Incentive Design for Mitigating Corruption: A Theoretical Model
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Abstract
One of the main causes of corruption in government agencies is due to the issue of moral hazard, resulting from asymmetric information, as information are not equally observed after the contract for the work assignment has been applied. In fact, the commanding officers lack sufficient information to monitor the performance of lower-level government officials, creating opportunities for them to seek personal gain through corrupt practices. To design policy mechanisms aimed at addressing corruption, this study employed the framework of the Principal-Agent Model and analysed incentive measures that could reduce corrupt behaviour among lower-level government officials. The results of the modelling analysis in this study found that there are no guarantees for government officials that they will receive a fair compensation if they perform their duties honestly and with integrity. Therefore, one solution to this problem is to provide limited liability as an incentive to encourage government officials to be honest. This can be done by using a corruption index as a criterion for considering promotions in the government sector.
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สงวนลิขสิทธิ์ © 2553 คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยศรีนครินทรวิโรฒ
คณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยศรีนครินทรวิโรฒ จัดพิมพ์วารสารเศรษฐศาสตร์และนโยบายสาธารณะ เพื่อเผยแพร่บทความวิชาการทางเศรษฐศาสตร์ นโยบายสารธารณะ และสาขาอื่นๆที่เกี่ยวข้อง ทัศนะและข้อคิดเห็นใดๆที่ปรากฏในวารสารเป็นความคิดเห็นส่วนตัวของผู้เขียน โดยบทความที่ได้รับการตอบรับจะถือเป็นลิขสิทธิ์ของคณะเศรษฐศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยศรีนครินทรวิโรฒ
บรรณาธิการ ผู้ช่วยศาสตราจารย์ ดร.ณัฐญา ประไพพานิช
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