The Buddha’s Attitudes on Metaphysical Questions in Theravada Buddhist Philosophy

Abstract

        The purpose of this study piece is to look into the Buddha's perspectives on metaphysical issues in Theravada Buddhist philosophy. The research examines the avyākatapañhā, or questions the Buddha declined to answer, as a metaphysical category in Buddhist philosophy. We argue whether it is correct to say that the Buddha left all metaphysical concerns unanswered.
        The findings indicate that metaphysical questions in Buddhism can be classified into two categories. The first comprises questions the Buddha declined to answer (avyākatapañhā), which usually entail extreme ideas (antagāhikadiṭṭhi) that do not lead to the cessation of suffering and are not conducive to the practice of the holy life. According to erotetic logic, these inquiries are not suggestive statements that can be immediately confirmed or denied. The Buddha's silence rejects the logical framework of such issues, commonly described as catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma).
        The second group includes metaphysical questions that the Buddha did answer. These reflect insights about the interaction between humans and the external world, as well as metaphysical questions concerning human nature such as the non-self, the nature of the five aggregates, the law of karma, and the definition of the term 'world'. What distinguishes these inquiries is that they are not designed to generate a binary yes-or-no response; rather, they attempt to comprehend what the Buddha taught on those topics and how those teachings contribute to liberation. As a result, the Buddha's stance on metaphysical problems should not be read as a wholesale denial, but rather as a selective engagement guided by whether the answers serve the path to liberation. The unwillingness to answer certain questions implies a rejection of defective structures and assumptions included in the questions themselves, especially when they do not further fulfill the goal of enlightenment.