article presents the cause of the accident and the root cause of the problem. Accident causation models are consisted of Domino Model, Loss Causation Model, Swiss Cheese Model, Epidemiological Model, STAMP Model, FRAM Model and SHELL Model. The results of the analysis revealed that the root cause of the problem lies in the dynamic relationship of change, human and system factors.
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