An Argument Against William David Ross's Explanation of the Use of Intuition in Moral Decision Making

Abstract

        This article aims to examine W. D. Ross's epistemological framework for ethical intuitionism as presented in his work The Right and The Good, focusing on the role of intuition in moral judgment. Employing an analytical approach to Ross's arguments supporting the establishment of ethical norms through intuition, the study reveals two key findings. First, Ross's foundational epistemological view, which posits that moral duties should primarily consider the past and present rather than extending to the future, presents a potential flaw. This oversight may lead to incomplete moral reasoning, neglecting the long-term impacts of actions and duties on others and future generations. Furthermore, Ross's own pluralistic theory of moral duties inherently involves future considerations, creating an internal inconsistency given his rejection of future-oriented outcomes. Second, the study finds that Ross's assertion of intuition as an inherently correct internal insight for moral decision-making also exhibits argumentative weaknesses. Ross's concept of self-evident intuition does not yield the same clarity or axiomatic truth as mathematical facts or logical inferences due to its inherent ambiguity and inability to establish definitive moral principles. Consequently, these flawed supporting arguments undermine the validity of his conclusions and diminish the overall credibility of his reasoning.